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Chapter
4
Myanmafication
(3):
the four attributes
of disciplined democracy
Shortly
after General Ne Win's military coup, Smith discerned a trend in Burmese
political ideology. For the first time a new national political ‘ideology’
seemed to be emerging that might just replace ‘tradition’ as the way of
legitimating government. Contrasting it with U Nu's ‘failure of leadership’,
he viewed the army as ‘in some ways more conducive to modernization in that it
can afford to emphasize the secular, rational, and scientific approach to
problems’.
It may be true that the army can ‘afford’ modernity. But unfortunately such
benefits have not materialised in the case of the Burmese army. Furthermore, the
SLORC-SPDC regimes have no secular national ideology, except the sense of
control over loka through magic, and their idea of modernisation and
development is so far guided only by propaganda. It is after authority as a
product of what it calls legal and cultural tradition. These unfortunately are
no more than templates around which the population of Burma must shape
themselves. It aims for the short-term goal to bolster authority in the present.
The
form of democracy that is being proposed is not much more than ‘boundary
politics’. There is little in terms of ‘freedom’ in the democracy that is
currently being proposed. Freedom, insofar as it is permitted, must work within
frameworks, within traditions, within boundaries that can be controlled by the
State. In this boundary politics the army has the duty to patrol, and military
intelligence has the duty to inform on all boundaries; whatever transcends must
either be clarified, enlightened, made to understand, or it must be constrained,
put down or exterminated. Any entity working at these boundaries cuts itself on
the sharp edges of this regime – imprisonment, exile, or even death, whichever
is the more effective.
Today,
the SPDC believes that if only foreigners would see it is striving to improve
the country, then they would come round to its views. In this chapter, I aim to
examine what ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ means on its terms. The
early stages for this formulation were already set by Saw Maung on 27 November
1988, when he is reported to have said ‘as the Vinaya is to the Rahan and the
fencing is to the village, so is discipline to the race’.
In an interview with Asia Week on 17 January 1989, he said that ‘you
need full discipline to enjoy full democracy’.
He later said in his speech that ‘democracy goes together with discipline
[rules and regulations] [dImiukersISiutahasv\:nµ>km\:nµ>]’,
and ‘discipline in other words means laws [sv\:km\:nµ>Siuta
Law epå.b¥aX]’.
On 5 July 1989, during the transitional period, he referred to this as ‘guided
or limited democracy’.
It
was not until much later, namely in November 1997, that the SPDC developed a
more elaborate idea of ‘disciplined democracy’, which it characterised more
specifically as accompanied by the following: (1) ‘rights to freedom exercised
within framework of law’, (2) ‘compatible with political, economic and
social structures of State’, (3) ‘in line with historical traditions,
customs and culture of nationality’, and it is (4) ‘especially democracy
that brings benefits fairly for all nationals within the framework of national
solidarity’.
Let
us examine here, one by one, the regime's attempt to deal with these proposals
and build disciplined democracy. In appealing to the qualified and strictly
compartmentalised nature of democracy – for it is all characterised as
substantially contained within local ‘frameworks’, ‘structures’ or
‘traditions’ – we must remember that the regime is challenging its foreign
critics to come up with a substantive analysis of what it does in terms of local
values. To have any effect, therefore, we must evoke in our arguments those
critical cultural and religious values that live within the boundaries that the
regime declares is rightfully its to
(c)
ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33,
Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN
4-87297-748-3, p 081/392
govern. Of course, this is difficult, as
since 1962 Burma has been academically the most neglected country in Southeast
Asia. Indeed, this is exactly why the regime stresses these local values because
it knows that foreign critics find it difficult to build an argument
against their clichés. Since it controls its own academics, it therefore
has little criticism of its ideas. However, one would expect a government
serious about progress and development to do more than propagate propaganda, and
instead to carry out a serious study of the nature of these existing
‘frameworks’, ‘structures’ and ‘traditions’. Where are they? How are
they constituted? To what extent do they overlap? What synergy is there between
various concepts among the various national groups? The fact is that the regime
performs no such vital research. Worse, it forces its journalists and academics
to write cheap propaganda. There is no sense of reality or trying to reveal the
truth.
Yazathat
and the framework of law
On every occasion, when members of the regime accept
democracy as a concept, it is invariably qualified by saying that democracy
activists must work ‘within the framework of the law’.
-
Regretfully, Daw Su Kyi's rigid and uncompromising stance
towards the authorities has created unnecessary setbacks for Myanmar in its
transition towards democracy. The confrontational line she has been pursuing in
the political arena has quite often forced the authorities to take necessary
measures intending to maintain stability in the country by the lawful
enforcement. Unfortunately, her actions and motives are not only unsupportive in
the building of democratic institutions but serious setback for Myanmar in
becoming a functioning democracy within a reasonable amount of time …
-
It is very much regretful and surprising to witness that Daw Su
Kyi, who has been criticizing the Myanmar Government for not being a democracy
has failed to realize that even in a full-fledged democratic society political
activities have to be conducted with the framework of the law. Activities
intended to create civil unrest, disobedience are not tolerated by any
government in the world regardless of political system they practise.
Aung San Suu Kyi retorts that
it is the regime that flouts the laws.
-
SLORC does not abide by the existing laws and what they are
doing is contrary to the existing laws. They keep saying when they want to
attack us that they won't tolerate any action contrary to the existing laws. But
they are the ones to constantly flout the law. [ZD1]
Reports by international human rights groups, to the
chagrin of the regime, would appear to agree with Aung San Suu Kyi that the law
does not function in Burma. Human rights groups either see an absence of law in
Burma, as in Myanmar, ‘no law at all’,
or they see Burma as completely ignoring international legal criteria, as in Burma
beyond the Law. Here, the SLORC's
‘attachment to legal form is no more than a thin façade’, and ‘the
picture which emerges is one of a regime which seeks to use the notion of law to
buttress its own political pre-eminence’.
The regime shakes off its foreign critics by claiming to
follow local legal tradition. It needs to be demonstrated, first of all,
what the claims of both sides amount to in terms of local Burmese concepts of
law. Current legal reports on Burma do not, however, attempt to unravel the
‘local’ concepts of law the regime proclaims as their guide.
Given the regime justifies its existence on the basis of
law, one would expect it to be clear on the meaning of law. This is not the
case. It is surprising how trusting it is of its own knowledge and understanding
of legal matters, and yet how little it really knows. The SLORC's clampdown on
NLD party members prior to the elections prompted Amnesty International to
appeal to the SLORC to charge politicians with an actual offence at the time of
arrest. Saw Maung said that ‘it is like forcing us to take action against
these persons [NLD] even though we do not wish to do so as we are all Myanmars’.
The EEC had imposed sanctions as a result, and he bemoaned his lonely situation
saying that ‘what must I do for our country not to be misunderstood by other
nations of the world, for us not to be misunderstood and for our country not to
be hurt or harmed’. Saw Maung then explained how the army should be
disciplined, and that the Buddhist law of ultimate truth [AmHn\tra:]
of impermanence was the ultimate law for everyone. This is either cynicism or
ignorance; I believe it is both. It is difficult not to conclude from its
behaviour that the regime is hastening the ‘ultimate law of impermanence’
for the people of Burma, and before soon, for itself.
(c)
ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33,
Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN
4-87297-748-3, p 082/392
Law and the regime
Law
has been the most important qualification and self-conceived responsibility of
the regime from the very beginning. Indeed, the SLORC stands for State Law and
Order Restoration Committee, and the very first of its four aims was ‘to
ensure maintenance of law and order prevalence of regional peace and
tranquillity’ [tra:¨pedsiu:miu:er:nµ>ny\eòmeA:K¥m\:qayaer:],
and the fourth and last was ‘to hold multi-party elections’.
With the introduction of the State Peace and Development Committee the
anticipation of benefits was brought forward a little more, but such would
appear a mere palliative, as the concepts of law and order remained the army's
primary justification for holding onto power in Burma. Indeed, ever since Ne Win
took power, democracy has always been the last element in a path that grows
increasingly long and more fully populated with prior reservations and
qualifications (see chapter 1). Ne Win also used democracy as a lightning rod to
dissolve tension in crisis situations, but when he felt confident, democracy was
invariably pushed forward into the future.
After
the elections, Saw Maung stated on 27 March 1989 that ‘a new legally elected
government’ would come into being that he hoped ‘will strive its utmost in
leading the State in the interests of the people’. At that point he would have
the army ‘go back to our barracks’.
Under the Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law No. 14/89 of 31 May 1989,
‘promulgated’ by the SLORC itself, the parliament (Hluttaw) ‘shall
be formed with the Hluttaw representatives who have been elected in
accordance with this Law from the Hluttaw constituencies’. The
government that would emerge from the elections had a choice between the 1947 or
the 1974 Constitution. This upbeat assessment that the future would be a
democratic future was given a boost when the SLORC in its pre-election
press-conference said that ‘the elected representatives can choose one of the
[two] constitutions to form a government, and we will transfer power to the
government formed by them.’ Furthermore, if the elected representatives ‘did
not like the two existing constitutions, they can draw [up] a new constitution.
Neither the Defence Forces nor the State Law and Order Restoration Council will
draw up a new constitution.’
From
there on, once the election results came out and the army was electorally
condemned, democracy was qualified by new preconditions. Today, in the SPDC
slogans democracy still has the lowest priority, for now it has been translated
into writing a constitution under the supervision of the army prior to
government taking power, a procedure they have dominated now for almost a decade
with no results to show. Article 19 judges that SLORC's actions ‘cannot be
justified under Burmese domestic law.’
With
‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ thus increasingly pushed further towards the
horizon of time, law looms larger as the only justification of its actions and
legitimacy. Saw Maung's favourite expression was that everyone had to work
‘within the framework of the law’.
For those working outside the framework, there is danger and there are threats,
for ‘there is no danger for those who live within the bounds of law and
order’ [¨pedAtæc\:mHaenqmH¥AN†ray\mRHi].
Anyone who, once having been opposed to the regime,
strikes a deal with the army and accepts its patronage and benevolence, is
celebrated in the national media as ‘returning to the legal fold’.
To return to the legal fold is, furthermore, equivalent to ‘joining hands with
government’, i.e. SLORC-SPDC.
Law
is also co-equivalent to the domain controlled by the army. This has been
admitted as much in
(c)
ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33,
Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN
4-87297-748-3, p 083/392
relation to the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Organisation (DKBO).
Indeed, in one of his early press-conferences, Saw Maung stated that the army
did not choose to take power but that it was inevitable. He proclaimed that the
SLORC is the army, that he himself had ‘not done anything beyond the bounds of
law’, and that during his forty years military service he had ‘not infringed
any military discipline or the laws of the land’.
Saw Maung took pride in saying that although Burma was under martial law, the
army did not invoke military courts, but of course the civilian courts were
already under instructions to sentence according to army commands.
In his speeches, he often assumes co-equivalence of army discipline with law,
and expresses his frequent dislike for political parties. He equated political
parties with illegal behaviour. Indeed, he tied democracy to ‘discipline’,
and believes that ‘discipline in other words means law’ [dImiukersISiutahasv\:nµ>km\:nµ>pµX sv\:nµ>km\:nµ>Siuta Law
epÅ.b¥aX].
This becomes particularly clear when Saw Maung criticised the NLD and said:
‘I'm not the kind who does things outside the legal confine. I don't
dilly-dally or shilly-shally and I don't do politics for a living.’
In short, whatever you call the political system, people must co-operate in
‘the people's war concept’ where ‘it is necessary for the entire people to
join hands with our Tatmadaw with heart and soul’.
Laws
in Burma are issued like army orders. They require no debates or long drawn-out
legistlation, but are simply ‘promulgated’ by the generals in authority.
‘After promulgation, laws must be abided by’ [¨pedSiutaòp™an\:ôpI:rc\liuk\naPiu>liu].
‘Promulgation’, derived from Latin ‘to expose to public view’, in
English means ‘to make known [the gospel or king's laws] by public
declaration’ by means of publication or otherwise. However, ‘promulgation’
is as uninformative about the process of law as is the signature under every
news-item in the Burmese censored press, ‘Myanmar authority concerned’. It
tells us nothing about procedures of law on the basis of authority.
In the final |
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