|
Chapter 3 Benedict Anderson argued that the nation is an ‘imagined community’, that it is not a given reality and involves imagination.[1] Winachukil accepts Anderson's model as useful, but modifies it to argue that it is ‘a discursive construct’.[2] In particular he looks at how the shift from the pre-modern cosmology discourse to a modern discourse involves the creation of a domain with definitive boundaries mapping the geo-body of the State. The transition between these two discourses, so Tambiah has argued in the case of Thailand, is about the transition from a pulsating mandala galactic polity, working to cosmological boundaries, to the ‘radial state’, working to geographical boundaries.[3] Though there are similarities between the Burmese and the Thai situation, there are also some significant differences. In Thailand the king retained its place at the cosmological centre even in the new discourse, but in Burma the last king disappeared from the centre when the British carried King Thibaw away from his Mandalay palace in 1886 and placed him in exile in India. Furthermore, the British controlled the State and placed British royalty at its centre, permitting no indigenous rule for sixty-two years. We would expect, therefore, the concept of national unity to have different meanings from the Thai context.[4] As I have already pointed out in relation to Aung San's politics, national unity, along with national independence, was the chief pre-occupation of Burma's earliest generation of politicians.[5] However, it has also been the chief pre-occupation of the current generation of democracy leaders. In fact, this emphasis on unity characterises the ideology of Burmese politicians in general. Thus, Aung San Suu Kyi herself in her very first political 28-paragraph short speech used this very concept of unity (nyi-nyut) nineteen times, and in the Burmese version of Freedom from fear it is additionally used in titles of speeches on at least two occasions.[6] As Callahan perceptively says, ‘common to both the SLORC and the NLD is an overarching emphasis on unity and solidarity’. [7] She views this emphasis as ‘simply inimical to the development of institutional mechanisms that can accommodate the needs and demands of the broad range of social forces that exist throughout the country’.[8] I am not sure that this concept itself is responsible for this, for as I will show, it is rooted in various ideas with their own ramifications. What is certain, is that constant stress on national unity is undoubtedly a reflection of the awareness that divisions, and in particular ethnic divisions, exist. It is necessary to investigate this concept further. Today, national unity continues to be the most important political concept in the vocabulary of the regime. For example, it set up a web-site called ‘Unity is No.1’ that says ‘protect your country with Information Technology’, which focuses on attacking the NLD in particular.[9] The web-site contains links to pages that indicate how support for the regime comes from the country's borders, and from repentant (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 059/392 political activists abroad. National unity is an assumption at the core of the regime's political vocabulary, including ‘national consolidation’,[10] ‘national reconsolidation’, and ‘national solidarity’. Underlying all these concepts is nyi-nyut-yeì, a concept that has its central meaning in Buddhism, and more particularly in the life as lived in the monastic order with the meaning that the majority decision should be respected. This was already commonly used in the Sagaing period, found in the Kaunghmudaw Pagoda inscriptions as well as in Maha Thilawuntha's writings. This very same concept is also the overriding theme in some of the earliest Buddhist chronicles such as Sasanavamsa in reference to the comportment of the Sangha.[11] Ethnic diversity within the country is of a particular kind. We find the concept of national unity much used in other countries where majority cultural and linguistic groups are differentiated territorially, as in the case of Eastern Europe and Canada. National unity is less stressed in, for example, the United States, a country with an ethnically mixed population most of whom trace their ‘roots’ ultimately to beyond the country's borders. Furthermore, in most democratic countries national unity is seen as layered, and discussion focuses on ways of representing the spectrum of diverse interest groups in government through various political parties and NGOs, while keeping a high standard of human rights and stability. There are two features of Burmese concepts of national unity. First, in Burma the story of national unity is not primarily addressed at the level of institutions but at the level of the person. Second, it is primarily addressed not at the level of secular ideology, but at the level of Buddhist practice. This Buddhist practice conceives of the realms of the body and the nation as homologous, and both as subject to the same laws of samsara. National unity is closely bound up with strong personalities able to strike a high moral cord, and in particular it is represented by Aung San himself. Aung San was widely regarded as having accomplished and indeed himself representing, national unity. However, the meanings people attached to his role in forging unity and indeed, the meanings he himself attached to unity, cannot be understood without comprehending the Buddhist concepts surrounding mental culture. His sense was more a cosmological, even ideological, sense of unity operating on the vertical imaginary Buddhist cosmological plane, in particular where the higher mundane (loki) realms transit into the transcendent (lokuttara) beyond. Since 1988, however, with the opposition's strong claim to Aung San, Myanmafication turned into a hasty search to attribute content to what had hitherto remained largely undefined. Though many elements in this discourse may appear similar to Aung San's and that of his mentor Thahkin Kodawhmaing, it in fact represents a major shift in the interpretation of unity. First, the Myanmafication programme provides an impersonal replacement of Aung San as symbol of unity – it represents a shift from unity conceived in terms of personalised influence (awza) to that of impersonal authority (ana) as expressed in the shift towards military intelligence and through the array of Government Organised Non-Government Organisations (GONGOs, see below). Second, it represents the aim to territorially realise actual unity between diverse ethnic groups on a geographical horizontal plane through improvement of transport and initiatives in development. Third, it has raised the profile of certain material ingredients in the concept of national unity, including such ideas as common racial origins, common culture and common language. I here trace these concepts as used by Aung San and his mentor, Thahkin Kodawhmaing, and later by the SLORC and the SPDC, and I finally explore how national unity is being developed in relation to ASEAN (see table 6). Early concepts of unity National unity – Aung San's samadhi and monastic unityEmphasis on unity is commonly found in other Theravada Buddhist countries.[12] Indeed, Burmese politicians view Buddhism as providing a form of unity no other religion can match, a religion that even permits crossing boundaries. As Aung San states in a speech to the Siamese delegation, Burma and Thailand are bound together by their ‘spiritual affinity’ based on Buddhism, and he expressed admiration for how Thailand introduced far-reaching legislation ‘to enlist Buddhism in the cause of national unity’.[13] Indeed, in (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 060/392 Burma at least, as I shall demonstrate here, national unity is not only an emphasis arising from Buddhism, but is observed as the product of certain Buddhist practices, the inducement of certain states of mind, that are comprised by what I call mental culture. Table 6. Core political terms and their relation to mental culture
Aung San's role in the liberation of Burma is reiterated in a leaflet distributed on the 35-year commemoration of Martyrs' Day by the regime in 1982. Here he is presented as the Fourth Unifier of Burma [biul\K¥op\eAac\Sn\:Aa: stut†òmn\maNiuc\cMkiu sv\:ruM:tv\eTac\qU], after the kings Anawratha, Bayinaung and Alaungmintaya. This particular reference has been attributed originally to a historian named ‘Lewiss’.[16] U Nu, however, expressed a similar view shortly after Aung San's death, in which he designated Aung San as the fifth (rather than the fourth) unifier of Burma, adding Sinbyushin as the fourth:
Elsewhere U Nu, in his radio speech at the time of the interment of Aung San's remains and those of the other martyrs, referred to this period as ‘the fourth great pillar (mandaing) of national harmony’ (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 061/392 [vIvæt\er:m‹ioc\] to be established without arms and through metta.[18] U Nu also summed up the source of this national unity as the quality of one-pointed mind [qmaDi samadhi] that characterised Aung San. Thus he said in relation to the issue of national unity [vIVæt\er:] that ‘it is only because of General Aung San's goodwill (cetana) based on the ingenuity of his steady samadhi that success was attained in overcoming the difficulties of unifying the country’.[19] Moreover, his path was followed ‘with truthful samadhi’ [qsßaqmaDitv\ûkv\sæa] by the other fallen leaders.[20] U Thein said about Aung San, ‘He impressed me deeply as a man possessed of great powers of concentration.[21] The quality of samadhi is the product of mental culture (bhavana). It is also a vital attribute of the original mythical unifier in this world, namely the first elected king (Mahasamata) at the beginning of the world who was replete in ‘moral virtue’ (sila), ‘one-pointedness of mind’ (samadhi) and ‘wisdom’ (pañña) (See App. I.2). Though Aung San, as befits a man of high standards, once wrote an essay in which he denigrated the popular perception of him as advanced in samadhi,[22] such only confirms the popular perception that the struggle for national independence and national unity are produced internally in the mind through mental culture, and, contra the Myanmafication project, was not historically seen in itself as the product of culture, civilization or race. If Aung San did not extol his own samadhi, how then, did he himself express the unity the people feel he represents? The concept he himself used for ‘national unity’ is amyò-thà nyi-nyut yeì [Am¥oi:qa:vIVæt\er:], which was also the title of his speech ‘National Unity’ on 17 January 1946. In this speech he urged for national unity and working towards non-factional politics. He made three main points. First, to educate the people on party politics, which was new to the Burmese people, he said that ‘just as we built the Shwedagon Pagoda brick by brick, so the peoples of Burma must jointly work towards their aims’.[23] This would suggest that unity is not just produced by personally transforming one's mind, but also by jointly working towards commemorating Buddha's enlightenment, i.e. charity towards commemorating the Buddha's successful overcoming of his mental defilements through mental culture.[24] Second, he argued that a united party produces national unity. The AFPFL party at the time represented the unification of diverse forces seeking national independence nation-wide. Aung San was deeply concerned about the threat factionalism posed to this unity. He took the example of the ‘false monks’ [AlzêIrhn\:][25] posing a threat to the unity of the Sangha, ‘if even in the Buddha's time there were false monks, so also in our AFPFL there will also be false monks that I do not know about’.[26] He then gave the example of a rich man who discovers that a particular monk is a shameless monk, and decides not to associate with him. Aung San's advice was for Party members to, in analogy with the conduct of the Sangha towards shameless monks, simply not to associate with those who cannot maintain the high standards of conduct the AFPFL strives towards. Third, he argued that party aims, in turn, take care of the human state as a foundation and serve to prepare for future enlightenment. He says ‘in religious terms, only after having become a human being can one become a Buddha, as a human being has the power to create and strive for what he has envisioned’ [Baqatra:Ar eòparmy\Siuyc\lUkmHBura:òPs\Niuc\ty\x dIeta.ka lUmHa Pn\tI:Niuc\tµ. Asæm\:qt†irHity\].[27] It is interesting that this idea of unity-through-enlightenment, through the transcendence of divisions, which has such an important role in Burmese myths of political transformation (see App. I.6), was later also used by his daughter Aung San Suu Kyi. Mistakes were attributed to her by the regime in a major press campaign (see chapter 16). (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 062/392 Aung San's views of national unity expressed the politics of unification in the human world as an activity that prepares for the attainment of nibbana and commemorates the Buddha's enlightenment. As we have already seen, the concept of national independence, of personal freedom, and the socialist goal are themselves expressed in terms of nibbana. Indeed, U Nu's view of Aung San's superior samadhi merely serves to confirm that national unification is about the politician's mind in preparation for the quest for nibbana. National unity – byama-so tayàI will return later to Aung San's concept of politics, but here I am only concerned with discriminating broadly between different ideas about national unity before and after the Myanmafication initiative started. I have already noted how closely Aung San's idea of unity partook of Buddhist ideas. However, this preoccupation with Buddhist meanings he inherited from the early struggle for freedom by Buddhist institutions. Aung San's concept of national unity is not complete without understanding that of Thahkin Kodawhmaing's, his mentor. Burmese political forces had been mostly unanimous since the inception of the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) in 1906. In 1920, after various Buddhist groups united together, the YMBA changed its name to what became the first organization representing national independence and national unity,[28] namely the Greater Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA). This was popularly expressed at that time in terms of the concept of harmony-unity or nyi nyut yeì [vIvæt\er:]. However, in 1921 the Dyarchy question was introduced that created serious divisions among the Burmese. These divisions motivated Thahkin Kodawhmaing to write an essay in 1928 on the ‘Chronicle of National Harmony-Unity (1)’ [vIvæt\er:razwc\ (1)].[29] The first split occurred between the GCBA and the U Pu faction, headed by U Ba Pe, which contained 21 council members and was known as the 21 Party and which opposed Dyarchy. Devoted to Home Rule, Thahkin Kodawhmaing was upset that this split among Burmese political leaders would have an impact on Burma's future. He stressed the morale of keeping unity through harmony [vIvæt\er:] by recounting an ancient tale.
Loss of the most valuable part of the fish to the Indians (the clever fox) took place as the result of disunity among the Burmese, who had been reduced to deceiving one another (samasika vinsana dhamma [qamaqikw¨êntra:]). People were also engaged in measuring superficial mundane differences such as comparing status quo, wealth and so forth, so that if one party could not get what it wanted it was even prepared to let go of the common good. Thahkin Kodawhmaing wanted the politicians to improve their mentality and show unity by joining together and putting a united demand before the Simon Commission. His expectation was not met and factionalism remained rife, but his work gives us an insight into the idiom an influential Burmese writer at that time used to admonish behaviour so that Burmese political leaders would attain national unity. It is crucial that one particular aspect of Thahkin Kodawhmaing's thought about national unity be understood. Without this, it is impossible to understand the current disposition of the NLD. Thahkin Kodawhmaing attributed discord and factionalism among Burmese leaders to the loss of unity. However, unity was, in turn, attributed to the lack of byama-so tayà in the modern period. He asked ‘in what way is samasika vinasana dhamma the greatest danger to unity [vIvæt\er:ýkI:]?’, which he answered by saying that it was because ‘in this era people are without byama-so tayà towards one another …’ [yKueKt\AKåqmymHamUka:t¨I: NHc\.t¨I:ATU:pc\ òbhîsiur\tra: kc\:l¥k\].[30] In his Commentary on dogs [eKæ:!Ika], Thahkin Kodawhmaing repeated his attack on divisive
behaviour, this time comparing it to dog-like behaviour. He also commented from
his own point of view as hermit-unifier of Burma, and as being in possession of byama-so
tayà (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 063/392
Since byama-so tayà practice results in the same one-pointed quality of mind (samadhi) through which Aung San was popularly perceived to have unified the country, this concept shares in and supports the overall view that the unity as represented by Aung San and Thahkin Kodawhmaing is a mental unity as represented by samadhi. I will come back to this later, as it is a core element in the contemporary democracy movement and in the foregoing socialist period that is ultimately based on building a country based on the Thirty-Eight Mangala (see below).[32] In 1932, Thahkin Kodawhmaing wrote ‘Chronicle of harmony (2)’ [vIvæt\er:razwc\ (2)].[33] This article dealt with the issue of dyarchy. The problem of either falling in line with India's demands for national independence or to separate from India, was created by the British for the Burmese politicians to argue and fight over. This argument was sapping the strength of the Burmese nationalists. The British succeeded in destroying Burmese unity as the dispute caused divisions between family members throughout the country seemingly without anyone realising who was the real culprit. Two delegations, one from Burma and one from India, came back from negotiating in England to their respective countries. However, their reception was radically different in their respective countries. The Indians worked in unity for their country's interest, while the Burmese politicians were disputing and fighting against one another for their self-serving interests. Thahkin Kodawhmaing felt that this pleased and worked to the benefit of the British colonial government. Thahkin Kodawhmaing praised Mahatma Gandhi, the father of Indian politicians, when he took prison terms instead of compromising the interest of the country and when he fought by fasting from inside the prison wall with disregard for the imminent risk to his own life. In contrast, many Burmese politicians collaborated with the British and took their 5000 Kyat salary, using their status to oppress their opponents. Thahkin Kodawhmaing pointed out that even the Buddha, who had predicted that the Sangha would last for 5000 years, would have been unable to change the attitude of such selfish politicians. Thahkin Kodawhmaing gave the example of the Buddha's teaching known as kosambadaka khandhaka, after Kosambi, the location where the Buddha himself could not pacify disputing monks which caused disharmony and a weakening of the Sangha. The Buddha left them because they no longer took his words seriously. The Buddha then went to Pulalei grove to meet three monks, Shin Anuroda, Shin Nandiya and Shin Kimila, who were meditating there. The Buddha inquired with what mental disposition they were living (as opposed to the disputing monks). The monks replied to the Buddha that, though they each have separate bodies, they were living in one mind. Thahkin Kodawhmaing proposed that there are two kinds of monks. One group quarrels among one another and encourages divisions while another group lives in accordance with the Buddha's teachings and, through mental culture, creates a peaceful, harmonious, productive and desirable atmosphere that forms the foundation of national unity. In this same way, he contrasted how Indian leaders behaved harmoniously after returning from England compared to Burma's politicians who were fighting one another for personal gain. He gave these two examples and expressed the desire to see reunification of national politicians and called for their utmost devotion to the country's interests. Thahkin Kodawhmaing followed this up with examples from Burmese history, to remind egotistic politicians how disharmony ruined dynasties (including Tagaung through Pagan, Pinya, Myinsaing, Sagaing, Ava, Nyaungyang etc.). Buddhism and unity as harmonyBurmese ideas of national unity are based on the Buddhist concept of harmony as a product of mental culture. In the evocative words of Hpo Hlaing, the early advocate of ‘traditional democracy’ under King Mindon and King Thibaw:
(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 064/392
One criticism Winichakul expressed about Anderson's work is also relevant here. Anderson had sketched national identity largely as a positively rather than a negatively phrased attribute. In other words, it was phrased in terms of the possession, rather than the absence of, a particular quality or substance. Winichakul, on the other hand, argues that, in the Thai case at least, this is not so. He argues that ‘to figure out a sphere of commonness is to identify the difference between that sphere and the one beyond’. If Anderson's description implied that ‘an imagined entity always implies the absence of such an identity at the point beyond its boundary’, in the Thai case, the pre-modern or Buddhist concept of State functioned on a very different basis. It is true that the nation implies a presence of something, namely a diverse landscape of sacred entities such as pagodas, monasteries, the Buddha's footprints and palaces. However, this presence itself postulates an absence. It postulates a vertical cosmology of the three mundane spheres (loka) pointing ultimately towards nibbana as representing the beyond in which there is absence of ignorance and suffering. Rather than pointing at local presence, the ultimate idea of unity of the nation therefore points at a local absence. Though Winichakul does not take it this far, I am inclined to think, given the foregoing discussion of the views of Aung San and Thahkin Kodawhmaing, that the pre-modern concept of the Burmese nation centred upon attaining to the heights of loka on the path to lokuttara or nibbana, in which the noblest attributes are the suspension, and eventual elimination of those mental defilements held responsible for precipitating differences that pose a threat to harmony and unity. In other words, they are about the State in which there is absence of inferior mental process. From his mentor, Aung San inherited national unity as a sacred space created by mental culture in which harmony prevails and, as a result of this, national unity. He generated a sphere of influence (awza) upon which it was possible to build a sphere of authority (ana). It is harmony within the Sangha produced through correct moral and mental behaviour that is the chief analogy for the nationalists' own concept of national unity. As mentioned earlier, to Aung San the merit attained by collectively building the Shwedagon, the collective part of the quest towards nibbana as human beings aspiring for perfection in Buddhahood, and the frequent collective harmonious assembly of monks while keeping their moral code of conduct high, are the primary analogies presented for the meaning of ‘unity’ [vIvæt\er:]. Thahkin Kodawhmaing's byama-so tayà concept and the good conduct of the meditating monks who were ‘of one mind’ are thus most vital to the understanding of all subsequent politicians, ranging right from Aung San, U Nu, Ne Win and now the senior NLD members. Indeed, socialism and democracy have themselves been understood primarily as political systems built upon this sense of national unity as harmony, as a by-product of Buddhist mental culture, and in particular through byama-so tayà. It is important to stress that early dictionaries understand the nyi-nyut-yeì concept in Buddhist ways. For example, Judson gives it as an idiomatic expression particularly used by monks to mean ‘if circumstances allow’ [Aeûkac\:vIvæt\lYc\], used when laity ask a monk to do something for them, where the Vinaya does not permit making a definite promise to do so. To break the Vinaya rules would be to break the harmony and unity of the Sangha. Furthermore, Hok Sein gives the primary meaning of the verb nyi-nyut í [VIVæt\f] as meaning ‘to harmonise’. A monk once expressed to me the Buddhist institutional manifestation of ‘harmony/unity’ [vIVæt\er:] in terms of ‘association’ [qmg© samagga]. This samagga concept is the main ingredient in the names of many associations (including the United Nations) and is the default concept for union [qmg©Aqc\:]. In Buddhism it means ‘being in unity’, ‘harmonious’, and it is an indispensable element in a number of expressions that suggest involvement of consent and agreement (samaggatta) of the parties involved: for example, ‘to dwell in concord’ (samaggavasa), and ‘to harmonise, conciliate’ (samaggi-karoti). It also implies peace, as in ‘making for peace’ (samaggakarana), ‘rejoicing in peace’ (sammagganandin), ‘delighting in peace’ (samaggarata), and ‘impassioned for peace’ (samaggarama).[35] In Burmese, to be ‘on friendly terms’ is sometimes expressed as ‘to be samagga’ [qmg©òPs\qv\]. The idea that national unity might be associated with monks who attained harmony by emphasising certain Buddhist mental states, and might be modelled on those attained in the Sangha, presents the Sangayana held by King Mindon and Prime Minister U Nu, and later Ne Win's efforts to unify the Sangha, (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 065/392 in a very different light. In bringing consensus to the Sangha with reference to Buddhist practice and learning, and in placing vipassana at the heart of government, were they not attempting to make true national unity in and of itself? Marking the moments at the beginning and at the end of colonialism, their convention of the Sangha through the Sangayanas represent an attempt to heal and unify the country. This association between the need for harmony in the struggle for national independence idea is still operative, for in first year primary school books children are taught to read, saying ‘treasure your lut-lak-yeì (freedom/national independence), apply yourself to nyi-nyut-yeì (harmony/unity)’ [læt\lp\er:kiu Tin\:qim\:påX vIvæt\er:kiuþki:pm\:påX]. Late concepts of unityU Nu took this pre-modern discourse of unity to its climax when he declared Buddhism as the national religion in 1962. This represented consummation of national unity as a natural step from the Sangha unity he aimed for when he organised the Sangayana in the 1950s. However, as we now well-know, this turned out to be more divisive than U Nu himself anticipated. The 1962 coup initially seemed to mark a revision of the concept of unity. Buddhism was no longer to play the central role in concepts of nationhood. In the recently revised history of the army, Ne Win's 1962 coup was justified because U Nu's measures had resulted in ‘the destruction of nyi-nyut’ [sv\:luM:vIvæt\m§p¥k\òpa:òKc\:].[36] In other words, the military alleged that from a pragmatic point of view the ideological underpinning of national unity had come into conflict with reality, and that U Nu had acted against national interests. From this point of view, only the army could save the day. However, later developments showed that this is not the case. Initially the credo was to emphasize that the State would look after the stomach and basic needs, and it looked as if a different concept for unity would arise. Nevertheless, after 1971, with the launch of the Burma Socialist Programme Party as a mass organization, Buddhist ideology was reintroduced as central to Burmese socialist ideology. In particular, the ideal of byama-so tayà was reintroduced as the bedrock of socialist ideology at the front of every BSPP document (see chapter 19). This
regime's response to the perceived 1988 threat may be divided into several
phases in which Buddhism has played an equally important role. After 1988, the military substituted this open vertical cosmological discourse
based on mobility of monks in mentla culture for an emphasis on a somewhat unimaginative horizontal geographical
concept. This concept of loka differed from the preceding socialist
period. Instead of presenting the unity of the country in terms of Buddhist
practice or the unity of the Sangha, unity of the country came to be represented
as co-equivalent to the unity of the army, for they say that ‘the fate of the
nation lies in the hands of the Tatmadaw’.[37] The first phase was dedicated to sloganeering unity. The second phase was represented by delving for new ‘scholarly’ concepts of national unity. The third phase involved a wholesale restructuring of State institutions and its bridges with society. Suffice to say, the ultimate unity the army has in mind is the unity of the army, and re-uniting the blood-relationships among the ethnic groups who had supposedly only been divided from the Burmans by colonialism and fascism. The slogan ‘Tatmadaw and the people in eternal unity, anyone attempting to divide our blood is our enemy’ [tp\nHc\.òpv\qUômµûkv\òPøeqæ:KæµlaqU tiu>rn\qUX], conceives unity of the Myanmar family literally as limited by blood,[38] not the perfection of mind through byama-so tayà that can encompass and transcend relationships of enmity in non-violent universal fashion. From my reading, there is nothing intellectually inspiring in the censored and propagandistic views brought forth. It portrays the army as a cuckoo that can only live by eliminating all its rivals and by preying on weaker (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 066/392 species than itself. Against this stands the political discourse of the NLD, for whom mental culture, and in particular byama-so tayà, is not only the political ideology, but is the only way to keep the political opposition together in the face of concerted oppression by the authorities; these are thoroughly decent expressions of Buddhist sentiment. Sloganeering unityUnwilling and in my view intellectually quite incapable of engaging opposition leaders in discussion, the regime began a campaign in September 1989 expounding slogans seeking to encourage unity.[39] These slogans were the brainchild of a new 24-member Committee for Writing Slogans for Nationals [Am¥oi:qa:er:eSac\pud\m¥a: er:qa:er: ¨I:sI:eka\mtI], set up on 16 April 1989 to re-establish control and improve the spirit of patriotism among Burma's national peoples. The regime witnessed Aung San Suu Kyi's success and was incensed at the way she had allowed an anti-military contest of slogans between 13–17 April 1989. The regime's response was to have its committee compose about fifty slogans, among which were ‘Our Three Main National Causes’ [diu>tawn\Aer:3på:] [ZM1], all of which pointed at national unity. This concept is popularly represented on posters and illustrations by a strong young man testing the strength of a tied bundle of bamboo with an old man looking on admiringly; the bamboo stalks represents the unity of Burma (including the individual ethnic strands of the Myanmar family). Since 1990, these slogans have been reproduced in every newspaper, on the first pages of every magazine and every book, and on bill-boards in central public spots around the country up until today. By 1992, a pattern had emerged in the enumeration of these slogans, rather like the way in which monks and ritual masters (beik-theik saya) remember the numbered categories of ancient wisdom. Saw Maung's original ‘Four Tasks’[40] soon proliferated into The Twelve National Objectives – comprising the Four Political Objectives, Four Economic Objectives and Four Social Objectives [ZM3]. These all serve as guidelines in fulfilling the Three Main Causes [ZM1]. It is remarkable how these slogans come symmetrically in threes and fours, and how they are presented as true, like the Three Noble Jewels and the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha. To make these come true, we are told by the media at every available opportunity, would be to build and transform Myanmar ‘into a peaceful, prosperous, modern and developed nation’.[41] No open discussion of these aims is encouraged or permitted, but print-houses have found some consolation in resisting this imposition of sloganeered unity by leaving the page on which the quotes occur uncut, so that the page cannot be turned and the slogans cannot therefore be read; a small excusable ‘binding error’ in a totalitarian State. Journalism and the historical quest for unityThe slogan approach to national unity was soon supplemented with a journalistic search for new symbols of unity in Burmese history. The range of issues brought up in the transition from unity-as-slogan to this more discursive concept of unity reach maturity in Minye Kaungbon's book Our three main national causes, representing a series of 44 articles, most of which were published in the national newspapers between 15 July 1993 and 19 June 1994. In the foreword, he argues that Our Three Main National Causes are ‘national responsibilities which must be held in esteem and striven for by the people residing in the nation and all Myanmar citizens living abroad’. He scrutinises colonial history for reasons why Myanmar fell to the British, and to learn the necessary lessons so that this would not happen again. Military heroes were brought forward, mainly from earlier history than Aung San. Aung San plays hardly any role in this scenario, nor does his Buddhist terminology about unity in terms of the Sangha and byama-so tayà. (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 067/392 Colonialism and the destruction of natural unityFrom history was drawn the idea that foreign domination had destroyed national unity. Myanmar, he argues, was a united country until the British began to interfere.
The British enslaved Burma, exploited it, and ‘drove a wedge in order to sow suspicions and hatred among our national brethren’.[43] Though nature dictates unity among the races, ‘mutual distrust and disaffection had emerged among fraternal Myanmar national races only as a result of divisive tactics resorted to by British imperialists’.[44] The Union of Burma Inquiry Commission Report of 1 December 1958 is cited below to make the point that, using the metaphor of flowing water unifying tributaries, the waves of migration in the early ages were just about to be diluted into one another as the British came to reassert divisions.
Only the army reunifies, party politics divideThe country remained disunited until the SLORC accomplished ‘national consolidation’: ‘at present, however, national consolidation has been restored thanks to noble, correct and sincere efforts of the State and Law and Order Restoration Council’.[46] Indeed, this is not the ‘unification’ of the country, but its ‘reunification’, the rightful restoration to its original and natural state of unity.[47] Such is reflected in the concept of ‘national reconsolidation [Am¥oi:qa: òpn\lv\ sv\:luM:vIvæt\er:]’ (my emphasis) in the Four Political Objectives [ZM1]. This has sometimes been conceived of as the elimination of this ‘historical (colonial) negative legacy’.[48] If Aung San himself and his selfless personal struggle to attain samadhi analogous to good monks, represented the concept of unification prior to the SLORC, now the concept of ‘reunification’ or ‘reconsolidation’ places unity in the category of a natural state of affairs belonging to the pre-colonial past. In this version, unity was not accomplished not by Aung San. Division was sown by colonial powers and reunification was not re-established until the SLORC came to power. The hero in all this was not so much Aung San, who barely receives a mention, but the royal army under the leadership of Maha Bandoola,[49] who stood up to the divisive foreigners, and who also happens to join the symbol of the lion on the recent 500 Kyat currency denomination; this is all part of crowding out Aung San not only from Burma's national currency, but also from national memory. Because the SLORC managed to restore this natural state of affairs, today ‘the centre of unity for all national races, all parties and organizations and for all classes and masses of the people … is the Tatmadaw’.[50] The army is committed to providing ‘necessities of life’ and deserves support by all people.[51] Indeed, the army is presented as a benevolent a-cultural and a-factional entity – an entity beyond difference – that exists solely to look after the well-being of all Myanmar peoples. Unlike monks, who do not help in social tasks, the army is ready to help the people with all their needs.
(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 068/392 This is a sequel to Ne Win's disdain for politicians, who ‘do not have any practical knowledge’, and permits ‘civil servants to become leaders’.[53] Or, as another of the regime's journalists says, while special interest groups engage in divisive party politics, only the army can engage in truly ‘national politics’ because it is beyond division.
Maung Maung asserted during his brief presidency that ‘no service personnel shall carry out party politics’.[55] Saw Maung took this up and said that the army is ‘neutral’,[56] and is ‘not confined to the interests of a single party but in the broader national interest’.[57] Indeed, he made a virtue of his ignorance of politics, for he said that ‘I do not know politics’ and ‘I don't know anything about party politics’, and so the army does ‘not understand political tricks’.[58] It underlies the slogan, supposedly issued by the army and the ethnic groups in solidarity with oneanother, as if they both work together at national unification: ‘undivided, united we shall always be withstanding divisive acts of anyone (Nationalities and Tatmadaw)’ [By\qUKæµKæµtiu>mkµæAômµsv\:luM:mv\X (tiuc\:rc\:qa:lUm¥oi:m¥a:NHc\. tp\meta\) ]. This is a belated response to Aung San Suu Kyi's challenge to army ideas about political organization. She had reminded Ne Win that the BSPP's own literature had emphasized that ‘if we should have to choose between the good of the party and the good of the nation, we should choose the good of the nation’.[59] The regime is making a virtue of a necessity – they are not, and cannot be, a political party because, relying on authority (ana) and not on influence (awza), they have no popular foundation. However, if army-as-government is beyond representing the particular interest groups that represent the diversity of the country, then also the reverse argument holds, that is to say that the army represents none other than itself. This would disqualify it from a political role in the world's democratic countries, particularly when engaging in business in addition to its other roles (see chapter 4). Nevertheless, the fact remains that the army is the main Burman presence in the ethnic minority areas, and since the army asserts that insurgency arises from discrepancy within the family of nationalities due to gaps in the standard of living and due to discrepant views as the result of colonial interference, it maintains that the army sees itself as the preferred agent for development. The army ‘develops’I have already noted that since May 1989 various instruments were put in place for development of the border areas. These instruments included The Border Regions National Races Development Central Committee aims to accelerate ‘development efforts for border region national races’, and the Work Committee for Development of Border Areas and National Races which aimed ‘to develop areas whose development had been retarded by insurrections to the same level of development enjoyed by other areas of national races’.[60] Now unable to rely on the popular vote, these bolster its claim to be the sole agency supposedly able to control development because of its country-wide presence, and this is how its name came to be changed to be State Peace and Development Council, for development can only take place in (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 069/392 peaceful (i.e. conquered) areas. Desire for peace and development now justifies conquest and therefore justifies the central role for the army in government. Minye Kaungbon suggests that unity of all races means to share a similar economic environment (unity in poverty and prosperity):
This concept of fraternal unity between the races as leading to a similar standard of living is then immediately coupled to the concept of development: ‘in accordance with this conviction, the Revolutionary Government had consistently endeavoured to achieve economic and social development of undeveloped areas where national races lived’. Minye Kaungbon then suggests that the agencies concerned with Border Regions National Races Development were set up to accomplish this development for the sake of reunification. However, if we look at the history of dispute between ethnic groups and how the army considers development projects, we find that the regime's own development agencies began to impose restrictions. The restrictions controlled the establishment and running of education facilities, and restricted the teaching matter. Moreover, all international aid was to be channelled through the agencies affiliated to the regime. Many ethnic groups felt perfectly capable of managing their own education system. One example is that of the restrictions imposed on the new National High School. As a result, the Mon have called for Japanese aid to be channelled directly to them and not through the regime's agencies.[62] This kind of conflict can only increase as more development projects are initiated, and as these start to impact on the cease-fire agreements. National unity is therefore at risk from the regime's own concept of centrally controlled development which, in the end, will exacerbate rather than quell political unrest. In his articles Minye Kaungbon describes how in 1824 colonial history began with united opposition to the British on the part of all ethnic minorities, for at that time ‘patriotism, nationalism and anti-imperialism of Myanmars was most intense’.[63] A whole list of reasons is given why Burma succumbed to the British during the three Anglo-Burmese Wars, including in particular the lack of central co-ordination of all national groups, a lack of skill in modern warfare and a lack of strong leadership.[64] Since the army today supplies the solutions for all these weaknesses of the past, these arguments are followed by a series of articles on ‘Let us rally around the Tatmadaw, build and defend the country’.[65] Here ‘English troops were mercenaries and Myanmar troops were patriotic heroes’.[66] Though many ethnic groups demonstrated loyalty to Myanmar, the British succeeded in setting up divisions between the Bamars and the ethnic groups. Nevertheless, once the British were weakened, the ethnic minorities were once again reunited in Myanmar. Until the GCBA, the national peoples offered resistance separately and on a local basis, but ‘this war lacked central co-ordination and remained only as local anti-imperialist struggles’.[67] Thus, ‘national peoples stood united under the leadership of the GCBA’.[68] Though on return to Burma the British ‘tried to sow dissension between the Hills peoples and the Plains peoples’, nevertheless ‘the national peoples held a conference at Pinlon and signed the unity Pinlon Agreement on 12 February 1947 and thus foiled the British plan to divide the country’. In this account, it was not so much Aung San and the comrades that secured independence, but it was the struggle on the basis of ‘the spirit of Pinlon’ that ‘won the people their national independence’.[69] If the army is unified, so is the oppositionThe aim to unify the country through military rule has its corollary, namely unification of the political (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 070/392 opposition. All contemporary forms of opposition to the army's intent to restore unity to Burma are interpreted as ‘reactionary elements who smell of slavery [to colonial powers]’, which ‘requires us to be very vigilant as regards these “maggots”’, and for which we need to re-examine and learn from history.[70] Indeed, according to this xenophobic approach, ex-colonial countries are all waiting to exploit the opposition in order to reassert their supposedly unified voices of interference. As Nawrahta put it
Because democracy means people trying to represent interests on a smaller scale than the entire nation, on the one hand, and across borders, on the other, it is ruled out as ‘selfish’ and ready to be exploited by ‘foreigners’, of which the consequences ‘will lead to the destruction of the State and the people’.[72] Myanmar and the Mongol SpotAccepting Cochrane's Mongol Spot [mHt\sa] as the ‘anthropological’ measure of all peoples of Myanmar as ‘one single race’, Minye Kaungbon argues that ‘notwithstanding the various names under which we may be known, we are all descendants of Mongols’.[73] This he originally takes from the view expounded in the Union of Burma Regional Autonomy Enquiry Commission published in 1948, which also refers to the national races of Myanmar as all blood relations and descendants from Mongols.[74] It is clear from Dr Hla Myint, the Director General of the Department of Health, who expresses delight at the slogans about consolidation and familial kindness between the ethnic groups, that the Mongol Spot is not just a journalist idea, but has scientific credibility. In her assessment of ‘research contributing to national consolidation’ she writes that the research ‘has led to the conclusion that “We all descended from the Mongolian Tribe and therefore we, the indigenous of races are not aliens but kith and kin.”’ She continues, ‘as this research has unearthed conclusive and scientific evidence as to the blood relationships of the national races, the fabrications of the colonialists have been shown for what they are. For the future generations as well this constitutes a piece of historical evidence for the trusting the blood relations and not outside whenever the affairs of the State are to be carried out.’ She then proceeds to consider that the apparent shortness of the Tayone tribe in the Kachin State is ‘because of their health problems though they are Mongolians like us’.[75] In the current debate, however, it was originally Saw Maung's aim to ‘scientifically’ root out the Karen as having ‘one hundred percent Mongoloid blood’, and as having ‘even more Mongoloid than the Bamars’ that set the army on this track. This was evidence that division was created by foreign interference.[76] Since it was the colonialists who invented the idea of the Mongolian origins of the Burmese peoples in the first place, contradicting the Burmese belief of having originated from Northern India and Nepal, this merely confirms the strength of colonialist discourse in penetrating Burmese self-perception fifty years later. In spite of asserting commonality Minye Kaungbon cannot resist the temptation to provide the Bamars with a special historical mention that lifts them high above the Mongoloid race and raises their pride as a superior race, namely that ‘Bamars are descendants of Sakyans who are of the Aryan Race or of some other descendants of Aryans’. Though there is ‘scarcely any race that can claim descent from exclusively one original race’, nevertheless, Burma's proximity to India permits the claim that the Burmans have ‘an ornamental Aryan superstructure on the existing Mongoloid foundation’, resulting in some historians proclaiming that ‘Myanmars were descendants of Aryans’.[77] (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 071/392 Research into unity as consolidation As already mentioned, the SLORC had formed by 31 May 1989 the 11-member Committee for the Compilation of Authentic Data of Myanmar History headed by Dr Khin Maung Nyunt. By the mid-90s academic answers to the problem of unity were becoming available that attempted to go into more detail than the journalistic approach from the very institutions referred to above, namely the Myanmar Historical Commission (MHC), the Myanmar Institute of Strategic Studies (MISS) and the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS). However, even in this academic sphere the agenda remained one of military propaganda. As Kyaw Win, Professor and Head of the Department of History at Rangoon University explained, ‘the divide-and-rule policy of the British was the main cause of the disintegration of national unity’.[78] In other words, national unity is still assumed to have been in evidence until the British arrived and destroyed it by encouraging dissent between the Burmans and the ethnic minorities. Again, in this account, we no longer see Aung San as the one who accomplished unity, but rather it is the British who prevented the Myanmar ethnic family from joining together according to ancient rights. In short, unity did not have to be re-invented, as it was Myanmar's natural state prior to the advent of colonialism, and it was merely to be ‘reconsolidated’ so as to restore Myanmar to its harmony of old. This attainment has been attributed to the army under the SLORC and the SPDC. Khin Maung Nyunt – Burma as a human bodyAfter some historical research, one historical interpretation of national unity as consolidation finally emerges. In 1996, in his keynote address ‘National consolidation’ Professor Khin Maung Nyunt defines this as ‘a unanimous integration, without divergence of opinions, of all ethnic nationalities’ and as ‘the goal that can be achieved only by the will of the nation as a whole’. Burma has the good fortune to have seven ‘contributory factors’ to national consolidation, namely its good geographical position, common anthropological origin and relationship, strong historical background, rich natural resources for economic development, sound social system, cultural tradition and heritage, and favourable time and circumstances. Burma's favourable geographical position ensures that ‘all its physical features … all rise, run and terminate well within its boundaries’, so that ‘Myanmar does not have to share her physical features with any neighbouring country’ as ‘nature has endowed Myanmar with a naturally integrated entity’.
The analogy of the body for the shape of the country is taken further by Khin Maung Nyunt in respect of cultural heritage, about which he says that it is ‘the norm by which the identity of a country, people or nation is distinguished’ and also ‘it is a nation's “personality”’.[80] In this account, however, he looks for a common organic factor that binds Burma together, namely the ‘common anthropological origin and relationship’ between the 135 ethnic groups. Khin Maung Nyunt asserts that the cultural and physical origins are the same of Burma's peoples:
The third factor contributing to national consolidation is that Myanmar has a ‘strong historical background’ as it is ‘not an artificially created country as a result of the world wars, the arbitration of the (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 072/392 great powers or an emerging new nation grown out of a fallen empire’, but ‘a natural country evolved out of its geography, anthropology and long span of history’. This ‘strong historical background’ is why colonialism was not enduring. However, ‘external intrigues’ and ‘internal disunity’ cause dangers to the unity of the country and it was ‘the concerted effort of the Tatmadaw and the people that rescued the country in time from such dangers’. Since these dangers persist, ‘while building a peaceful, prosperous and modern developed nation, we all should keep averting all impending dangers with patriotic spirit and national consolidation’. The fourth contributory factor is the wealth of natural resources for economic development, and the fifth is a ‘sound social system’ where ‘all Myanmar ethnic communities live in an extended family including relatives from both parents, and where ‘communal help is available in times of distress’, so that ‘such a liberal social system provides an atmosphere conducive to national consolidation’. The sixth and most important contributory factor is cultural tradition and heritage, and ‘it is the cultural heritage based upon Theravada Buddhism that gives the cultural identity of Myanmarness to the country and its peoples’. Though animism, Nat worship, Hindu Brahmanism and Mahayana Buddhism are found as ‘the main strands in Myanmar culture’, it is ‘Theravada Buddhism that permeated the daily life of Myanmar peoples’. Because Buddhism is ‘undogmatic and tolerant’ it is possible for ‘latecomer faiths Islam and Christianity’ to peacefully co-exist with Buddhism. Finally, Myanmar is ‘at the threshold of a new era, for time, place and circumstances are favourable for the achievement of national consolidation if only the peoples have the will to do so’. It is favourable because the many groups are ‘now returning to the legal fold to join the Government in the constructive works’, and ‘there never was a time when the country enjoyed peace, stability and progress, as it does now’. Colonel Kyaw Thein – unity through transportColonel Kyaw Thein, Deputy Chief of the OSS, provides a military strategic interpretation of national consolidation in his paper ‘An analysis of the return of the armed groups of national races to the legal fold and the renunciation of armed insurrection.’ This paper looks for unity with the ethnic minorities. The persistent lack of unity between the Bamars and the other Myanmar peoples is not only due to divisive colonial heritage, but also the ‘difficulties of transportation’ and ‘the lack of improvement in the quality and quantity of contacts’, which resulted in indigenous peoples beginning ‘to harbour misconceptions regarding the Bamars and the Myanmar proper, construing themselves as the victims of Bamar discrimination’.[81] Armed conflict is the main cause for Burma falling behind its neighbours in development, the causes of which Kyaw Thein attributes to ideological differences, hard-line nationalism and religious extremism. He assesses the successes and failures of the U Nu AFPFL government and the Ne Win revolutionary regime, concluding that each had only limited success, so that civil war continued largely unchecked. As for the SLORC, he praises its achievements in having nine groups abandon armed insurgency between 1988–92, so that by April 1992 the SLORC's ‘serious intentions to achieve national consolidation became obvious’. A further six groups ‘returned to the legal fold’ between 1993–95. In November 1995 Khun Sa, the leader of the armed opium-trafficking group, surrendered to the army between January and February 1996. The regime could proclaim that by now only the Karen National Union (KNU) was the last insurgent group operating freely. He concludes that ‘the claim that the problem of armed insurgency within Myanmar is nearing its final resolution and disappearance is amply justifiable’. He attributes the failure of prior regimes to the insistence on the seizure of weapons. The SLORC did not insist on surrender of weapons and focused instead on ‘co-ordinated efforts aimed at regional development and building mutual confidence’. These developments were accelerated by the Ministry of Development of Border Area and National Races. The issue of abandoning weapons would be raised at the time of the new constitution, which the armed groups have ‘voluntarily expressed’. Commentators on this paper concur with Kyaw Win. It is undoubtedly an achievement to have negotiated a cease-fire. However, it is my view that the concept of development as initiated by the regime, and the way it is handling issues such as education together with the role of the vernacular languages, are now increasingly central. These, along with the economic conditions of the country, suggest that any proclamation of success is premature. Furthermore, the insistence on channelling foreign aid through the (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 073/392 regime's institutions is already showing friction with the ethnic minority groups and aid agencies. There is no doubt that a surrender of weapons will prove impossible to orchestrate under these circumstances. As a result of these difficulties, the regime is forced to keep pushing forward the constitution, thereby further compounding political uncertainty. They are wasting an opportunity to accomplish a much more broad-based and more effective solution in conjunction with the elected members of Parliament, and in particular the influential NLD. ASEAN and national unityIt is of interest that for Aung San unity was not actually limited to the nation alone. As a product of mind, unity has applicability well beyond the geography of the nation. Aung San, in a farsighted speech made in January 1946, aspired for Burma to be part of ‘something like the United States of Indo-China comprising French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia’.[82] Furthermore, he repeated this in a later broadcast on All-India Radio entitled ‘Asiatic Unity’, in which he said that ‘Asia is one, in spite of diversity on the surface and the colour of the people’.[83] Unlike the regime, however, Aung San, was careful not to tie this to race or religion – he treated it as a matter of co-operation between neighbours. ASEAN unity, however, since it is based on such a diverse array of cultures and interests, is today straining the regime's concept of national unity as a substantive racial and cultural entity. Aung San's vision was not realised after national independence. After 1962, Burma returned to being the hermit state it had been during royal times. Nevertheless, the poor state of the economy and the 1988 protests forced Burma to open up its borders to an influx of businessmen and tourists. The country had not experienced anything similar since 1962. Burma was granted observer status in ASEAN on 20 July 1996, and formally became a full member of ASEAN on 24 July 1997. Aung San's concept of unity was a product of the struggle against domination by foreign capitalists and fascists, and was primarily meant to make sense internally. How is the current regime, given its xenophobic views, to conceive its centrepoint of identity in relation to this recent attempt at attaining second-level ASEAN unity? Entry into ASEAN forced the generals to rethink the concept of Burmese unity within a new family atmosphere of Asian nation states. This concept of unity must now not only be understood internally, but it must also make sense from the outside. Khin Maung Nyunt in the final paragraphs of his key address on the concept of national consolidation gives us a clue about the significance of ASEAN to national unity. He explains to us why ASEAN is important, for he says that South-East Asia is ‘politically stable and economically developed and advanced, moving with bright prospects into the 21st century’. The regional unity of ASEAN permits participation in this regional organization which is rapidly taking up its own agency and tracing its own path of development against that of the West.
In other words, the inclusion of Burma's friends Indonesia and Singapore in ASEAN, and the general atmosphere of non-interference in affairs of member countries, turns ASEAN into a convenient bloc from which it is possible to consolidate national unity with impunity, as no criticism will be forthcoming. Furthermore, Burma would be backed up by ASEAN against western criticism. In ASEAN and Myanmar, Tekkatho Tin Kha presents a collection of articles and comments on Burma's role in ASEAN in the year running up to its inclusion. When reading this, one realises that in these early days Burma's concept of unity (as opposed to harmony) was being projected onto ASEAN. It is commented that by accepting Burma's observer status ‘ASEAN has taken a step forward to achieve the objective of “Ten nations, one voice and victory ahead” in international affairs through unity’.[84] A few months prior to Burma's admission to ASEAN, the government-controlled newspaper included ‘ASEAN from a Myanmar perspective’. This article conceived of ASEAN in terms of the diverse local perceptions of the same entity in the way six blind men conceived of an elephant, each touching a different part of the body. (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 074/392
The author proceeded to point out that though ASEAN may be perceived differently by the different blind men, it was always clear that ASEAN was not a place to celebrate diversity but to develop a sense of unity, for ‘in a region characterised by diversity in every sense – geographical, cultural, ethnic, and political – a common goal pragmatically focused on the shared destiny of the region, rather than on values and norms that differed according to the different “after-tastes” of colonial masters’. Colonialism brought difference to Asia and to ASEAN, and so the Asians must take it upon themselves, for the sake of unity, to remove these differences and keep their focus upon similarities. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration stressed promotion of economic co-operation, its first objective was ‘to promote the economic, social and cultural development of the region through co-operative programmes’. However, rather than a programme of co-operation, the author saw this programme as a form of support for its Myanmafication project of forging unity throughout the country.
Economic development then, is dependent on the need to belong. Furthermore, the sense of belonging that goes with development requires Myanmar and ASEAN identity to reinforce each other, and be ‘forged’.
The author stresses a number of ASEAN characteristics as positive. ASEAN identity is ‘to be aware of and to accept the differences while strengthening the similarities’. It is an enclosed system, ‘the wall that stands strong and firm in the face of challenges and dictates from outside … the wall that protects and weathers those within from the harsh winds blowing without … the wall that tells everyone of the residences inside and that demarcates the extent of our domain’. It is also a centralised system, for just as ‘all roads lead to Rome’, so also ‘all ASEAN matters emanate first from the ASEAN Secretariat’, and this in turn is ‘the rope that binds all members and partners … of ASEAN National Secretariats in the capitals of member countries, and the ASEAN Committees in third countries’. The Bangkok Declaration that set ASEAN into motion is ‘like a needle that first took up a strong and wonderful thread, with the aim to ultimately achieve a very special necklace of the ten colourful beads in the region of Southeast Asia’. The author exaggerates given the regime's attacks on fleeing refugees and its skirmishes with the Thai army as a result of its own infringement on Thai territory, as he says that ‘not a single shot has been fired in anger in resolving disputes, which underlines the Association's track record of brotherly relations, even in the thick of an intra-regional conflict’. If these early ‘Myanmar views’ express a regimented and centralised view of ASEAN, the regime's official view after joining expresses membership of ASEAN as a necessary precondition for the tranquillity and stability of Burma and for its efforts at promotion nationally of its ‘economic, social, cultural and development conditions’.
Burmese ideas about unity are, of course, the product of their own relative isolation. Development of the old European democracies, for example, involved many independent relationships across borders not (c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 075/392 just between governments, but between non-government organizations, churches, unions, opposition parties, universities, businesses, ethnic groups and alternative counter-cultural movements. Many European towns and cities are twinned with a counterpart over the borders. No European country would worry about these independently initiated cross-national links and any concept of unity in this context is cross-cut by many ties, and governments play only one role among other bodies in defining and guiding such ideas. What matters here is whether government represents the politics of these diverse groups sufficiently so that as many people as possible witness the benefits of government representation and do not feel the need to resort to terrorism. Instead of seeing itself as providing a minimal form of representation, itself dependent on all agencies in the country, the regime instead understands ASEAN primarily as a network of inter-state relationships in which each government monopolises representation of the entire landmass and all the peoples living within its territory and all other agencies operating within it. As Burma was closed for so long at government level, government holds that complete political unity must be achieved first at any cost. ASEAN membership must imply a united Burma. Anticipating Burma's ASEAN membership it was said that there were ‘a lot of noises and criticisms against ASEAN's latest move – but with unity, hard work and diligence, it will not be long before the prophets of doom are proven wrong’. This unity is represented as a victory over colonial power, for ‘an ASEAN that ultimately includes all ten South East Asian countries will finally celebrate a victory over the divisive legacies of different colonial masters that ruled the region in its pre-independent days’.[87] This view of ASEAN, links unity to the unfinished struggle for independence from colonialist agencies. Since Aung San did not defeat the enemy, continued struggle requires supervision from the army and its agencies. In this line of thought, Burma would appear able to fulfil an international role only when it has literally achieved complete unity, that is, when it has eradicated all diverse views and is able to speak in a single voice with a single channel of command for the entire territory, including the one-third of Burma's territory where Rangoon has not yet established control. This is all done in the name of preventing foreign penetration of Burma's territory, since this would result in loss of independence. Of course, by insisting on the centralisation of all forms of representation through itself, and by eliminating the array of diverse independent institutions that could fulfil such a role alongside the military, the regime is also confirming its own view that there are no institutions in Burma that could capably and independently represent alternative interests in the country. By eliminating the institutions that could provide such an exchange, the army is continuously confirming its own concept of unity at every turn, the concept that it alone can serve as the unifying force of such diversity. The army views this task of unification as its alone to accomplish. Some foreign scholars have believed this propaganda, and are unfortunately giving it credibility, which it should not have. Nevertheless, understanding such view permits us to understand why the disintegration of the army came to be presented as the ultimate disaster for the entire nation. Aung San Suu Kyi, as daughter of the founder of the army, threatened military unity, and this threat was thus a national threat, for divisions in the army are naturally interpreted as national divisions. The army became myopically focused upon the idea of ‘unity’, and so it began its slogans of ‘non-disintegration’. However, the army is not concerned with unity for Myanmar's sake alone. Today, the army employs the notion that is unifying for a greater cause, it is creating a Myanmar ‘family atmosphere’ within the broader family of ASEAN. In doing so, it does not face the reality that the other governments in place have populations mostly with different religions and different priorities. Hitherto it emphasized that ASEAN unity provides the impetus for a renewed vigour, to have total and absolute control over all exchanges within, and keep at bay the return of colonialism. Wen the Karen, one of the last groups to hold on to their autonomy, did not want to join the Myanmar family, this was expressed in terms of their unwillingness to return to familial relationships for the sake of ASEAN.
(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p 076/392 This emphasis on ASEAN unity running parallel to Myanmar unity, necessitating ethnic minorities to dilute their identity and merge it into the pool of Myanmar blood for the collective good, is an expression of how the regime views all forms of ethnic dissent as a national th | ||||
![Text Box: Table 6. Core political terms and their relation to mental culture
horizontal bounded model: ‘radial polity’* vertical Buddhist ‘mental’ open-ended cosmological model: ‘mandala polity’*
* See Tambiah World conqueror, world renouncer, pp 102–131, 197–98, 526–8. SLORC-SPDC Aung San Suu Kyi: principal leader of the NLD Aung San: founder of Communist Party, Freedom Bloc, army, Pinlon Agreement, AFPFL, national independence Thahkin Kodawhmaing: ideologist anti-colonial struggle, grandfather modern Burmese politics, teacher of Aung San and U Nu
lut-lak-yeì [læt\lp\er:] national independence freedom,‘second independence struggle’,‘revolution of the spirit’ U Ottama's and U Wisara'sloka nibbana(national independence & enlightenment) alchemy, samatha, Ledi Sayadaw's vipassana
nyi-nyut-yeì [vIvæt\er:] national unity,national solidarity,national (re)consolidation (through army) national reconciliation harmony (through social meditation and sangha)byama-so tayà national unity attributed to Aung San's samadhi (one-pointed mind)/ analogous to Sangha national unity analogous to unity of the Sanghabyama-so-tayà
tayà úbadei[tra:¨ped] law (‘royal decree’, yaza-that), army discipline justice (dhamma), monastic code of conduct
yin-gyei-hmú[y¨\ek¥:m§] Myanmar family civilization/culture/Mongolian spot / history-archaeology international (Burma) mental culture/byama-so ta-yà(self-empowered)](table_6.gif)
![[Front Cover]](images/covercuta.jpg){kind=link}