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Houtman, Gustaaf. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa Monograph Series No. 33. Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, 400 pp. ISBN 4-87297-748-3


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Chapter 5
Myanmafication (4):
building Mangala country and the Myanmar human origins

In chapter 2, I presented the main vocabulary of Myanmafication – national unity, national re-consolidation and extensive renaming of the country. In chapter 3, I developed the concept of unity, demonstrating how the army replaced the Sangha in the model for unity. Finally, in chapter 4 I developed the Four Attributes of Disciplined Democracy that represent the formally declared programme for countrywide change – law, structures of State, culture and traditions of the people and the economic benefits. However, the Myanmafication project includes several other elements not immediately specified as formal attributes of disciplined democracy. This chapter describes this second-tier, more informal elements of Myanmafication, and in particular the role of Buddhism, gender, archaeology and the relationship with Japan.

Buddhism

Central to Burmese identity is Buddhism, and so Buddhism has to be represented somewhere near the core of Myanmar culture. However, a major problem surrounds how exactly it should be integrated. I have already noted that the army competes with the role of the Sangha in forging national unity. However, if Buddhism is not emphasized, then it is unlikely that the regime stands a chance forming any political organization with sufficient influence (awza). On the other hand, if Buddhism is over-emphasized, then relationships with internal and external agencies may be damaged. Problems will be generated internally if Buddhists are motivated to take freedom into their own hands, and uncontrolled manifestation of charisma erodes the regime's control over the country. Furthermore, any emphasis on Buddhism will alienate members of other religious groups. Moreover, if Buddhism is over-emphasized in the organizations and projects of the regime, then it makes it difficult to attract foreign aid, as donors fight shy of providing funds for what are deemed religious development projects. Also, the majority of ASEAN countries are not Buddhist, and it is therefore difficult to place Buddhism forward organizationally.

Nevertheless, by placing ‘Myanmar’ cultural heritage at the core of the new political system, and in the name of renovating heritage to attract tourists, the regime can disguise its material support for Buddhism as culture, and still gain merit and legitimacy according to the old models of royal legitimisation without foregoing international goodwill.

Beyond this, however, there are strong political reasons for supporting Buddhism. The regime's journalists have proclaimed the 1988 protests to have caused the defilement of Burma's pagodas, including the Shwedagon Pagoda. It alleges a communist conspiracy underlying the democracy movement. Saw Maung stated that those involved in party politics ‘ought not to mix up politics and religion’, but since ‘we (the army) are not doing politics today’, so ‘we are not those who do party politics’.[1] The implication is that, since the army has abandoned party politics, it may now involve itself in Buddhism because Buddhism represents in this system the neutral ground beyond party or government, as I will show later. Indeed, in the Burmese version (not the English) of his speech, Saw Maung expresses the desire to ‘guard the Buddha sasana for its long duration’ [budÎqaqnaADæn\rHv\eAac\esac\.erHak\].[2]

Monasteries, had furthermore become identified as centres for ‘subversive’ activities resulting in the boycott of the military between August and October 1990. Another reason is thus to crowd out, through a programme of positive sponsorship, subversives.

The government has to restore, repair and renovate pagodas, stupas, temples, monasteries, ordination halls, prayer halls and other religious structures shrouded with shrubbery or have become dens of vice. In the meantime, a discord was sowed between the Tatmadaw and the monks of Mandalay which had to be resolved with much difficulty …[3]

The latter is a reference to the first monastic boycott against government in Burmese history. The regime totally reversed its earlier stance on Buddhism, and instead of unsuccessfully repressing it and 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p121/392


providing the opposition with more Buddhist supporters, it decided it was time to initiate a large programme in support of Buddhism.

The army has a long history of using Buddhism as a tool to retain power and to fight communists. The Psychological Warfare Department is notorious for thinking out new strategies by playing on the gullible points of Burmese Buddhists. The dhammantraya project has been well documented. It was apparently ‘convinced that they could do it much better than the religiously pious U Nu or other civilian political leaders and other organizations.’[4] However, this did not translate into popular support for the military faction in the subsequent 1960 elections where this propaganda in fact resulted in enhancing the popularity of U Nu.

The project for support of Buddhism is another military attempt to manipulate the Burmese population. In June 1990, a new Department for the Propagation of the Sasana (DPPS) [qaqnaeta\ Tæn\:ka:òpn\>pæa:er: ¨I:sI:@an] was established. This incorporated the Burma Pitaka Association, the private initiative ex-Prime Minster U Nu had originally been permitted to set up by Ne Win when he returned under the amnesty to Burma in 1980. This proved easy to incorporate as U Nu was under house arrest between December 1989 and 25 April 1992 for refusing to disband the parallel government that he had formed. There was nothing he could do about it.

From 20 March 1992, Religious affairs, which had under the Ne Win regime been represented by the Department of Religious Affairs under the Ministry of Home and Religious Affairs, came under a separately constituted Ministry of Religious Affairs. This is today one of the most powerful ministries, incorporating the above-mentioned DPPS in addition to the Department of Religious Affairs. On the same date three new religious titles were instituted, to be awarded in recognition for efforts to missionise Buddhism.[5] New initiatives for training monks to missionise Buddhism all over the world were under way. That same year is the first time since King Thibaw that official recognition was extended to monastic schools.

Around this time newspapers also began to markedly reflect more Buddhist content. Thus, the bottom of the Burmese language Worker's Daily of 12 March 1992 first included a reference to the Thirty-Eight Mangala, instead of the usual political slogans. This paper had succeeded the Burmese Mirror (Kyeì Mon) and the Burmese Light of Myanmar (Myanmar Alìn) from 18 September 1988, after these had been taken over by the pro-democracy factions during the uprising. When the Myanmar Alìn was restarted on 1 May 1993 under regime control, the mangala had been respectfully moved to the top of the page above the masthead, and from then on one of the Thirty-Eight Mangala was cited every day for fifteen days each until today.[6] Indeed, the intention behind these newspaper references become clear from A Guide to the Mangala Sutta, subsequently published by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1994 (see below) where, as we shall see, it aimed to pacify rebellious youngsters.[7] At the bottom of the front cover of the newspaper would be such political slogans as – ‘Emergence of the State Constitution is the duty of all citizens of Myanmar Naing-ngan’ – and in the main body of the newspaper would appear the nationalist slogans. In this way, the symmetrically numbered political slogans were legitimated, given credence, by the equally symmetrically numbered scriptural passages that were placed most prominently on the front page.

Penetration of the Buddhist message further permeated government-controlled mass media. For example, in September 1998, out of thirty-two daily television programmes scheduled on Burma's single television station three were explicitly Buddhist. These programmes were initiated in 1997 and implied a shift in the regime's attitude to the role of Buddhism in government.

Similarly spectacular is the frequent appearance of the generals dressed in white robes over their uniform, as if they were observing the eight precepts, or as if they were yogi entering meditation centres. As one observer put it ‘they are pretending to be pious, deflecting attention from their political interests’.[8]

The regime has manifold uses for Buddhism, ranging from legitimating itself, inculcating useful values in the Burman population, especially women and the young, to homogenize the ethnic groups, and overcoming the defences of the foreigner. Like Minye Kaungbon's metaphor of Burma's national races as waves diluted into greater waters, he suffixed this characterisation with the statement that it was the water of Buddhism 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p122/392


that was responsible for diluting the races. When the British arrived in 1824 the dilution of the races had supposedly already been completed.

By then, there were no longer any differences in faith, in culture, in customs, habits and laws among indigenous races of Myanmar. Buddhism had by then become bed-rock of the cultures, literature, laws, customs and habits of all indigenous peoples of Myanmar. With the arrival of Buddhism in Myanmar, Buddhist culture spread with the result that with the exception of national races living in remote inaccessible areas, all other national groups abandoned their individual cults and became Buddhists. The light of religions continued to spread to the remaining areas of Myanmar. The culture of all national groups of Myanmar was therefore a unified one.

There was also only one scripture and literature that branched out of religion. A single and unified law also emerged out of customs and habits that stemmed from a single religion. There would also be not very much differences in human conduct and social mores because the roots of all of them are in religion, although there may be slight local variations.[9]

The regime's deep involvement in Buddhism had become evident by the time Aung San Suu Kyi was questioned on the significance of the SLORC's actions in the field of Buddhism. Aung San Suu Kyi responded ‘I hope that they will pay more attention to the essence of Buddhism, that would help a lot.’[10] Unfortunately the regime's actions speak for themselves. The informal agenda behind the regime's efforts ‘to brighten up Buddhism’[11] is to Myanmify the country, not through Buddhism, as a truly universal value system based on techniques of mental culture that liberates from culture, but Buddhism as an enculturing rule-based transactional system at the apex of which stands the regime itself as the master of all transaction, as the ‘selfless’ masters of ‘goodwill’ (cetana). Where culture and Buddhism had formerly been carefully distinguished, the former occupying a narrower and inferior domain, under this programme the two have become conjoined in the attempt to broaden the boundaries of the Myanmar mandala.

Merit making, restoration of Buddhist heritage, social service

The regime uses merit making to support construction of a new tourist infrastructure, and infrastructure more generally, including roads and other public amenities. Indeed, as we shall see, it uses merit making as a cultural concept to justify its extensive use of forced labour. In a report entitled the ‘SLORC's abuses of Buddhism’, the regime is depicted as having ‘presented itself as the preserver and protector of Burmese culture, including Buddhism. The regime's propaganda, laws, and actions, however, make a cruel mockery of that pious facade.’[12] The regime put a Buddhist gloss on the unethical exploitation of the Burmese people by calling forced labour the voluntary contribution of labour to gain Buddhist merit. Khin Nyunt cynically stated that ‘the people of Myanmar were of the Buddhist faith and were willing to contribute voluntarily to the development projects, believing that they would be the first ones to enjoy the results on Earth and thereafter’.[13] Furthermore, in recruiting soldiers to the army sometimes use the language of Buddhism to lure youngsters from the countryside to do the most dangerous jobs by playing on the idea that the army defends pagodas and monasteries against attacks from other religions.

The army and merit making

The regime's revived interest in Buddhism is evident from the newspapers, which report acts of merit by the generals such as renovating famous pagodas in which the generals play the chief role, accruing merit. For example, at the Shwe Htidaw hoisting and consecration ceremony of Htilominlo Pagoda in the Pagan cultural zone, attended by Vice-Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services Commander-in-Chief (Army) General Maung Aye and wife Daw Mya Mya San

The congregation shared the merits gained.

At the auspicious time, Commander Maj-Gen Ye Myint, Minister U Aung San and Minister Maj-Gen Sein Htwa hoisted the first tier of the Shwe Htidaw.

Accompanied by entourage of celestials and royal entourage of the Ministry of Culture, General Maung Aye conveyed the Seinbudaw, Secretary-3 Lt-Gen Win Myint conveyed the Hngetmyatna and other members conveyed religious objects, various tiers of the Shwe Htidaw and htidaws of cetis circling the pagoda.[14]

Another example is the Bakaya Monastery of Amarapura. The first Bakaya monastery built for King Nyaungyan (AD 1599–1605) was at the forefront of providing the palace with training in occult arts. The 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p123/392


restored Bakaya Monastery, however, is a later one dating to King Bagan (AD 1846–1853), the son and successor of King Thayawaddy who built it in 1847 under the name Maha Way Yan Bontha, and offered it to the Sangharaja Ashin Pinna Zawta. Reconstruction started on 5 February 1993 and was completed three years later. This monastery was also renowned for its occult arts.[15] Also, there is the renovation of the Golden Palace Monastery (Shwe Nandaw Monastery), originally an apartment of Mindon's Palace named Mya Nan San Kyaw.[16]

Other merit making activities are regularly publicised. For example, there are collective novice ordinations by army units into the monastic order.[17] Also, the cause of the army's fight for the unification of the country is, we are made to believe, supported by the entire country in Buddhist ways. The fight at the front is causing many casualties in particular among the lower ranking soldiers, and so ‘every year, dry rations are presented to monasteries and homes for the aged in dedication to the fallen Tatmadawmen and merits gained are shared’. As the army ‘is providing every assistance for these disabled soldiers, the public is also taking part in the task with immense generosity, indicating the perpetual unity, goodwill and love between the Tatmadaw [army] and the people toward building the nation's modern armed forces’. It was SPDC Secretary-2 Bureau of Special Operations Chief of Staff (Army) Lieutenant General Tin Oo who urged ‘military personnel to value the cetena and metta of the people’.[18]

Forced labour and merit making

Behind tourism and behind the Burmese national economy lies the question of what the regime calls ‘voluntary labour’. It is to permit the tourists to travel safely and admire ‘Myanmar culture’, and for the businessman to invest, that the soldiers are now fighting to gain control over the areas rich in cultural and mineral resources. It is they who largely provide the finance to make this unification of the Myanmar family possible. However, their concept of development involves using their authority to make people work for them ‘voluntarily’, for the army replaces the Sangha in the SLORC-SPDC of concept unity.

A UN Rapporteur said that the term ‘forced labour’ characterises a whole host of activities including what would ordinarily be a meritorious deed:

130. The Myanmar authorities continue to deny the existence of the practice of forced labour in the country. According to the argumentation of the Government of Myanmar, the concept of forced labour is not applicable to Myanmar, because the people of Myanmar are voluntarily participating in labour for community development, such as the construction of pagodas, monasteries, schools, bridges, roads, railways. During the last visit of the former Special Rapporteur, he was told in his meeting with Secretary One that ‘stories about forced labour were not true, … the people of Myanmar were of the Buddhist faith and were willing to contribute voluntarily to the development projects’ …

132. The Special Rapporteur continues to receive numerous reports from a wide variety of sources indicating that the practice of forced labour remains widespread in Myanmar. It has been alleged that civilians are forced to contribute non-compensated labour to certain large development projects. The projects concerned are said to include the building of roads, railways, bridges and gas pipelines.

People living in villages near the various projects are said to be frequently forced to contribute labour under the threat of reprisals if they do not comply with the request. Numerous reports indicate that there is an especially extensive use of forced labour in several railway construction projects. Elderly persons, and sometimes children, have reportedly been seen working along the railway.

According to reports received, the poor conditions at construction sites have led to accidents and illness, sometimes causing the death of several persons.[19]

The regime justifies its forced labour programme in terms of traditional Buddhist concepts of merit making.

Voluntary service in the interest of the community is a deep-rooted and ancient Myanmar tradition. It is based on our world view that man cannot exist in splendid isolation unless he is an Arahat (i.e. someone who has attained a state of liberation from mundane life), and that to succeed in life, a human being must strike a balance between what is good for self and what is good for all. Beginning with the basic unit of family it has been ingrained in our philosophy of life that to thrive, both physically and spiritually, each has duties to perform – duties for the various positions or status one occupies in society throughout the span of life as a human being; as child, parent, teacher, monk, citizen or ruler. But added to this is the Myanmar’s innate spirit of generosity and kindliness. The bountiful natural environment of the country may have shaped and conferred this special characteristic on the Myanmar people regardless of whether they be Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Bama, Mon, Rakhine or Shan.


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p124/392


… People from all walks of life for instance contributed their labour towards the building of the Maha Wizaya Pagoda [Pagoda built by Ne Win], south-east of the Shwedagon Pagoda and towards the Sacred Tooth Relic Pagoda [Pagoda built by the regime to foster improved relations with China], on Kaba-Aye Pagoda Road in Yangon. These are instances of community service on a large and organized scale and it might be misconstrued as something that happens once in a great while and at the insistence of those in authority. That is not the case; it is a daily phenomena, be it in small villages, towns or cities. Prayer halls and the precincts of pagodas and temples large and small, are swept by volunteers daily …

Since the beginning of their history, the Myanmar people have demonstrated this strong community spirit and service. We willingly give wealth, time and labour for the welfare of the people in [our] community. This community spirit comes to us naturally …

This has been our national trait and custom since ancient times. The Myanmar people are, by nature, good neighbours both in times of need and joy. One might perhaps think this tradition has declined in the larger towns. But it is not so. Perhaps a very few, who have been brought up in the west and been imbued with western ideas, may look upon all this with jaundiced eyes and call it forced labour. But you only have to see the faces of those at work, to realize that these are people who are happy in service to others and to the community.[20]

This view of forced labour as happy, meritorious and cultural behaviour, in-keeping with long-established practice, is not just a one-off invention by a right-wing journalist, but it is the view that the regime is presenting to the outside world. It just happened to be so that the government Tooth Relic Pagoda that housed the Chinese Tooth Relic on an official State visit from China was most certainly built according to independent accounts with forced labour, for Skidmore reports having personally ‘interviewed over one hundred families in Mandalay and Yangon’ who were ‘forced to work on the construction of the Tooth Relic pagodas’.[21]

In response to questions about forced labour there is not even the semblance of investigative research, for General Able asserted confidently:

Rubbish, these unfounded rumors … It is the Buddhist tradition for people to volunteer to work for the betterment of the country, because we believe we get merits for the next life. It is the communists and Aung San Suu Kyi who spread rumors of forced labor, and certain writers and reporters who believe in them and write lies to hurt my country. If I had a house and my house needed repair, the entire neighborhood would be there to help me and they wouldn't expect to be paid.[22]

Usually forced labour is justified in relation to the 1908 Villages and Towns Act which supposedly permits village councils to order citizens to work as forced laborers. However, the act in fact gives village councils the right to impose ‘compulsory service for public purposes without any discrimination on grounds of birth, race, religion and class.’ Furthermore, the 1947 Constitution stated that ‘forced labour in any form and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall be prohibited.’[23]

The regime is worse than monarchy in the way it has conscripted labour. Even King Mindon, unlike some of his predecessors, had insisted on paying for labour provided by his subjects,[24] and did not require them to attend court matters while they were busy during harvest time.[25] Hla Toe, who inspected documentation on debt at first hand for that period, found that until 1868 there was some evidence of corvee labour during Mindon's reign, but ‘after the introduction of a coinage currency and the thatha-mei-da taxation system in 1868, King Mindon abandoned the demand of corvee labor for his irrigation projects by the request of the hsaya-daws of the Di-pe-yin district.’[26]

After the International Labour Organization (ILO) repeatedly pressed the regime on the issue of forced labour and forced portering for the army, the regime argues that the Burmese people delight in giving free labour in return for Buddhist merit. Over the past ten years Burma has the distinction of having a regime with the greatest and most persistent labour violations.[27] The result was that in 1995 the ILO found the regime's arguments ‘so unconvincing that it was compelled to set aside in Special Paragraphs of its final report the conclusions that forced labor must be eliminated once and for all and that unions, independent of the government, must be allowed to exist if workers so choose.’ This placed Burma's leaders in the 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p125/392


company of Nigeria's notorious military rulers, also cited in a Special Paragraph. However, by 1996, keen on being seen to be honourable in the context of the opening of its Tourism Year,

The SLORC representative no longer denied the existence of forced labor. Nor did he explain to the Committee as he had in the past that there had been a small misunderstanding, that what the international community sees as widespread, systematic use of forced labor to rebuild the country's decaying infrastructure is actually the Burmese age-old cultural tradition of ‘voluntary labor’ to gain Buddhist merit. This time he triumphantly announced that because the 45-year war with the country's ethnic minorities was virtually over, the government had to find something to do with Burma's 400,000-man-strong military. From now on, he reported, the soldiers’ labor would be used to rebuild the country's infrastructure, not the labor extracted by force from the Burmese people.

However, the ILO considered the evidence, and once again decided to cite the SLORC in Special Paragraphs, this time mentioning the case in its report ‘as one of persistent failure to implement Convention No. 29 and Convention No. 87,’ which in ILO speak is ‘the strongest terminology available to the Committee.’ The regime's disdain is currently facing a seldom-used ILO procedure ‘reserved only for the most egregious cases of abuse’, namely an official Mission of Inquiry into alleged use of forced labour with public hearings.[28]

The slogan ‘Selflessly in the service of the country, work hard, all in our public service’ [kiuy\k¥oi:mPk\ tiuc\:òpv\tæk\Ræk\eSac\ýkio:pm\:tiu>wn\Tm\:X] is to be understood in terms of the regime's useful synthesis between concepts of Buddhist culture and free ‘voluntarily’ forced labour. I will later return to this attitude in relation to discussing the concept of mangala and cetana.

Buddhism and Myanmar culture

Many aspects of Buddhism are therefore useful to the regime. However, there is much uncertainty about the exact role of Buddhism in this national cultural development scheme. We only have to follow the reasoning of the historian Dr Khin Maung Nyunt (b. 1929) who, as a member (retired Director-General) of the Historical Commission, editor of Myanmar Perspectives, and member of the Central Executive Committee of Writers and Journalists Association, is involved in numerous committees, and is most actively involved in thinking out the parameters of Burmese culture on which the future Burmese State is to be based.[29]

Dr Khin Maung Nyunt is asked questions by an audience of Burmese and foreign scholars on Buddhism.

Dr. Sein Tu asked the author to comment on the role that Buddhism played in the resurgence of the spirit of patriotism, the way it strengthened the resolve of the Myanmar people into a concerted struggle that eventually led to regaining of independence and the part played by the Sangha or Buddhist monks in anti-imperialist agitation. He also wished to know the present and future tasks of religion in nation building.

Reply – The role of Buddhism in the national renaissance is very great. In 1904–1905 there emerged a modern nationalist movement with the formation of the Young Men’s Buddhist Association on the model of the Young Men Christian Association. Originally this association was religious and cultural and it maintained that to promote Buddhism was to promote Myanmar culture. It was not political in the initial stage but very soon this association assumed a political character and provided the basis of future movements for national independence and the monks also played a role in these movements, as did writers and journalists. So, Myanmar modern nationalist movement was Buddhism inspired.

With regard to the second part of the question, Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt replied that Myanmar is a secular state and Buddhism is not the State Religion although the majority of Myanmars are Buddhists. Due recognition is given to other faiths. But the government recognizes the fact that religion in general, not just Buddhism, has a major role to play to salvage the nation and the people from the ravages of material progress. The Government recognizes that Buddhism as well as other religions play a major role in the maintenance and refinement of the cultural life of the people.

According to this interpretation Buddhism moved from a cultural issue in the first decade to a nationalist political movement in the second. All religions might have a role to play in culture, but in what proportion of importance? If equivalent, then would the plurality of religions not militate against a singular Myanmar civilization?

‘Anthropology’ Kyaw Win, Deputy Director General, Department of Culture, evidently highly confused but undaunted at the prospect of engineering culture, then makes this inspired comment that ‘Union Culture, which includes the culture of the national races needed to be elaborated, especially their intangible culture, since Myanmar culture is Union culture’. To this Khin Maung Nyunt confidently replies affirming 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p126/392


that ‘Myanmar culture’ is not ‘Bama [Burman] culture’ but ‘encompasses all 135 nationalities [i.e. it is Myanmar culture]’.

Reply – Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt said he used the term Myanmar culture not Bama culture. That it therefore encompasses all 135 nationalities. He stated ‘I first began with indigenous culture and clarified what it meant and put the emphasis on abstract aspect of culture and this I believe includes all the 135 national groups.’ He said he had not gone into details about their special aspects such as the performing arts, fine arts, life styles, and their rituals and ceremonies because that would require an encyclopaedic study.

Having first diversified cultures through diverse religions, and then joined this diversity under the umbrella of an ‘abstract’ unity through Myanmar culture, Daw Kyi Kyi Hla from Myanmar Perspectives then asks Dr Khin Maung Nyunt about the maintenance of such integral Myanmar culture in the face of the disintegrating effects of modernization (equated with ‘alien culture’).

Daw Kyi Kyi Hla gave her comments on the question of the alien cultural influences brought in the wake of the changing world and Information Super Highway and stressed that though this was to be expected, we should not let them overcome us; that we should think of ways and means to protect our cultural identity. That, though the Government had done much we should not place the onus of responsibility on the Government alone; that it was time, each and everyone gave a helping hand, especially to convince the younger generation that modernization and progress need not clash with our culture.

Reply – Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt said that this question was pertinent not only to Asian developing countries but even in most developed nations like America. He continued by saying countries like America, Japan, Germany, France were now paying a cultural price and it seems they are about to lose their cultural identity. Even old countries like Britain and France are confronting this danger of losing their cultural identity. That was probably the reason why France is now attempting to build up a French speaking world. And this is a step taken by a country like France, which claims to be the most cultured country in the world. Developing countries like ours have no need worry yet because we still have the basic cultural elements to rely on. Not too much has been lost yet. He said culture can be revived through education and that through religion one could retain culture and also, he said through concerted action with neighbouring countries, like the ASEAN. He added that almost every ASEAN treaty had either a paragraph or article on cultural co-operation and that there was general recognition of the dangers of material progress overwhelming basic cultural values. The media also has an important role to play in educating the younger people on this issue.

So Burmese development in the context of ASEAN should not ‘pay the cultural price’ and follow the western nations who ‘lose their cultural identity’. Developing countries like Burma have the precious resource culture to rely on, which can be retained and developed through education, religion and co-operation within ASEAN. There is a question here over whether emphasising culture does not pose risks with 135 ethnic groups in Burma. Perhaps losing a little culture would not do any harm?

Dr Damrong Wattana, from the Faculty of Political Science at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, perceived a conflict between the emphasis on modernization and on traditional culture. So he asked what the size of the population of Buddhist monks was, whether they were ‘considered as human resources contributing to national development’, and ‘how monks were developed and if there were any plans or policies on that’.

Reply – Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt replied that the Religious Affairs Department would be more competent to answer the question on the size of the Buddhist monk population, which, he said, varies because there are some who are not life-long monks. A rough figure of full-fledged monks would be about 300,000 [about 1% of the Burman population].

Concerning the second half of the question, Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt said that monks certainly were considered a valuable human resource. They play a significant role in monastic education where the monks give the children moral instruction and also teach them the three ‘R’s. The Government successfully has reintroduced monastic education at the primary level. Monks also play an important role in the maintenance of the natural environment, for they not only encourage but actually take the lead in planting trees of all kinds, fruit trees, shade trees and flowering trees. They may also be called the custodians of national culture.

Inculcation of Buddhist values in the youth of Burma and the ecological role of monks may be applauded. However, given the diversity of religions in Burma, there would appear to be some conflict between the emphasis on traditional culture by placing monks as the ‘custodians of national culture’ and the promise of equality within the Myanmar culture family, and also with the desire to modernise.

Mr M. Rajeratnam, Director of the Information and Resource Sector, Singapore, questioned Khin Maung Nyunt's assumption that the West was on the decline, and he said he thought ‘it was just the opposite’, as ‘Western Civilization was well on its way to being preserved and strengthened with a return to religion in many parts of Europe and America.’ His view was that ‘the open value system of the West had allowed civilization to strengthen itself’. So he asked Khin Maung Nyunt whether he thought ‘an open society would allow our own Asian cultural values to be preserved and strengthened’. Does Khin Maung Nyunt see ‘globalization and the preservation of the deep cultural heritage of Myanmar as two contradictory trends’?

Reply – The speaker [Khin Maung Nyunt] in reply said that he did not say the West was on the decline, but that they were 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p127/392


facing the problem of losing their cultural identity, and that they were trying to revive it. For example, the British and French are trying to preserve things British and French respectively. And the same he said was in the case of the Americans.

The speaker then went on to say that he considered Buddhism an open value system, and that it was why religions before and after it could continue to exist. Thus the open-value system of a country could promote and enable culture to exist and flourish.

Concerning globalization in the 21st century, he said, a global village from the material point of view, the communications point of view and from the media point of view sounds very nice. But there still remains the spirit of nationalism which is very much alive. He said globalization was not a new concept but a new term for the idea of a cosmopolitan state and that this idea had existed since the time of the Greeks. Attempts to establish a cosmopolitan state has been made at every stage of history and much has been written about it but that it had still to be realized. Large empires such as the Roman Empire, the British Empire and the Soviet Union were established which sooner or later broke up again into nation states. So as long as there are nation states there must be a national cultural identity to uphold this state. He added that, in his opinion, a global state or globalization in the 21st century could not be realized. As regards the contradiction between globalization and maintenance of national culture, it does not exist, since the establishment of a cosmopolitan state is unacceptable.

Khin Maung Nyunt seems to think that all political entities ultimately break up into nation states, with monolithic cultures based on some ‘common national identity’. Furthermore, in placing this identity firmly into Buddhism as the ‘open’ religion, this places Buddhism at the centre of Myanmar Culture for all ethnicities and religions. Buddhism, because of its ‘openness’, is supposedly able ‘promote and enable culture to exist and flourish’ and thus to serve as a short-hand for a concept of ‘Myanmar culture’. In short, Myanmar culture has become ‘Bama’ culture in the name of Buddhism.

It is quite evident that the regime places a barrier in terms of accepted legitimacy between Burmese and other forms of Buddhism in other countries. Indeed, the openness of Buddhism stops at the Myanmar boundaries and does not extend to other Theravada countries, as is clear in respect of Burma's frosty relations with Thailand. These views demonstrate that there are many hopeless contradictions in the policy makers' ideas on the role of Buddhism in Myanmar culture.

Buddhism and youth training

As already noted, the regime is, of course, not just seeking merit when it supports Buddhism. Currently Buddhism is thought to sustain the core values of Burman identity, or, as Khin Maung Nyunt said, monks are ‘custodians of national culture’.[30] In short, ‘when people began to take interest in religion, religious teachings began to spread. People became gentle and soft.’[31]

This is why the regime has decided to give its own Union Solidarity and Development Association training in Buddhism which ‘prevents alien culture’ and helps the ‘preservation of national culture’.

YANGON, 25 Feb–Member of the Secretariat of the Union Solidarity and Development Association Minister for Culture U Win Sein yesterday gave counsel to trainees of Buddhism Course (High level) organized by Sagaing Division USDA.

The minister said there are less adverse conditions in our country due to the teachings of Buddha and people believe their karma.

He said conducting such course prevents alien culture and helps them instil religious culture and it means preservation of national culture.

The minister urged them to distribute the lectures among their village, ward and township.

The ten-day course is being attended by 52 trainees in Sagaing, 33 in Monywa and 21 in Kalay.[32]

Numerous other reports are available attesting to the regime's declared attempt to inculcate Buddhist values in the USDA,[33] and it was claimed at the third annual meeting on 12–15 September 1996 that the USDA had at least 1.23 million trainee youths attending courses in ‘Buddhist culture’.

Buddhist culture syllabus

The Ministry of Religious Affairs has been encouraged by the regime's culture policy makers to adopt a missionary approach and is making instrumental use of Buddhism to support the State as they envisage it. But what kind of values does it teach? It is worth examining the educational material emanating from the Department for the Propagation of the Sasana [DPPS] since it began publishing these in 1994.

A guide to the Mangala Sutta: the ideology of State[34]

The more one reads the Guide to the Mangala Sutta, the more one realises that – in the absence of a 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p128/392


political ideology – this is the regime's equivalent to the BSPP's The Burmese Way to Socialism (30 April 1962). However, this rendering of Mangala Sutta is intellectually inferior as both a political and as a Buddhist document – it bluntly advocates Buddhism as an instrument of State. The categories of loka [1-30] versus lokuttara [31-38] remain, however, as stable Buddhist categories. But it is the interpretation of these by the military, who prefer to stick to the loka categories to do with ‘basic needs’ and with ‘the stomach’. For the democracy movement, however, the only path to freedom open to them while in prison is the latter path away from loka so narrowly defined. To both, however, mental culture represents the philosophy of the State. Nos [31] Austerity (tapa) and [32] Byama-so tayà precariously balance at the point of contact between both worlds and both political philosophies – who has the better right to proclaim this their political philosophy?

The Mangala Sutta is one of the first texts children in Burma learn. It has always been an indispensable part of the syllabus for Burmese children, both as pupils in monasteries and nunneries, and in secular schools. Its importance is derived from its supposed efficacy as the first of the eleven paritta texts, recitation of which ensures freedom from danger and fear. It is commonly recited on the occasion of appreciation and recollection of good deeds [anumodana ANuemadna] at donation ceremonies. It is of particular importance in foundation and house-warming ceremonies that involve the initiation of domains and attempts to reconcile cosmic unbalances and changes. It is not so much about prediction by reading supernatural signs and omens to anticipate directions in one's fate, but through adopting correct mental cognition by means of good practice that foster harmony, it is instrumental in securing a balanced and harmonious environment to live in without disturbance or fear of the future. In this sense it is portrayed as equally predictive as the search for omens.

For these reasons it had been emphasised by King Mindon. Apart from Mindon's personal practice of meditation, his questions to his monks on vipassana and his encouragement of vipassana in the royal court, he also made it known that he despised some Brahmanic ritual aspects. He preached the Mingala Sutta [Sutta on auspiciousness] to Phayre, which ‘provides lessons of direct practical application, capable of immediate and fruitful utilization by people in all walks of life, irrespective of differences of sex, status or station, sect, race or nation’. In preaching it, the good king ‘told the distinguished visitor … that [it] could well be the text-book of a world-citizen’. Soni explains how a superstitious Brahmin who throws away his clothing in the cemetery fearing that a bite into it by a rat was an inauspicious omen. As soon as he heard the Buddha picked it up he went to dissuade the Buddha as he worried himself that it would bring inauspiciousness also to him and his monastery. The Buddha, however, brought him to clear understanding that such things as rat-bites are not inauspicious. Indeed, auspiciousness is ‘the discarding of all superstitions connected with the “seeing”, “hearing” and “touching” of things or persons, also of all superstitions connected with the eclipses of heavenly bodies, dreams and signs in one's surroundings, that leads to auspiciousness and even to the Blessed State’. For Mindon such ‘clear’ and ‘auspicious’ vision was not, in the ideal, attained through formal rituals associated with superstition by the advice of a Brahmin. Instead it was attainable, in the ideal at least, through vipassana practice.[35]

General Saw Maung in 1990 responded to the view expressed by some pro-democracy activists that the core meanings of democracy are encompassed by Mangala Sutta. He also responded to the criticism that the army were not adhering in their actions to this Sutta. He said that the lack of discipline among the people indicated to him that these people themselves did not know Mangala Sutta.[36] However, since 1992 this Sutta has clearly been asserted as the formal ideology of the Burmese State, when it came to be extensively quoted in all its newspapers (see above). This emphasis, however, was very much due to the emphasis already placed on this sutta under the U Nu period – this represented an original a democracy sutta. The byama-so tayà [32] then became ideology of the Socialist State. Here, its translation as published by the regime has turned it very much into an instrument of authority. So it is worth examining in some detail.

The mangala are a core component in measuring appropriate political behaviour, as expressed in many an article and editorial.[37] These teachings are presented as ‘Myanmar Beatitudes’ at the heart of Burmese 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p129/392


culture, explaining many a Burmese custom such as cultural responses to embarrassment (ànade [Aa:naty\]) and respect for elders (gadó [kn\eta.]).[38] Indeed, Khin Maung Nyunt said that they represented the essence of Myanmar ethical and moral principles and that ‘one can even draw up plans to gain peace and prosperity for the world.’[39]

The regime uses this sutta as the guide in its Myanmafication project. But they do so in terms of an entirely different meaning of mangala. This association with culture in the Burmese imagination is to be attributed to the association of the mangala with the division of Burmese life-cycle rites. The Twelve Mundane Mangala Rituals [elakImgçla 12på:], including weddings,[40] earboring ceremonies, the ploughing festival and the novitiation festivities. In these rituals the honorary Brahmin Master of the Abhiseka [Biqik\Sra] plays an important role by making ‘the occasion auspicious (mangala)’. However, these loki mangala are of a different kind from the ones mentioned in Mangala Sutta. Only the latter are known as the Thirty-Eight Mangala without the prefix ‘mundane’ (loki), for these were taught by the Buddha and encompass the supramundane fruits of correct mental culture practice.

The guide is based on Kyaw Htut's[41] Mangala Sutta lectures he started in 1967 at the YMBA. National mangala examinations started independently in 1944 but were taken over by the YMBA in 1948. Kyaw Htut's lectures to national mangala instructors were published three times in Burmese (1976, 1983, 1985) before appearing in English. The Burmese version of this text is prescribed for today's mangala examinations. The purpose of the guide is to inform teachers how to teach pupils about the Mangala Sutta at three levels – i.e. how to teach to read the Sutta, write the Sutta, and internalize its significance in both Pali and Burmese.

The English edition seems to have been hastily published in order to provide material input into the regime's sudden Buddhicisation and in its desperate search for an indigenous political philosophy.

The Sutta, the second the Buddha delivered after his enlightenment, contains the Thirty-Eight Blessings [mgçla tra: 38 på:]. The latter guide introduces mangala as a prototypical element in Burmese custom through the greeting mingalaba [mgçlapå][42] that mostly came into use during the British colonial period as a Burmese equivalent to ‘Hello’ or ‘How are you’ . The book draws attention to how the Buddha's teachings fit into the creation of a ‘Mangala State’. Since the first part of the Sutta concerns the creation of order in the mundane world, the booklet presents it as ‘important in the making of a nation of good citizens, and in the building of an ideal State, or a Mangala Country’.[43] Indeed, it is taught to children ‘not just for the sake of religion’. ‘In social affairs and matters concerning the making of a nation also, the Mangala Sutta is the dhamma that gives the right guidance’ because it contains ‘a great deal of social matters and a great deal of other matters concerning the development of a country.’ Indeed, ‘the scope of the Mangala Sutta is so vast that with these … kings and ministers can govern a country’. There may be diverse political systems in the world, but ‘none of these are outside the scope of the Mangala Sutta’. It forms ‘a sort of planning programme for the development of a country or nation, or indeed, for the development and well-being of the whole world.’[44] As part of this building up of the country, the YMBA began a course disseminating a 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p130/392


means to fight against the abuse of narcotic drugs ‘in accord with Mingala Sutta’.[45]

Mangala means different things to different people, and it is variously translated as meaning ‘auspice’, ‘good omen’, ‘luck’, ‘blessing’, ‘beatitude’ or ‘fortune’. The guide presents Mangala as an ‘unresolved riddle’ that the inhabitants of the world's Southern Island (Jambudipa) were seeking – some believed it was seen, some that it was heard, yet others believed that it was sensorially pleasant. None could resolve this question. Guardian spirits entered the debate, and controversy resounded for twelve years throughout the celestial realms right into the highest brahma realms. When finally Sakka, king of the Devas, and king of the Buddhist and the Burmese pantheon of spirits, said that the discussants were ‘like someone who ignores live coal and tries to make fire from … a glow-worm’, he sent a deva to the Buddha at Jetavana monastery to find the answer to what the highest mangala are.[46] The Sutta was the Buddha's response to this question. It reinterprets mangala ‘from a practical and more useful angle’, where ‘signs and omens gave way to modes of conduct, family responsibilities, social obligations and training of self’,[47] i.e. from a supernatural idea of fate into a system of practice on a path that rewards with the final emancipation from samsara. This guide groups the Sutta into seven sections that graduate from building blocks of society to building blocks of the political and economic order, and finally to the attainment of nibbana. In other words, these do express the complex relationship in Burmese politics between building a political order and the practice of mental culture and the attainment of nibbana.

Discourse of the Supreme Blessings (Mahamangala Sutta)

Bahu deva manussa ca                                            Many devas and human beings,

Mangalani acintayum                               longing for their well-being,

Akankha-mana sotthanam                         pondered what constitutes auspiciousness;

Bruhi mangala muttamam                        O, tell us, what is the highest auspiciouness

 

A. Four Foundations of Human Society (1–6).

[1] Asevana ca balanam                            [1] Not to associate with the foolish,

[2] Panditanan ca sevana                          [2] to associate only with the wise,

[3] Puja ca puja-niyanam                          [3] to honor those worthy of honor,

Etam mangala muttamam                         this is the highest auspiciousness.

 

[4] Patirupa-desa vaso ca                          [4] To dwell in a suitable locality,

[5] Pubbe ca kata-punnata                        [5] to have done good deeds previously,

[6] Atta samma panidhi ca                        [6] to set oneself on the right course,

Etam mangala muttamam                         this is the highest auspiciousness.

 

B. Four Aspects of Education (7–10).

[7] Bahu saccanca [8] sippanca                 [7] To have wide knowledge, [8] and skill in technology,

[9] Vinayo ca susikkhito                           [9] to have discipline and good training,

[10] Subhasita ca ya vaca                          [10] to speak what is true and pleasing,

Etam mangala muttamam                         this is the highest auspiciousness.

 

C. The Seven Fundamental Principles of Mangala Country – rules of performance (11–17).

[11] Mata pitu upatthanam                       [11] To support one's mother and father,

[12] Putta darassa sangaho                       [12] to care for one's wife and children,

[13] Anakula ca kammanta                       [13] to have a blameless occupation,

Etam mangala muttamam                         this is the highest auspiciousness.

 

[14] Danam[48] ca [15] dhamma- cariya[49] ca [14] To perform acts of charity, [15] righteous living,

[16] Natakananca sangaho                        [16] to help relatives,

[17] Anavajjani[50] kammani                        [17] and blameless action.

 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p131/392


 

Etam mangala muttamam                         this is the highest auspiciousness.

 

D. The Three Defences of the Mangala Country – rules of restraint and abstinence (18–21).

[18] Arati [19] virati papa                         [18] To refrain from evil (in thought, word and deed),

[20] Majja-pana ca samyamo                    [20] to abstain from intoxicants 

[21] Appa-mado ca dhammesu                 [21] to be diligent in doing good deeds

Etam mangala muttamam                         this is the highest auspiciousness.

 

E. Preservation of the Mangala Country – the Nine Obligations (22–30).

[22] Garavo ca[51] [23] nivato ca                  [22] To be respectful [23] to be modest

[24] santutthi [25] ca kataññuta                [24] to be contented, [25] to be grateful

[26] kalena dhammassavanam                   [26] to frequently listen to the dhamma

Etam mangala muttamam                         this is the highest auspiciousness.

 

[27] Khanti ca [28] sovacassata,                [27] To be patient, [28] to be amenable to advice,

[29] Samanananca dassanam                    [29] to see often the samanas [holy ones]

[30] Kalena dhamma sakaccha                  [30] to frequently discuss the dhamma

Etam mangala muttamam                         this is the highest auspiciousness.

 

F. Renunciation of the Worldly Life (31–34).

[31] Tapo ca [32] brahma cariyaca            [31] To practise austerity, [32] and the practice of pure life,

[33] Ariya sacana dassanam                      [33] to have perception of Ariya [noble] truths

[34] Nibbana sacchi kiriyaca                     [34] to realize Nibbana (through Arhatta-phala)

Etam mangal muttamam                          this is the highest auspiciousness.

 

G. Attributes of an Arahat (35–38).[52]

[35] Putthassa loka dhammehi                  [35] When touched by pain and pleasure,

Cittam yassa na kampati                           an arahat's mind is unshaken,

[36] Asokam [37] virajam [38] khemam     [36] 't is free from sorrow, [37] pure and [38] secure.

Etam mangala muttamam                         this is the highest auspiciousness.

 

Eta-disani katvana                                    Those who have fulfilled these things,

Sabbattha maparajita                                are invincible everywhere,

Sabbattha sotthim gacchanti                      are safe and happy anywhere,

Tam tesam mangala-muttamamti                              this is the highest auspiciousness.[53]

 

About [1–6] it is said that ‘it would be quite wrong for anyone to think there can be progress and development without the … four mangalas as bases’, and so, ‘whatever one does, whether it concerns religion, economics or politics, one must have these four Mangalas as bases.’ Indeed, in whichever language of whichever country, ‘there is, in fact, no subject, whether it is education or politics or anything else, that can do without the above four bases …’.[54] The first thirteen mangala, ‘as one goes through these Mangalas step by step, one completes the building of the Mangala Country’.[55] As for the first thirty Mangala, it is said that their observance ‘would bring peace, prosperity and well-being to all mankind’, and that these rules ‘must be strictly observed by all national leaders as well as the people’.[56]

Stern warnings apply to Nos [11–17], for these are about obligatory ‘performance’ that ‘must be strictly obeyed or action would be taken against anyone who fails to do so’.[57] Taking [14], [15] and [17] together, these are used to justify what the regime's critics have called ‘forced labour’. The guide expresses much longing for Burma of the past, as if past good behaviour was a product of royal authority – it justifies the current state of affairs in which power is in the hands of the military. For example, as for [15], charity, ‘in the olden days Myanmar was a Mangala country’, because in those days there was much charity when people ‘built monasteries, dug wells and tanks, built roads and bridges on their own initiative and at their own expense’, so that ‘government had to spend very little on such works’. In this way ‘any gift given for the 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p132/392


welfare of the country is charity or dana’.[58] Also, in relation to [17], ‘blameless action’ is ‘mainly associated with welfare and social activities, like building roads and bridges, giving free tuition to the poor and other social work during one's spare time.’

The guide also makes the judgment that today people no longer stand up for the truth, for in relation to [14], ‘a Myanmar, by nature, dares speak out the truth’ even when faced with the death penalty, for ‘such is Myanmar pride’, but since World War II (after democracy and westernisation) ‘the number of people who dare to tell lies has increased’.[59] Nevertheless, not all is lost, for in relation to [19] there are many such holy persons in Burma with whom association is beneficial.[60] As for [22–30], it is claimed that these ‘may be applied to all subjects, including organization and administration, politics and social welfare’, and it is relevant for the military, teachers and students alike.

From [31–38] we find reference to several forms of renunciation, techniques of mental culture and various states of mind that ultimately lead to the state of nibbana beyond this mundane world. This raises complicated questions. Particularly important to the political order are [31–32], tapa and byama-so tayà, for these still operate at the limits of the mundane sphere of life. These are attained by few. However, [33–38] are no longer about observances but about ultimate fulfilment. It is only those who have fulfilled the full Thirty-Eight who have attained ‘the highest auspiciousness’, who ‘are invincible everywhere’, and who ‘dwell in happiness and safety anywhere’. This section raises particularly complicated questions about perceptions of the Buddhist State. This is where the discourse of loka nibbana is situated as the ultimate goal of the State. However, I shall deal with this in more depth later.[61]

Exams in Buddhist culture

The main book used in teaching the youth and USDA members, and available at all bookstalls, is The class book for the exam in Buddhist culture [budÎBaqa y¨\ek¥:m§ saem:pæµ qc\Kn\:sa], first published by the DPPS in 1994. This is divided into four main subjects, including Buddhist cultural practice (prayers, taking the moral precepts, duties (singalovada) and the meaning of Mangala Sutta), Buddhist culture and the Burmese language (dealing with such subjects as Maharathathara's writings Lokaniti, Mahosadha), Buddhist philosophy (the Abhidhamma), and Buddhist theories about the various constituents of body and mind.

Annual exams on Buddhist culture had already been held since May 1984. However, it was felt that a broader reach beyond the monastic schools was needed, for which this new syllabus was intended.

The teachings of the Buddha (Basic Level)[62]

Divided into nine chapters, The teachings of the Buddha introduces the life of the Buddha, how to pay homage, charity, the history of perpetuation and propagation of the sasana, social duties, Abhidhamma, moral culture and the Pali alphabet.

The introduction to this book conveys the purpose for which Buddhist teachings are destined. It says that Buddhist ethics prohibits evil conduct and ‘everyone must dutifully perform his duties related to the society, to the State and to the nation, including oneself, one's family and one's relatives.’ It describes the negative legacy of colonialism for Buddhism, and rejoices in the way current government can support Buddhism freely.

Now the Government of Myanmar is trying to build a modern, prosperous and peaceful nation with great effort, and it realizes the importance of Buddhism in the nation-building. If the people abide by the teachings of the Buddha and give a helping hand in the nation-building, the objectives of rebuilding the country will be accomplished smoothly and rapidly.

For this reason, the Ministry ‘effectively supports the activities for propagation of Buddha's teachings throughout Myanmar’, and ‘especially the Ministry encourages the dissemination of Buddhism in hilly regions and border areas in which Buddhism could not flourish in the past.’ In the syllabus, stress is placed on ‘social duties and moral cultures’ for the youth who are not in touch with regular teachings of the Buddha.

Therefore, if the youths thoroughly study this book, they will realize the essence of Buddhism and become good citizens who display a good moral conduct, who love and cherish their mother-land, their nation and their culture. Only such good citizens will be able to repulse decadent cultures that have infiltrated into the country from other lands. So long as Buddhism flourishes 


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p133/392


in the country, the Union of Myanmar will be peaceful and rapidly develop in every respect.

The book concludes with a chapter on ‘moral culture’, which is divided into polite manners or courtesy, gentleness in speech (verbal politeness), and good thoughts (mental politeness). Moral culture is important for the nation, for ‘every country or every race has its own moral culture which is the characteristic of that country or that race’. Myanmar's moral culture is based on Buddhism. In its emphasis on culture (Buddhendom), however, the authors find an excuse to veer from the Buddha's teachings by including such things as not blowing one's nose or sneezing carelessly, whether at a pagoda platform or school. Indeed, if one wants to fart ‘one should go away from the audience’. Also, one should not be ‘jealous of superior ones’ or ‘compete with companions of the same status’.

Buddhist missionary facilities

As the country opened up to the outside, there was much pent up demand for missionising supposedly pristine Burmese Buddhism to the outside world. One of the major growth industries, therefore, has been Buddhist missionary work.

Between 1962 and 1988, while the country was closed, the main missionary groups were privileged organizations associated with teaching vipassana contemplation, in particular the Mahasi and U Ba Khin traditions, which had much influence in the military regime. These movements go back to the days of the Ledi Sayadaw's foreign mission in 1913, and Hpo Hlaing's assertion of vipassana as the way for Burmese to realise non-self, as opposed to the heathen foreign colonialists occupying Lower Burma.

The missions on the one hand, provided the Burmese communities overseas with a way of keeping in touch with the higher Buddhist traditions of Burma, and provided interested foreigners with instruction on Buddhist meditation techniques as developed in Burma on the other. However, they also provided the Burmese communities in Burma with a regular stream of visitors from abroad, and apart from diplomatic relations this was the only permitted exchange with the outside. The history of its teachers and institutionalization abroad has long exercised the Burmese imagination. In other words, during the period of Burma as a ‘hermit nation’ it was a modest but important instrument for both the internationalisation of Burma and the ‘Burmanisation’ of foreigners. Today, with centres all over the world, this form of Buddhism was certainly Burma's major export service industry.

Since 1988, however, many more traditions have been making plans to propagate the sasana. Also active, apart from the Mahasi and U Ba Khin vipassana traditions, are pupils of the Mahasi Sayadaw, namely Chanmye Sayadaw and Sayadaw U Pandita. The Pa Auk Sayadaw is the contemporary teacher to watch with a large following of foreigners. Among the private initiatives is the Maha Bodhi meditation centre, once documented by Mary Byles, today also building special facilities for foreigners.

Sitagu Buddhist Academy

One of the most spectacular private attempts, however, is the Sitagu Buddhist Academy [qItgUkmëa>budÎtkïqiul\ ] in Sagaing Hills set up by U Nyanissara (b. 1937). In the monastic order since the age of fifteen, he was originally ordained in his place of birth at Thegon Township in Pegu. He was eventually trained by the Sangha University in the English language for the propagation of Buddhism. In 1965, he founded his own college in Lay Myet Hna, and in 1968 he moved to Sagaing. He then spent three years meditating at the Mon forest monastery in Thabeik Aing in Lower Burma, since which he has become known as the Thabeik Aing Tawya Sayadaw [qpit\Aiuc\etar qµkun\:Sraeta\ ARHc\¨a%iœr].

In 1979, he moved back to Sagaing where he was offered his own monastery, namely Sitagu Vihara. In 1981, he began to collect donations for the construction of a water supply system to provide clean drinking water to the six hundred monasteries of Sagaing Hill. And in 1987, he began construction of the Sitagu Aryudhana Hospital, a Sangha hospital equipped with modern medical facilities and a permanent medical staff of thirty, that was opened in March 1990.

In 1981, he went on his first missionary tour to six Asian countries, and he visited the USA the following year. He was exiled by the regime for some three years after the 1988 disturbances, but eventually managed to return, receiving several titles from the regime. He made many tours to many countries, eventually resulting in December 1994 in the foundation of the Sitagu Buddhist Vihara in Texas, USA, by the Theravada Dhamma Society of America.[63]


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p134/392


 

After his return he devoted himself to collecting funds for the Sitagu Buddhist Academy, whose goal is ‘to teach and train missionary student monks and nuns in the hope of further spreading the Buddha's teachings’. In huge grounds many strikingly architect-designed buildings have been erected arranged in a large square, with the aim to teach many of the world's major languages so missionary monks may be trained for work abroad, and interested foreigners may be trained in Burmese Buddhism. When I was there in August 1998, this project had not yet been finalised. U Nyanissara has thirty-nine booklets and pamphlets to his name, mostly in Burmese, but some in English.[64]

The Dhamma Talaka Peace Pagoda

One interesting development is official sponsorship of the new Dhamma Talaka Peace Pagoda built in Birmingham, England. Dhamma Talaka means ‘reservoir of truth’, and the pagoda is described as symbolising ‘peace, compassion and the noble exemplary qualities of the Buddha’, and as ‘the earthly manifestation of the mind of the Buddha’.

It was built under the auspices of Dr Rewatta Dhamma, the Burmese monk who founded the Birmingham Buddhist Vihara in 1978, the first Burmese monk to have established himself in Britain. He gives classes in vipassana in Britain, and was the figure the regime identified as having the potential to mediate with Aung San Suu Kyi, and indeed he was actually involved in mediation attempts. He visited Aung San Suu Kyi on 7 August 1994. She indicated her willingness to negotiate. It would appear from Rewatta Dhamma's account that the SLORC clearance to negotiate came from the highest level and that it was Khin Nyunt who initiated it. Khin Nyunt and Rewatta Dhamma met in May 1994. Because of his mediation, Aung San Suu Kyi met SLORC members on 20 September and 28 October. When Rewatta Dhamma returned to Burma in December, however, and met Aung San Suu Kyi again on 30 January 1995, it became evident that negotiations with the SLORC were not advancing. She had just issued a press release via her husband, delivered in Bangkok, that she was not about to do a secret deal with the regime behind the back of the elected members of parliament, and would only negotiate after having consulted senior members of the NLD and the other parties. This monk emphasized in particular byama-so tayà to overcome the political divide between the NLD and the regime (see below).

The grounds of the Dhamma Talaka Peace Pagoda were consecrated in 1990, construction began in 1993, and it was formally opened between 26–28 June 1998. The pagoda was decorated by two craftsmen from Burma and is filled with various items sent by Burmese donors, including a Buddha statue. The project received official sponsorship from the regime, including a speedy customs passage through of items sent from Burma and the active co-operation of the Burmese embassy. The opening ceremony was attended by senior Ministry of Religion officials, including Minister General Sein Htwa and the Chairman of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee.[65]

International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University (ITBMU)

The regime has put forward various spectacular missionary projects of its own. It has commenced some large-scale building projects for Buddhist missionary facilities at Kaba Aye, including the State Pariyatti Sasana Tekkatho (Yangon), the Convocation Dhammayon Ordination Hall (Kaba Aye) for the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee Sayadaws, the Pitakattaik Library, the projected Sixth Buddhist Synod Mawgun Museum at Kaba Aye and the International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University Project on Dhammapala Hill.[66] It is also renovating the Maha Pasana Cave at Kaba Aye, originally built by U Nu.

The largest project of the regime is undoubtedly the International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University (ITBMU) which opened on 9 December 1998. Ignoring the other Buddhist countries, the regime proclaims that ‘Myanmar is the centre of Theravada Buddhism in South-East Asia’ and that the ‘International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University will stand as a model university.’[67]


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p135/392


Attempts were made to set up Buddhist universities before during the U Nu period, when the Buddha Sasana Council Bill resulted in the foundation of the Dhammadhuta College in 1952. However, this was soon eclipsed by the Sangha University founded several years later by the Institute for Advanced Buddhist Studies with money from the Ford Foundation which enjoyed support from the army.[68]

Drawing its inspiration to a large extent from U Nyanissara's Sagaing initiative (see above), by bringing him in as an adviser, the missionary aspirations are clear from the way the project is introduced on the brochure. Its claim to uniqueness combines scriptural learning with meditation:

Myanmar has carefully preserved Theravada Buddhism for nearly one thousand years. Now she is sharing her knowledge of Buddhism both in theory and practice with the people of the world to promote their happiness and moral well-being. For the first time those who wish to learn Theravada Buddhist canonical texts and insight meditation in Myanmar tradition, will have a chance to study them at the same institution.

Its objectives are to address the non-Burmese speaking population for whom the existing two State Pariyatti Universities in Mandalay and Rangoon are of little use, as the medium of instruction is Burmese.

to share the genuine Theravada Buddhism with the people of the world, to study and comprehend the canonical texts of Theravada Buddhism as approved successfully by the six Buddhist Synods, to teach the people to abstain from evil and do good deeds, to enable the people to believe in karma and its consequences, to know the difference between mind and matter, to promote the four modes of sublime living (Brahma Vihara) which would lead to the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous world, and to encourage and promote knowledge of the Four Noble Truths for Enlightenment.

Described as ‘a permanent centre of higher learning of Theravada Buddhism’, its grounds surround the Dhammapala Hill on which stands the controversial Sacred Tooth Relic Pagoda, which houses the Chinese Tooth Relic. The Relic was bombed on 25 December 1996, killing four people visiting the Kaba Aye Maha Pasana Cave, supposedly to perpetrate a diplomatic row with China.[69]

The university has three faculties, namely a faculty of Pariyatti (scriptural learning) with six separate departments (Vinaya, Suttanta, Abhidhamma, Buddhist Culture and History, Pali Studies, Myanmar Language), a faculty of Patipatti (practice) with three departments (Dhammanuloma, Samatha, Vipassana), and a faculty of Religions and Missionary Works with four departments (Comparative Studies of Religions, Missionary Works, Research, Foreign Languages and Translation). The Rector is Agga Maha Pandita Bhaddanta Silananda Bhivamsa.

The main medium of instruction is English, and the full spectrum of university qualifications is offered: one-year diploma course, Dip. (BDh), Diploma in Buddha Dhamma; two-year Bachelor of Arts degree course, BA (BDh), three-year MA course, MA (BDh); and a four-year PhD research programme, PhD (BDh).

Myanmar's keeping Theravada Buddhism pure and intact for many years finally leads to the emergence of the International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University. Such a university is welcomed because it will contribute much in sharing the knowledge of Buddhism both in theory and practice with the people of the world and with the noble intention of promoting their happiness and moral wellbeing. For those who wish to learn Theravada Buddhist canonical texts and meditation in depth in Myanmar tradition will find no better chance than at this International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University.[70]

The regime does not actually provide salaries, but bears the living expenses of staff and students. At its formal opening on 9 December 1998 it was stated that

Foreign scholars and yogis who come to Myanmar to learn Theravada Buddhist texts and meditation methods cannot study at one institution only, so they have to go to various places in the country. The opening of that University will enable the scholars to study Theravada Buddhist canonical texts and insight meditation practice at the same institution. Theravada Buddhism in English, French, German, Arabic, Hindi, Chinese and Japanese at the University will be implemented later …[71]

Than Shwe concluded his inaugural address saying ‘may I solemnly wish that the essence of the Buddha's teaching thrive and remain firmly in the hearts of peoples throughout the world,’ and ‘may all beings be healthy and wealthy and be able to practise and enjoy the fruits of the Buddha's teaching.’[72]


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p136/392


Buddhification as Myanmafication

Given its sudden emphasis on Buddhism, some have dubbed the regime's efforts to inculcate Buddhist values, in particular through the reports of enforced conversions, as ‘Buddhification’.

Indeed, the role of Buddhism in the dilution of ethnic difference was recognized by the writer Htin Fatt when, during the Ne Win regime, he expressed the view that Anawratha was a hero whose unification was accompanied by stressing Buddhist values. Inscriptions recorded in Anawratha's time were multi-ethnic, and were recorded in the four languages – Pali, Burmese, Mon and Pyu. These do not mention the concept ‘minority’, for the races were ‘all one’. He writes,

The banner under which all were united was the banner of the Buddhist religious society, Sasana. All are equal under Buddhism as a way of life. The idea, minority, never dwelt in the minds of the indigenous races of the Pagan days.[73]

Htin Fatt is a respected Burmese author and not a propagandist. Nevertheless, it is easy to understand how he is only a small step away from the view of races as ‘equal under Buddhism’, and the argument that the conversion of ethnic groups to Buddhism is desirable, for it would eliminate their divisive ways and permit Burma to become one.

This was already evident in A handbook on Burma, in which ‘the peoples of Burma’ are described as having experienced ‘fusion’ under the influence of Buddhism.

From the fourteenth century until the annexation of Burma by the British in the mid-nineteenth century, unification between the three main groups progressed rapidly through the spreading of Buddhist culture. When the British arrived, only the people in the outlying hills remained untouched by he civilizing influence of Buddhism. The rest of the people of Burma embraced Buddhism, thus leading to the growth of one culture, one written language, and one literature in the country.[74]

Sometimes Buddhism is used to overcome the defences of various ethnic and religious communities and to recruit to the Burmese army. A report on the regime's Buddhist activities suggests that Buddhism, as part of the propagandistic Myanmar cultural system, is as much foisted on Buddhist as on non-Buddhist communities. It is therefore better understood as ‘Myanmarize’ or ‘Burmanize’.

The interpretation of ‘Buddhification’ however, does not, account for the ruthless oppression of the Mon, the original Theravada Buddhists in Southeast Asia, or of the Shan, the Pa-o, and the Rakkhine who are also overwhelmingly Buddhist. It would be more accurate to say that SLORC is attempting to ‘Myanmarize’ or ‘Burmanize’ all the ethnic minorities, regardless of their religion. Burman Buddhists are just now experiencing what ethnic minorities, Buddhists and others, have suffered much longer.[75]

One context in which this becomes clear is in the case of the Mahamyat Muni Pagoda. The SLORC had supposedly been in search of pagoda treasures for superior instruments that might help them stay in power. The Mandalay Mahamyat Muni statue was broken open, leaving a gaping hole in the statue, and it was generally presumed that the regime was searching for the Padamya Myetshin, a legendary ruby that ensures victory in war to those who possess it. When anger about this event developed, the regime spread rumours about the rape of a Buddhist girl by a Muslim boy to draw attention away from their pillaging of a Buddhist site. The point of the Mahamyat Muni episode is that it expresses a popular sentiment, namely that the regime is prepared to violate the holiest of commemorations to the Buddha for its own selfish ends. No amount of pagoda donation would appear to compensate for this setback.

A distinction is appropriate between ‘Buddhicisation’, the voluntary inclination towards interpreting through Buddhism, and enforced ‘Buddhification’, the attempt to convert others. The latter is one element in Myanmafication. Myanmafication is intrinsically related to gaining control over, and disseminating and enforcing those cultural forms of Buddhism insofar as these are useful to the State and they enhance its legitimacy. Against this stands Buddhicisation, as the liberating forces of mental culture that are voluntarily applied to cope with the experience of repression and imprisonment, as practised by the political opposition and the repressed. Political opposition is often better coped with, as I shall argue through Buddhicisation.

Myanmafication and the gender question

Myanmafication, since it takes place primarily through the instrument of the army, is to a large extent the masculinization of Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi conveys the impression of being a defenceless and fragile woman aspiring to non-violent methods oppressed by aggressive highly armed male generals. Her femininity


(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p137/392


 differentiates her from the regime.

Rathe