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Chapter
11
Concepts in liberation politics
Sarkisyanz’s
Buddhist backgrounds of the Burmese revolution, despite slight
deficiencies, demonstrates a grasp of certain fundamental emic (internal to)
concepts of Burmese political culture. Most historians and political scientists
have realised that the enduring symbols of national unification, and the most
appealing electorally, are drawn from the domain of Buddhism. However, few have
realised that these are drawn in particular from the practices that make up the
category I have called mental culture.
Mental
culture is capable of establishing and maintaining homologous domains. Shwe Zan
Aung (1910: cover page), influenced by Ledi Hs's work, cites the Buddhist texts:
-
‘Tis
even as a border town, having strong walls and six gates … with a wise and
prudent gate-keeper … Thither should come from the East swift twin messengers,
asking for the lord of the city … he sits in the midst of the crossways. And
they twain, having truthfully delivered their message, should regain their way.
And other twain messengers should come from the West …’
-
…
The town is this body; the six gates are the six senses; the gatekeeper is
mindfulness; the messengers are calm and insight; the lord is mind; the message
is Nibbana.
Such
might also help explain why the Buddhist kingdom is so crucially dependent on
enlightenment experience – it was the Buddha's bodhi mandala around
which it evolved (See App. 1.7, 1.6).
Burmese conceptualization of national liberation politics cannot divorce itself
from personal liberation through mental culture. The more centrist and the less
embedded they are in ethics, the more they veer towards the ‘Hindu’ model of
control over loka and towards samatha and ‘mundane knowledge’
(loki pañña). The less centrist and more broad-minded they are, and the
more embedded they are in ethics, the more they veer towards lokuttara,
towards vipassana and ‘transcendental wisdom’ (lokuttara pañña).
Military politics draws firmly on the former tradition, as it is founded on
power and control, and focuses on and locates itself in particular domains. Aung
San Suu Kyi's politics, on the other hand, draws mainly on the latter, as it is
founded on purity and wisdom, and seeks a more universal good, seeking to
transcend place and the particular location. However, no government in power in
Burma can neglect either; as Aung San himself argued, politicians must ‘clean
up’ dirty politics by raising their minds to a higher level. This is achieved
by selectively emphasizing certain techniques of mental culture.
Here,
I explore six key concepts in Burmese political tradition that have hitherto
passed by unanalysed, but which are a measure of the importance of mental
culture to Burmese political tradition. Two of these – yantarà
(‘mechanism’) and cakka (‘wheel’) – deal with ideas about order
and how government is presupposed to maintain it. Three – tawhlanyeì
(‘revolution’), wunthanú (‘patriots’) and htwetyak gaìng
(‘freedom bloc’) – deal with the process and institutional manifestation
of rebellion and revolution. A fourth, azani (‘martyr’), deals with
the meaning of personal perfection in Buddhist and political tradition.
Government
(Yantarà)
Government is not
just in the hands of human beings, but is very much in the hands of supernatural
forces. These supernatural powers range from low predators, assigned the duty to
guard treasures, trees or other landmarks, to the highest noble deities such as
Sakka, the Buddhist King of the Gods, who oversees all from his seat in the
heavens, and the Brahmas, who can be appealed to for wise and powerful help.
Consequently, techniques of government address more than issues pertaining
merely to the human plane of existence. Hence, to understand government, we must
understand these forces.
One commonly used
concept associated with government, apart from asòyá, is yantarà
[yN†ra:]. For example, General Saw Maung
in one of his speeches said that ‘the machinery of government have now already
ceased turning’ [Niuc\cMeta\yN†ra: lv\pt\m§ha
rp\qæa:ôpI].
In Burmese this concept is commonly used to
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ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
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distinguish different systems of
government.
In Saw Maung's case, what had ceased to function was the machinery Ne Win had
put in motion, and who in 1962 ‘took responsibility for the yantarà
(machinery of government)’ [yN†ra:kiu tawn\KMqv\].
We may ask
whether government is the mechanism, or whether government exists to guide and
facilitate a mechanism not primarily under human control but under the laws of
the universe. Most Burmese politicians will emphasize, for example, the
importance of samsara [qMqra] as
the ultimate form of government. It is this mechanism that is expressed as
‘the yantarà of samsara’ or ‘the wheel of samsara’.
Even Ne Win,
supposedly the most secular and ‘un-Buddhist’ of indigenous politicians, has
been presented by his biographer as working within the boundaries set by the
laws of samsara, the laws of conditioned existence. For example, the
first sentence with which Maung Maung introduces Ne Win says that ‘samsara
revolves around ceaselessly’ [qMqraqv\mrp\mna:lv\pt\jX],
and he explains that all conditioned phenomena in this world are subject to the
same laws of birth and death. Not only is this a common ploy in starting out
writing Burmese historiography, but as I will explain later, this conveniently
explains how Ne Win can be justified to have deposed U Nu, for he took over
government in the name of his superior vision of the laws of samsara that
U Nu had disregarded and misjudged. In other words, U Nu's nibbanic state
has been replaced by another nibbanic state, supposedly more pragmatic
and more down-to-earth, but nibbanic in formal ideology at least.
****
Yantarà
[XRÍYad], from Sanskrit yantra [yóN
† or XR†Y],
Pali yanta [XR†],
is in Burmese defined as (a) ‘a construct invented to aid efficacy in a task,
within which are collected various instruments’ [ZgSm`adAtWmdYFm:eg
TQmMfdReg>mk`a>m :YeXa`WohedWohed:eg AgkSá>md MSmB>mNadk\a `kBa:m`Efd];
(b) ‘weapons released by mechanical means’ [A:mTp>mbZwMmk\a Z:mQ:m]; (c) ‘thing which turns like a
wheel’ [A:m:lb\egb ZFmk\a`Ya].
First,
there is the modern meaning of machinery. In Burmese there are two very
different associations with this term. In current Burmese it means ‘yantarà
wheel’ (‘engine’ or ‘machinery’), as in XRÍYadA:m.
It also means a yantarà army (‘mechanised division’) [XR†YadMSm]
(e.g. a mechanical engineer is sometimes referred to as ‘master of the yantarà’
[XR†YadA:mBYa]).
Second,
this concept has a longer history in its reference to supernatural devices. One
still finds commonly on the Burmese bookstalls books teaching you to draw yantarà
in the sense of diagrams that will enhance one's control over the world. Yantarà
is often used in reference to the workings of kamma (kamma yantarà).
Mostly,
however, it is used in the sense of a supernatural instrument created so as to
gain power.
Evidently the BSPP was not immune to this supernatural element, as we shall see
later, in the ‘mundane techniques’ employed by its leadership. This element
of supernatural power is also evident in the naming of the BSPP Cadre as amyútei
[`WphkMk:Oá], ‘cadre of immortal
jewels’, from (Skt) Amrita-dhani. Note that not only does this
terminology draw heavily on magic, in a way that shades into and runs parallel
to meditation, but nibbana is sometimes also expressed as ‘immortal
country’ [SpFm`WM].
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In the Asoka
inscriptions yantara is a ‘construct’ or mandala:
-
[it]
generally refers to any constructed, artificial instrument or device, and also
denotes a ‘magical diagram’ somewhat akin to a mandala. Like a mandala, it
is essenceless in its outer aspect, but is constructed in such a way that it can
contain within it an essence that can be found by the wise. In fact the word
‘mandala’ means an ‘enclosing of essence.’ As one etymology defines it:
‘manda’ means essence (or ‘pith’) … ‘-la’ means seizing that –
thus ‘seizing the essence’ (mandala).
I
have already noted the re-orientation of the early kingdoms in relation to the mandala
produced by the Buddha's mental culture (App I.4), in which the essence was
captured by the Buddha at the time of his enlightenment, resulting in a complete
reconfiguration of the political landscape. I have also noted that political
leaders have expressed national unity and leadership in terms of terminology
drawn from traditions of mental culture. Certainly there are expressions
available that combine these senses of yantara – namely as modern
machinery, evidence of superior wisdom, and evidence of supernatural power. For
example, in his translation of Visudhimagga, the Mahasi translates what
is referred to elsewhere as the ‘wheel-machine’
as set yantarà. This device was used to test the attainment of the path
to nobility (ariya) and the samadhi of a blindfolded archer, who
in spite of not physically seeing the target hits it.
This supernatural power illustrates the benefits of attaining to the first path
(sotapanna) through samatha-vipassana. This is the power of
superior vision that overcomes adversity by seeing in darkness, and which
systematizes and controls machinery.
The wheel and dhamma
I
have already dealt to some extent with the crucial role of the dhamma in
law and legal discourse. This complex interlinking between mechanics and
government is also evident in the symbolism of the wheel. Sek [A:m],
Pali cakka [A:ï],
from Vedic cakra [A:r], ‘that
which is continuously turning [a wheel]’ or ‘the shape or periphery of it [a
circle]’.
This
concept has as many as eighteen different meanings in Burmese,
of which the following is but a summary.
-
i) a wheel of a
carriage or machine [A:mVfd]
-
ii) a discus [A:raZ:mQ:m]
or any of the supernatural weapons [QMmA:m, A:raZ:mQ:m]. The latter includes the thirteen types of
visible manifestations of the mandan [WR†QmkMam:sfd|
\ÙgSm 13Sád] which ensures freedom from danger, including: the Buddha's
108 marks, the fourteen dhammaset, the nine sangha, the colours radiated by
yahandas and silent Buddhas, lineages of special teachers, Sakka King with his
thunderbolt, the galon, the weapon of fire from the mouth of the naga, and so
forth.
-
iii) a disc or circle as a characteristic mark of a superman (mahapurisa)
-
iv) a [circular] array of troops [A:ïUoj^a]
-
v) a thunderbolt [Weg=m:sehdA:m]
-
vi) authority [`aLaA:m]
-
vii) a circular mark indicative of excellence, privilege or
authority [A:mZ:ðLa] such as the 108 marks
of the Buddha's foot [kÙwA:mkMam]. These
are also supposedly present on the foot of kings [kÙwV[ádkMam], deities, and monks, who do not ‘walk’ but
‘raise their circular marked [feet]’ [A:mkMamTpQmb\Fm]
-
viii) a circular charm buried in the flesh [`\ad~WõðSmk\aA:m]
-
ix) a circular object set up for marksmen to shoot at [SAmYQmA:m,
A:mSeg>md]
-
x) a world system [A:r[_a]
-
xi) agency aroused by medicine and witchcraft
-
xii) the Buddha's teaching [\a\QakMam,
MYadkMam]
The term is also used in a number of other senses, such as
‘a cycle’, ‘a region’ or ‘sphere’. Like yantara, it is used
in conjunction with samsara-cakra
to mean the ‘wheel of transmigration’.
The wheel is a symbol of the dhamma, indeed
represents the dhamma visually.
-
The wheel, the traditional symbol of the Dhamma, expresses
these points in a visual form. The Buddha states [§195] that when he gained
full knowledge of all four truths on all three levels – recognizing the truth,
recognizing the duty appropriate to
(c)
ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series
33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa,
1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p229/392
-
it, and realizing that he had fully
completed that duty – he knew that he had attained full Awakening. He
elaborates on his assertion by setting out a table of two sets of variables –
the four noble truths and the three levels of knowledge appropriate to each –
listing all twelve permutations of the two sets. This sort of table, in Indian
legal and philosophical traditions, is called a wheel. This is why the discourse
in which he makes this statement is called ‘Setting the Wheel of Dhamma in
Motion,’ and why the wheel used as a symbol of the Dhamma has twelve spokes,
uniting at the hub, symbolizing the twelve permutations that merge into a
singularity – knowledge and vision of things as they actually are – at the
still point of non-fashioning in the midst of the cycle of kamma.
-
Because new input into the causal stream is possible at every
moment, the actual working out of this/that conditionality and dependent
co-arising can be remarkably fluid and complex. This point is borne out by the
imagery used in the Canon to illustrate these teachings. Although some
non-canonical texts depict dependent co-arising as a circle or a wheel of causes
– implying something of a mechanical, deterministic process – the Canon
never uses that image at all. Instead it likens dependent co-arising to water
flowing over land: lakes overflow, filling rivers, which in turn fill the sea [§238];
while the tides of the sea rise, swelling the rivers, which in turn swell the
lakes [S.XII.69]. This imagery captures something of the flow of give and take
among the factors of the process. A more modern pattern that might be used to
illustrate dependent co-arising is the ‘strange attractor’: an intricate,
interwoven pattern that chaos theory uses to describe complex, fluid systems
containing at least three feedback loops. As we will see below, the number of
feedback loops in dependent co-arising is far more than three.
-
The self-sustaining nature of dependent co-arising makes it
easy to see why many non-canonical texts explain it as a wheel. However, the
many openings for feedback loops among the various factors – creating smaller
cycles within the larger cycle – make the process exceedingly complex. This
explains why stress and suffering are so bewildering. If they were a simple
cycle, there would be little or no variety to the sufferings of living beings,
and the process of suffering would be easy for everyone to predict and
understand.
In Burma most Buddhist wheels, including those represented
on the fans of monks, are twenty-four spoked wheels (based on the patthana).
However, the twelve-spoked wheel is that of the Dhamma (Four Noble Truths and
Eightfold Path).
The wheel is also more than this, for it also spontaneously
appears as a symbol of the righteous universal king. To prevent the Buddha from
accomplishing his renunciation after seeing the omens, Mara told the Buddha that
‘on the seventh day from today, the celestial Wheel Treasure for you will
certainly make its appearance’. The Buddha replied, ‘I already know even
before you that the divine Wheel Treasure will certainly arise for me. As for
myself, I do not have the least desire to become a Universal Monarch ruling over
the four Continents’ and told Mara to go away.
Also upon encountering King Bimbisara, who offered him kingship, he thought that
‘it would have been certain that I would become a Universal Monarch’.
In a similar way Burmese kings had the dhamma wheel
appear. Manuha Min was reputed to be possessed of the wheel, and in the
following paragraph it is clear how this symbol is closely related to pagoda
building and royal authority:
-
Now the glory of king Manuha, it is said, was this, that
whenever he spake a wheel issued radiant from his mouth. So when Manuha visited
and bowed his head before Anawrahtaminsaw, that king was aghast, and his hair
stood on end. Thereafter, in order to demean Manuha's glory, dominion and power,
he caused his food to be always prepared upon a jewelled salver and first
dedicated to a pagoda and then set before the king. And king Manuha took no heed
nor scrutiny, but ate of it. Thus after a while the radiant wheel that issued
from his mouth vanished. Then only, when it vanished, it is said he set his
heart at rest, saying, ‘Plot I never so shrewdly, it may not be!’ Then
stricken with remorse, he built a colossal Buddha seated with legs crossed, and
a dying Buddha as it were making parinirvana; and he prayed saying,
‘Whithersoever I migrate in samsara, may I never be conquered by
another!’ The temple is called Manuha to this day.
Kyanzittha is also supposed to have been in possession of
the wheel ‘because of his wheel-mark of royalty, and because the waterpot
fell back when they gave him to drink, he is also written Kayalanzittha.’
[kYMeg:mYaMt>m A:mNt:m} :YadZn\Fm:eg
`k:ra>mdSð} ‘:YadZnAAm\ad’ ^i}ZFmd
kYd:r\Fm].
-
[after Anawratha
had killed many thousands of babies and boys hoping to kill Kyanzittha] Now
Kyanzittha's mother entrusted her son to the king's chaplain and he
became a monk. And the masters of white magic and black spakke yet again,
saying, ‘He hath become a monk!’ And the king asked them: ‘How may this be
known?’ And they answered: ‘Invite thou them to a meal, and when it is ended
offer them water in a water-pot; and lo! from the mouth of him who shall be king
the wheel-mark will stand out radiant.’ So the king invited all the monks in
order; each day he served and gave them to eat. One day he invited Kyansittha
and served him and gave him to eat. When the meal was over, in due time he
offered him drinking-water in a waterpot. And lo! from Kyanzittha's mouth the
wheel-mark stood out radiant [Neg`;á
:oQmAAm\ad;nMt>mdWuA:mkSpa>mkSpa>mNt:m\Fm]; and the king saw it
and was aghast, and the pot fell back. And the king cried, entreating him:
‘Wilt though rob me of my throne?’ And the masters of white magic and black
[^idYadTpj^idYadFegMegb] spake into his
ear, saying, ‘He shall be king in the second generation after thee.’ And the
king said: ‘Ye tell me this but now. Alas! I have killed many, thinking he
would rob me of my throne!’ And he made Kyanzittha become a layman, that he
might attend in his
(c)
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ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series
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1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p230/392
-
presence. He took pity on him being his own son, and named
and called him Kyanzittha.
When
Anawratha sought to overcome Utibwa, the Chinese king in Gandala, and instructed
the Shwehpyi brothers, ‘he sleepeth guarded by a wheel [kYA:mRu>mb`eSm\Fm],
an engine worked by water. Suck out all the water with a tube, and mark three
lines on Utibwa's body.’
Revolution (tawhlanyeì)
The above discussion suggests that the mechanism of
government is not conceived as independent in and of itself. Rather, these
depend on and derive legitimacy from larger ideas about order governed not by
ordinary secular laws. The idea that government is maintained, on the one hand,
through supernatural magic in order to manipulate loka, and on the other
through mental culture to transcend loka remains with us at all times.
Hence, one would expect that the concept of political opposition and resistance
would partake of this quality also. Let me consider here to what extent Burmese
concept of ‘revolution’ draws on such meanings.
The term for revolution in Burmese is tawhlanyeì [eta\lHn\er:].
Taw in this context is an affix that denotes power, sacredness, reverence
or royalty, as in ‘sacred relics’ [Dåt\eta\],
‘holy abbot’ or ‘teacher of royalty’ [Sraeta\],
or ‘royalty’ [eta\wc\]. Hlan
means to change the position of things, such as ‘to turn inside out’ or
‘to turn up’. It thus means ‘inversion’ or ‘revolution’.
In his article ‘Burmese concepts of revolution’, Robert
Taylor analyses the concept of revolution in the context of modern politics
since the 1930s. On the whole, he makes an interesting argument over the
distinct uses of the terms ayeìdaw bon, as a lesser concept for
revolution implied in the 1948 struggle for national independence, versus taw
hlan yeì, the ‘real’ concept of revolution as implied in the 1962 Ne
Win revolution. So far, so good. However, Taylor makes this sweeping statement
that ‘in the classical, precolonial Theravada Buddhist-derived political
thought of Burma, the concept of political and social revolution did not
exist’, and that ‘political change meant primarily the substitution of one
ruler by another of the same kind.’ While saying this, he proposes no
reference to the Buddhist interpretations of the term. At least he could have
browsed through Sarkisyanz' Buddhist backgrounds of the Burmese revolution
to know that the meanings he attributes to the taw hlan yeì concept need
some reference to Buddhist ideas in order to work.
As I see it, there are three problems with Taylor's work.
First, his perspective on Burmese politics is blinkered on the Ne Win period, as
if 1962 was the magic moment that made everything right. Second, he generalises
about other periods as if they were inferior, unchanging, always in turmoil, and
so forth, as compared to the post-1962 era, which was revolutionary,
well-calculated and pragmatically conceived. Third, the way he illustrates these
concepts has remarkably limited depth, as if only Ne Win's ideas mattered, and
as if he had finally re-engineered the Burmese language to correctly express
appropriate political ideas.
There follows below a corrective of his arguments that in
pre-colonial Buddhist-derived political thought ‘the concept of political and
social revolution did not exist.’ I have already shown in chapter 9, how the
early personalities advocating vipassana, in particular U Hpo Hlaing and
Ledi Sayadaw, were characterised as ‘revolutionary’ (tawhlan yeì).
In chapter 10, I argued that, in the absence of a secular political space, the
Sangha is the custodian for harbouring rebellion. Here, I will argue that the
concept of ‘revolution’ can be interpreted in a radically different way from
Taylor's approach, taking into consideration a broader range of meanings over a
longer period of time. These indicate that revolution has always been there, but
it is conceived of as primarily realised in the person, not the collective –
this point Taylor misses entirely.
There are at least three early uses of this term. First,
the redemption of Vessantara's children from Zuzaka, the Brahmin, is sometimes
referred to as taw hlan thi. Prince Vessantara, who was to become Gautama
Buddha two lives later, gave his children away to Zuzaka, the Brahmin, in his
quest for the perfection of ‘charity’, and said ‘take them as their
master’. However, when Vessantara's parents eventually redeemed the children,
it was expressed as tawhlan thi, indicating that they had freed the
children from ownership by this Brahmin who behaved so despicably towards them.
Second, royalty and monks, i.e. those who are not in
bondage to the king, are sometimes able to go
(c)
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after greater forms of freedom.
For example, the same concept is used in the Pagan inscriptions to indicate the
‘revolution against greed [that produces the condition] of slavery’ [rmîk\kæ¥n\AòPs\mHeta\lHn\].
This indicates an early underpinning of revolution as arising primarily in the
mind, not necessarily as an ideology, but more as a practice that uproots greed.
Such is accomplished by gifts and charity (paradoxically, as perfected by
Vessantara who gave away his children in the first place, and by mental
culture).
Third, this very same verb, used in a passive sense, used
to be part of the formal question asked of a monk to know whether he is eligible
to be ordained, ‘are you a free [taw-lan] man?’ [eta\ln\mc\:ss\òPs\påf ela], i.e. ‘are you free from service to
the king?’ In the modern ordination texts the question is posed as follows:
[ordainer asks] Are you someone who
is truly free [taw hlan] and are not one of the four kinds of slaves?
BUzieqax
AN†azat-seqa k”n\el:m¥oi:tiu>tæc\ mpåwc\Bµ eta\lHn\ekac\:òmt\eqaqUqv\XAqix
òPs\fla:X
[initiate answers] Yes, venerable. I am a free [taw hlan]
and worthy person.
Aam
BeN†X XBeN†x ARHc\Bura:X Aamx eta\lHn\ekac\:òmt\eqaqU òPs\påqv\Bura:X
The monk is admitted to the ordination ceremony only if he
can answer that he is indeed free. This emphasis on prior freedom as a requisite
to ordination indicates that those who become monks have autonomy from royal and
any other kind of service. Once a monk, this freedom is subject to certain
guarantees, as the domain of the Sangha is relatively autonomous. It was from
this relatively independent Sangha hierarchy, furthermore, that kings drew their
highest servants. The Sangha was the path of labour mobility and the nexus for
relations between village and capital that a king needed in order to sustain and
legitimate his authority.
Fourth, and here it is possible to link the second and the
third concept, this ‘revolution’ idea is sometimes explicitly linked to the
uprooting of the self. There is an overlap between emancipation from the king,
from slavery and from ‘I’. The term for ‘I’ in Burmese is ‘your
holiness slave’ [k”n\eta\x k”n\m],
and to become a monk means no longer requiring to use this term for oneself.
In a booklet entitled Revolution against the self [At†eta\lHn\er:],
Teizàwbatha argues that the revolution concept in the initiation rite described
above implies that monks are ‘revolutionaries against the self’ [At†eta\lHn\er:]
as they are engaged in uprooting self, ‘the buildings of the enemy’, samsara
and wrong-viewedness, by uprooting craving [tanha t%Ha].
This, he argues, is what is implied in the Buddhist concept of ‘emancipated
one’ [ariya Ariya].
When we juxtapose these ideas about revolution, we realise
that what the Burmese mean by revolution needs to be understood in terms of the
Buddhist domain. Indeed, only drawing from Buddhist practices permits true
freedom from the kilesa, and thus to uproot the self. Here, since
ultimate freedom from slavery is to uproot ‘I’, these ideas bind mental
culture to revolution. The fact that this interpretation is not without merit is
evident in the powerful use of mental culture terminology in the speeches by
historical political revolutionary figures, including monks and secular leaders.
Evidently this is not irrelevant to the post-1962 concept
of revolution considering Maung Maung's analysis of Ne Win's role in what is
known as the Revolutionary Government [eta\lHn\er:
Asiu:r]. Maung Maung begins his description in the same way as the royal
chronicles, in which history is a form of contemplation on impermanence.
Furthermore, U Nu's rule, overthrown by Ne Win, had presented politics as being
about setting in place the possibility for people to attain to nibbana.
The first seven pages of Maung Maung's account of the Ne Win period are devoted
to the assertion that not only is the individual subject to samsara, but
so is the community, the village, the district and the country. Since he follows
Aung San in saying that ‘politics is samsara’ [Niuc\cMer:
qMqra], Burma's journey is also a journey of samsara. It is
important on this samsara journey to make the sasana flourish.
However, the BSPP asserted that ‘on an empty stomach, it is impossible to be
moral’ [AUmetac\.x qIlmesac\.ûkeqaeûkac\.\].
So without the necessities of life it is impossible to be totally free from the
mental defilements of greed and anger. Therefore, under Ne Win socialism the
revolution was represented as the ‘pragmatic’ preparation for nibbana
within the material world. This suggests that, according to Buddhist criteria,
Ne Win's revolution was a ‘lesser’ and not a
(c)
ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
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‘greater’ revolution. I
therefore believe Taylor is quite wrong even to characterise the Ne Win period
as revolutionary – it was Hpo Hlaing, U Nu, and now Aung San Suu Kyi, who are
the revolutionaries. They motivate people, Ne Win did not.
Hence, to understand revolution it is not enough to
juxtapose an unchanging pre-colonial Theravada idea void of revolutionary
potential against Ne Win's modern idea – the two blend and the later concept
feeds on the earlier. Ne Win's concept was never as radical as what Taylor
imagined it to be. The revolution was one of the spirit which it was in the
interest of the army, in control over loka, to deny.
Village
Nationalist Associations (Wunthanú Athìn)
If government and revolution
both address superior spiritual and supernatural orders, and are underpinned by
Buddhist practice and secular magic, then we would expect to see this in
concrete examples of the organization of Burmese resistance against colonial
power. How much of this do we observe here?
Two forms of rebellion
Widespread rebellions occurred
during the period between 1930–32. Two types have been identified, both
closely related to organizations called wunthanú athìn.
(i) The most effective
rebellions were those which also had the strongest wunthanú membership.
Sometimes wunthanú athìn were renamed Galon athìn. This
includes the rebellions of: Saya San who was a village wunthanú leader;
of Yazeinda in Henzada District, which originated with the campaign to collect
funds for So Thein GCBA in a wunthanú meeting; of U Thattalawka in
Yamethin District, where the main leadership was drawn from the chairman and
executives, and almost all members of the group were members of local wunthanú
athìn.
(ii) Other rebellions took place
by self-appointed leaders who, though not themselves members, nevertheless
worked in close co-operation with wunthanú. These include San Pe, Maung
Mya, Shwe Yon, Saya Nyan, San Mya, and Pyon Cho in Gyi.
Both rebellions stress (a) the
importance of ‘medicine’ (hseì) which includes tattooing and making
oneself invulnerable to weapons; (b) the revival of kingship, in which the
leaders are proclaimed king or prince, whose duty it is to defend and revive
Buddhist practice and Buddhist learning.
The earlier philosophy of
non-co-operation and self-sufficiency was advocated by the monk U Ottama. U
Ottama as early as 1911 had used the concept wunthanú rehkitá in his
preaching. U Ottama preached that nationalists should wear home-made cloth, and
boycott tinned and other goods of foreign manufacture. Wunthanú Athìn [wMqanu
Aqc\:] eventually became the name used for the collection of rural
nationalist grass-root village organizations encouraged in the 1920s by the GCBA
during its 1921–22 protests against taxation. Operating nation-wide, these
organisations were later given a more explicitly political basis by CP Hkin
Maung, the publisher of the YMBA's annual conference records and author of
political works.
Beyond providing the rebellions
with manpower, the wunthanú groups were, furthermore, the grass-root
support organizations from which eventually the Thahkin and the secular
political parties evolved in the 1930s. Furthermore, they also point at an early
concept for the army in Burmese mythology. It has been variously translated as
‘racially faithful ones’
and ‘Nationalist Principles’,
and characterised as a ‘patriotic title’.
Confusion of meanings
Though Burma's nation-wide
anti-colonial struggle originated with the Wunthanú Athìn, I believe
that the Buddhist and cultural themes underlying the meaning of wunthanú
are still misunderstood. First, members of the British colonial regime do not
seem to have appreciated its meaning.
Indeed, in my view,
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not even Burmese historians of this struggle touch on the
central concept underlying these organizations.
Second, there is considerable
ambiguity in the translation of Wunthanu, in particular as an element in
the names of various religious and political parties. When Ba Maw termed his
party Sinyetha Wunthanu Party in 1936, most scholars mistakenly
translated Wunthanú simply as ‘Association’ or ‘Party’, calling
it the Sinyetha Party.
Third, confusion over the exact
meaning of Wunthanu extends to the designation ‘The General Council of
Burmese Associations’ (GCBA) [òmn\matiuc\:rc\:qa:
(wMqanUPæµ>) Aqc\:m¥a:f Aqc\:K¥op\] or Myanma (Wunthanú) Athìngyokgyì,
which literally means ‘the great Burma controlling group (of wunthanú)
associations’ or ‘chief association of wunthanú ahpwé [wMqaNuAPæµ>K¥op\]’.
In some naming, Wunthanú and Athìn have been conflated into
‘Association’, as if wunthanú was redundant and was without meaning.
This runs counter to the view that, as noted, it is the Athìn element
that means ‘association’.
Components of the term
So far the evidence is that the wunthanú
concept has remained mostly untranslated because its meaning has not been
understood. What does this element mean? Wunthanú Athìn is made up of
two concepts, each of which has a history of its own. This Wunthanú [[n\aQg]
concept is short for wunthanú rekhkítá [wMqanurikðit],
P. vamsa anurakkhita. This is made up of vamsa, ‘lineage’, [`Wohed]
and anurakkhita, ‘preserve for eternity’, [`WqlkAa>mbkÙua:m;p>md].
Wunthanú by itself has been translated as ‘guarding [one's] own
kind’ [m¥oi:esac\.] or myòchit [m¥oi:K¥s\],
‘loving (one's own) kind’, i.e. patriotism. It means ‘preserving
the lineage, carrying on the tradition’ [`Woged`QtXm:eg kAa>mb kÙua:m;p>md"`Woghed:egkAa>mbkÙua:m\i].
The concept Athìn was
used in old Burma to refer to regimental royal service units.
The ahmudan were inhabitants of the irrigated areas of so-called
‘home-provinces’ around the Kyaukse, Minbu-Magwe and Shwebo area. They
belonged to specialised service units (asu or athìn) which owed
personal services to the royal court, usually called in through the township
officer (myóthugyì) in lieu of taxes to the royal court,
as opposed to ethnic groups in Lower Burma, who belonged to the non-taxpaying
groups (athi).
Since these service units did
not pay taxation, but instead provided services for the king (and by implication
for the king's sustenance of the Buddhist realm), it is no surprise that this
designation should have been revived to protest against the unfairness of the
British taxation system. Furthermore, as we shall see, the concept of wunthanú
also underscores the meaning of the army working in the service of the king as
upholder and protector of the Buddhist realm. These groups were
characteristically tattooed. Though tattooing had greatly diminished by the
early 1920s, it was revived in the mid-1920s among the wunthanú. British
administrators ‘discovered that one of the first evidences of planned
insurrection was a marked increased of tattooing activity’.
Wunthanú
– an interpretation
So far, I have not encountered
an explanation of wunthanú in any document purporting to analyse these
village organizations.
In the absence of an interpretation I will offer my own. Some aspects of Burmese
politics fall into place when we consider an episode concerning an individual
called Buddharakkhita, expounded in 5th century AD commentary Visudhimagga.
Buddhaghosa, in his account of the earth device, seeks to show the speed with
which the earth device can be established by proper command of ‘habitual
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behaviour’ [[á\f]:
-
For this Elder [Buddharakkhita VgOÎYe:ðeM],
eight years after his ordination, was once seated in the midst of thirty
thousand monks who were possessed of psychic powers [MQm;egdÙu>m], and had come to minister to the sick Elder Mah@rohanagutta
at Therambatthala. He saw the king of the Supanna birds (Galon) [<_hQmW>md]
dashing across the sky with intent to seize the king of the Nagas [Q<ádW>md]
who was offering rice-gruel to the Elder, and immediately created [TQmB>md}]
a mountain into which, catching him by the arm, he made the Elder enter. The
king of the Supannas struck the mountain and flew away. The Elder said,
‘Friends, if Rakkhita had not been there, all of us would have deserved blame
[`:lbYâl;n:rYSá\Fm] … .’
The ‘King of the Nagas’ is
associated with guarding enlightenment and the Buddhist realm. He receives the
bowls used by a succession of impending Buddhas to feed themselves immediately
prior to their enlightenment. Given the critical importance of Buddhas for
orderly proceeding of the cosmology (and the political order), he therefore also
plays a role guarding the entire cosmology and its inhabitants. Since without
the Buddha there would be no Sangha, he is therefore also regarded as protector
of the Sangha. Since without Sangha there would be disorder in society, he is
regarded as a protector of society also. In this particular example, the King of
the Nagas affords the power of protection to the most valuable senior members of
the monastic order responsible for maintaining its continuity and for that of
the political and social order.
Reinterpreting Burmese political naming
In my view, to understand wunthanú
properly means to understand government as addressing the machinery considered
earlier, namely the higher order of samsara. It means to understand the
importance of mental culture and supernatural power to the Burmese polity and
Burmese genres of history. Indeed, to understand this, in turn, means to
understand a range of other symbolic representations used by Burmese political
leaders.
The galon-naga opposition. In Burmese myths, the naga
is closely associated with the earth and water, as opposed to the galon,
who guards the sky. The Burmese have often represented conflict between the
British and the Burmese, on the one hand, and inter-generational conflict
between Burmese politicians, on the other hand, in terms of the conflict between
the galon and the naga. For example, U Saw and Ba Maw were
conceived as lining up with the galon of Saya San against the British
representing the naga. However, with the new generation of politicians,
such as U Nu, the naga came to be emphasized, instead, against the galon
enemy of the earlier generation of politicians.
In Burmese political history,
competing political agencies are thus expressed in terms of the tension between
the galon and the naga because these are supernatural agencies
that are widely considered to be powerful in affecting the machinery of
government and because of their role affecting and facilitate the machinery of samsara.
This is also evident in the propaganda against Aung San Suu Kyi, where she is
portrayed, not as the galon but as the Myayngu bird, a dangerous
irrelevance to the battle between the naga and the galon, for its
excrement permits the passing of seeds of the Banyan tree that destroys pagodas.
Patriots (myò-chit). Translation of wunthanú
as ‘patriot’ (myò-chit) makes a case for seeing continuity of this
concept into U Saw's Myochit Party, sometimes translated as Lovers of the
Nation, Lovers of the Land
or Love of Country
Party.
Legitimacy and meditation.
In the above example, entry into jhana, by means of the earth device,
permitted the creation of earth to defend continuity of the Buddhist realm. This
demonstrates how practising concentration on the earth device and mastery of
habits [[á\f] leads to the attainment of
these jhana.
There are various examples of
the use of samatha terminology as permitting the creation of and control
over earth, and governing and defending of domain. This has already been noted
in Thahkin Kodawhmaing's characterisation of Burmese self-rule and in the
concept of Aung San unifying through samadhi. I have also
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ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
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4-87297-748-3, p235/392
already cited
the example in which a monk published a leaflet calling for Wunthanu
members ‘to pledge themselves not to forget the lawlessness of the English,
and to meditate throughout the day on the law of impermanence [presumably of
British rule]’. The result is the same
– bring us back control over our land.
Freedom
Bloc (Htwetyak gaìng)
By now it should be evident that there is something in the
view that, because government addresses mechanisms of a higher order, mental
culture, taken in its broadest sense must play a role in qualification for
government. I have already indicated that Aung San's unification of Burma was
perceived as due to his samadhi or one-pointed mind associated with the
practice of concentration meditation (samatha). I have also indicated the
importance of byama-so tayà to national harmony (unity), as pointed out
by Thahkin Kodawhmaing. Here, I would like to demonstrate how the Freedom Bloc [Tæk\rp\giu%\:],
that nation-wide alliance against British colonialism that later evolved into
the AFPFL, expresses this link also. This illustrates the power of the link
between the struggle for ‘freedom’, in an absolute sense as freedom from samsara,
and ‘national independence’, as the freedom to control samasara. This
freedom, once again, is conceived of as arising in terms of the shape of the
circle – in this respect it resembles the ideas we have already looked at,
namely the yantarà, mandala, sek, and the dhamma.
However, it is not just the similarity in shape and the emphasis on mental
culture, but to this is added also that it is conceived of as the only ‘true
revolution’, a concept we have also already investigated.
Dr Ba Maw (1893–1977) was a politician who consciously
understood the importance of these higher forms of address to ideas of
government. Indeed, as a Christian himself, he may be said to have used
meditation sect symbolism instrumentally to further his political career.
Though much disliked by many Burmese, and in particular Burmese Buddhists, for
his collaboration with the English and the Japanese (he was a
‘Them-Burman’), Dr Ba Maw was Burma's most important public leader over a
fourteen year period between 1931–45. Ba Maw was born in the Delta town of
Maubin on 8 February 1893. His father U Kye, also known as U Shwe Kye, having
knowledge of both French and English accompanied the first Burmese mission sent
by Mindon to Europe. His father was also author of the Kinwun Mingyi's diaries.
He was educated at Rangoon College where he received his BA in 1913, and he
received his MA from Calcutta University in 1917. He was at Cambridge University
1922–23, was called to the bar in London in 1924, and received his doctorate
in Bordeaux also in 1924. He was the first Burmese to be appointed at Rangoon
College, where he was a lecturer in English between 1917–20.
Like Saya San, he joined the GCBA. He qualified as a lawyer
in 1924 and first came to prominence in 1931 with his defence of Saya San in the
colonial courts. Though he lost the case, ‘Ba Maw's attempt to champion the
cause greatly enhanced his popularity … and upon this wave of popularity Dr Ba
Maw rose to political fame.’
In 1936, he founded the Sinyetha (Poor Man's) Party, which was influential in
Burmese politics of the 1930s and early 1940s.
He was a leading politician in terms of public office
(though not always with the support of the public) until the British returned to
Burma in 1945. In the dyarchy cabinet of 1934 he was Minister of Education, and
became Burma's first Prime Minister under the new constitution in 1937, a
position he held until his government was brought down by the Rangoon University
students in February 1939. By October 1939, he became leader of the Freedom
Bloc, a new political alliance.
Under the Japanese, he later became Chief Administrator of
the Burma Executive Administration in 1 August 1942.
He was appointed formal leader of the indigenous administration of Burma under
the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in August 1943 which lasted until the
end of the Japanese occupation in April 1945. He was at that time Head of State
(Adipati), Prime Minister and Supreme Commander of the Burmese Armed
Forces. During his ‘coronation ceremony’, Thahkin Kodawhmaing gave him the
oath of office as if he were a king: ‘Adipati Ahinmingyi, Oh King! dost
thou promise to rule this land with justice and mercy? O King, dost thou
solemnly pledge to rule as your forefathers ruled, upholding the laws of time
immemorial?’.
Subsequent to the return of the British, he founded the
Mahabama Party in 1946, although the
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ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33,
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4-87297-748-3, p236/392
llimelight which the thirty Burma
Independence Army comrades achieved in the liberation of Burma, and his
involvement with the British and the Japanese administrations, eclipsed him from
a role in national politics.
Ba Maw's political career
There are three points to note about Ba Maw's career.
First, in 1924, the same year he was awarded his doctorate, he published Buddhist
mysticism: a psychological study, which indicates his early interest in
mental culture. I have not yet
located this, but in his 1925 review of it, Furnivall made a most interesting
comparison with William James' The varieties of religious experience in
which he suggested that, unlike James’ analysis, ‘Dr Ba Maw lays more stress
on the fruit bearing character of mysticism’ and ‘brings out that the mystic
experience itself is energising, an impulse, a refreshment of strength, a
renewal and intensification of vitality, whether for good or evil … This fruit
bearing characteristic of the true mystical impulse probably distinguishes it
from the anaesthetic revelations with which William James’.
Second, as a recently qualified lawyer, in 1931 he took on
the defence in the colonial courts of this very active element of mysticism in
Saya San, who posed the greatest challenge British authorities had met.
Third, in his memoirs, he recounts how in October 1939 he
was instrumentally involved in the creation of the Freedom Bloc, which he
conceived of in terms of a form of Buddhist mysticism.
Founding the Freedom Bloc
The Freedom Bloc was a wartime nationalist alliance between
the Sinyetha [Poor Man's] Party, Dobama Asiayone [Us Burma Party], and the
All-Burma Students organization. In his gloss on the English meaning, Ba Maw
first indicates that the students of the time, who proposed it to him in
September 1939, intended it to mean a war time alliance ‘for Burmese
freedom’ phrased in a way so as not to antagonize the British:
-
We chose the name of the alliance in the same way, empirically.
We realised at once the importance of finding a name that would capture the
Burmese masses. It had to be simple, nostalgic, if possible with a touch of race
or religion, and inflammatory without being too openly so, in order to keep
clear of the new defence regulations.
However, given his background in Buddhist mysticism, Ba Maw
put a different gloss on its Burmese name. After having described the English
concept Freedom Bloc, he then describes its Burmese equivalent, Htwet Yat
Gaing [Tæk\rp\giu%\:], a name which
already existed in the Burmese language to describe various kinds of cults, but
which he decided to apply to this movement. He translates the term as ‘The
Association of the Way Out’. Such explanation is at variance, it should be
pointed out, with Tinker's view that this name was ‘a name in obvious
imitation of Subhas Chandra Bose's Forward Bloc in India’
– Tinker's view at most applied exclusively to the English rendering of this
concept, leaving the Burmese idea to lead its own life.
The freedom Ba Maw sought to put forward to the public, is
the kind won in particular by means of samatha or concentration
meditation, for Bo Bo Aung, the supernatural character around which the
mythology of this movement revolves, is a patron of practitioners of samatha
who is portrayed usually with a rosary around his neck in a meditation position.
Ba Maw's actions reverberated among the members of these cults. For example, in
one biography of Bo Bo Aung published in 1939, the year the Freedom Bloc was
founded, the Freedom Bloc was identified
as appearing ‘like the sun and the moon’ the promise of benefits for all
Buddhists who supported the sasana upon the instructions of the ‘higher
teachers’ [`N:mBYa:sfd].
Ba Maw's early focus on Buddhist mysticism in his
doctorate, to my mind, played a role in inclining him to defend Saya San. Like
in the Bo Bo Aung millenarian cults, Saya San was widely regarded as an aspirant
weikza. He had written two books on indigenous medicine (loki pañña),
one of which starts with evoking the path to nibbana.
In one of his books, Saya San is described as ‘leader of the revolution’ (eta\lHn\er:eKåc\:Sac\).
Since politics is so closely tied into this samatha discourse and the
control over lokai that this implies, defense of Saya San in the colonial
courts launched Ba Maw into his political career. From the Saya San rebellion he
learnt many a lesson as to how to masterfully manipulate the Burmese millenarian
belief-system surrounding Bo Bo Aung to rally the Burmese peasants for the
Freedom Bloc.
The homelessness (in absence of having no home rule) of the
Freedom Bloc's functionaries helped forge
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ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33,
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4-87297-748-3, p237/392
‘a new sort of relationship among
us, something deep and mystical, like a revolutionary comradeship’. But it was
also more than that, for the choice of Burmese name of Freedom Bloc was meant to
appeal to the Burmese masses, and yet its political significance be sufficiently
impenetrable to the British.
Bo Bo Aung
Ba Maw's description of this Burmese dimension to the
Freedom Bloc is instructive for it directly associates personal spiritual
emancipation with the power of kingship. He begins this description by
recounting the story of Bo Bo Aung (see also on Aung San below, who some thought
a manifestation of Bo Bo Aung). Towards the end of the 18th century and during
the 19th century, there was a friendship between three persons: a) a man who
later became a hermit to attain ‘emancipation’; b) U Waing who founded a
great kingdom; and c) Bo Bo Aung who accomplished both.
-
Just at that time [of the foundation of the Freedom Bloc] an
old Burmese legend mysteriously revived across the country. It relates the story
of three school friends who entered into a pact to remain loyal to one another
through life. In after years, one of them became a hermit and attained the
supreme goal of emancipation; another, U Waing by name, became a king and
founded a great kingdom. The third among them, however, proved to the greatest;
he achieved the mystic's dream of complete power and transcendence.
He then goes on to recount the life of Bo Bo Aung, who
accomplished both the transformation of himself and the restoration of the new
kingdom.
-
One day the mystic, whose name was Bo Bo Aung, visited the king
in his palace in Amarapura. The king resented the existence of anyone in his
kingdom who could even remotely be a threat to this life and throne; he believed
that Bo Bo Aung's mystical powers were palpably such a threat, and so he decided
to do away with him. Knowing the king's thoughts, Bo Bo Aung walked boldly into
his presence, wrote a single O, which is the Burmese letter called wa,
on the wall, and defied the king to rub it out before he dared to think that he
would succeed in killing him. As soon as the king had rubbed out that O
two appeared in its place, and the two when rubbed out became four, and four
became eight, and so it went on doubling with every attempt till all the walls
were covered with the writing. Convinced now that Bo Bo Aung had attained
complete mystical powers, the king repented, renounced his throne and family,
and became a lone recluse.
So Ba Maw recounted here how the reigning king gave way to
the power of the mystic cum ruler-to-be, and how this disappointed king himself
went out into the forest to apply himself to becoming a recluse.
But his talk is of more than mere mystique. Finally, Ba Maw
goes on to assess the concrete relevance of bringing Bo Bo Aung into the
politics of Burma's liberation as follows:
-
The story had an astonishing effect; it aroused a great longing
for the past, its belief in magic, in mysterious powers and agencies in
constantly shaping our lives, in the messianic dream of a being who, having
himself attained deliverance, will one day deliver the Burmese from their
bondage. A popular song about Bo Bo Aung which appeared at the same time caught
on everywhere. It declared that Bo Bo Aung still lived, that he would save the
Burmese; through his mighty arts and spells Burmese glory would multiply as
unconquerably as Bo Bo Aung's wa's did once.
This concentration meditation symbolism was truly a
significant political weapon as it rallied the Burmese masses.
-
The Bo Bo Aung mystique was wonderful material for us and, by
its appearance at that moment, convinced large numbers among the unbelieving
that Bo Bo Aung or some mystical power he symbolised was preparing to help the
Burmese. I decided that the alliance must get Bo Bo Aung and his innumerable
following on its side, and so I proposed that we call the alliance Htwet Yat
Gaing. U Nu, who is very much inclined to believe in the occult supported
me. The rest left it to me, and so that name was adopted with results which were
almost as magical as Bo Bo Aung's magic itself. The strength of the alliance
increased like his wa's, especially in the monasteries and rural areas
where the ancient legends still live on as potently as ever. The Sinyetha Party,
with its strong monastic element, sang Bo Bo Aung's song at its mass meetings.
It also dug up old oracular sayings which were believed to contain deeply veiled
meanings and predictions, always taking care of course that these sayings could
be made to mean that British rule would end and the Burmese would be free again.
They stirred up the most powerful folk memories and yearnings.
With the strength of this symbolism, ‘Mandalay was ours;
and by the time we got back to Rangoon, the Freedom Bloc had become a full-scale
national movement and force’.
Subsequently, during the June 1940 Sinyetha Conference in
Mandalay, as Ba Maw recounted the history of the Freedom Bloc, ‘a compulsion
stronger than ourselves seemed to be driving us like a fate into the vortex of
the world storm’ so that he ‘spoke for the first time of a resort to
force’.
-
‘Cowards and fools,’ I said, ‘according to the
intelligence reports, call us fools for talking of force when we have nothing in
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ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series
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-
our hands, no guns, not even sharp knives or needles. Don't believe them; they
will give you every reason for doing nothing, for just talking about freedom and
doing nothing to gain it. I tell you that there will be plenty of weapons in
this war. Weapons are not only those you make for yourselves; they are also
those which come into your hands without your making them. Have no fear. Look at
your hands. They are empty now. But they won't be empty always.’ Then after a
pause to obtain the greatest effect, I said, ‘Bo Bo Aung will give us all we
need.’
-
The [colonial] intelligence men felt cheated, but the people
who heard the mystical name suddenly uttered knew the meaning and roared in
excitement. After that speech there was no holding back those who spoke after me
night after night. It was as if you watched a people's struggle taking form and
shape under your very eyes. it is said that when historically static nations
start to move forward they do so in sudden leaps and convulsions. The Burmese at
that moment were almost visibly tucking up their loin cloths, as we say in
Burmese, to take such a leap forward.
Hence this story about the supernatural powers of Bo Bo
Aung provides the link between leadership and the masses. Almost as soon as he
gave this speech, an incident occurred which demonstrates, as Ba Maw himself
said, ‘how wide the leap [of the masses] was’.
-
The incident occurred on the first night of the conference. I
had mentioned in my speech that Burmese strength would multiply like Bo Bo
Aung's song and the large crowd listened enthralled. The next morning some of
the early worshippers at Maha-myat-muni Pagoda, the most famous shrine in
Mandalay, perhaps still dreamy with the words and song they had heard at the
meeting the previous night, saw in the wind-blown light of the candle flames
faint circles glowing on the soft and uneven gold of the great Buddha image.
What some saw at first all began to see in time, and the number of circles also
began to grow. The story went quickly round that Bo Bo Aung's O's had appeared
at the most sacred pagoda in the town. Our conference was at once called Bo Bo
Aung's Conference.
Ba Maw recounts how various ‘cryptic signs and sayings’
appeared spontaneously which ‘were believed to foretell the defeat of the
British and their departure from Burma’.
At this very time of mass unrest, it dawned on Ba Maw that ‘the mass emotions
… would now have to be controlled and directed properly’, for if it should
‘get out of hand … too soon’, this ‘could be a serious setback for our
cause and struggle’.
-
I therefore decided to change the power structure of my party
into a dictatorship. The conference had convinced me that a revolutionary
situation was definitely shaping so that the party would have to get ready to
meet it in the revolutionary way; that is, by a concentration of power and
leadership during the struggle. Every revolution I know has had to resort to
such a form of authoritarian leadership during a transitional period.
This need for the application of a ‘concentration of
power’ was his justification for nominating himself as a ‘dictator’
(‘Lord of ana’ Aa%aRHc\), he needed to
make sure that the energies aroused by this concentration symbolism would be
properly orchestrated.
Ba Maw, in his conversation with Aung San before the
conference, indicated that the appeal of the Burmese Freedom Bloc was the
link between political leadership and the Burmese masses, necessary for a true
revolution, as opposed to a conspiracy (leadership only) or an insurrection (the
masses only).
The significance of this concentration symbolism for the success of a true
‘revolution’ should not be underestimated:
its power, of course, is derived from its capability as a technique to transform
both the mental defilements in the person and the world, and both the mystic and
the king.
It is clear that the story of htwetyak pauk is
recognized in the Burmese encyclopaedia as a story which contributed to the
revolutionary ideal of Burma's liberation from the British, for it is said that
-
In the struggle to win back the freedom (lutlakyeì)
Burma had lost: the YMBA and the GCBA; the student strike; the 1930 Saya San led
revolution (tawhlanyeì) of the hill people and peasants; the 1938 oil
strike by the workers led by Thahkin Bò Hlá Aung; the Burma Freedom Bloc (bama
htwetyakgaìng); the Burma Revolutionary Party (Bama Tawhlanyeì Pati) –
these are all significant mile-stones in the history of Burma's revolution (tawhlanyeì).
In his ‘Sub-commentary on the red dragon (or serpent)’
(Nagà tika), Kodawhmaìng suggested that Dr
(c)
ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series
33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa,
1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p239/392
Ba Maw ‘was the chief of
the Burma htwetyat-sect’, the Burmese workers, peasants and students
were its members, and Aung San was the Deputy Chief. For the aforementioned,
‘England's hardship is Burma's chance’ (Ingaleik ahket bama achyek)
during which ‘under the flag of Burma's htwetyak gaìng Burma's
political gaìng [note: he uses sect as opposed to party] will unite’.
Kodawhmaing wrote of uniting the Thahkins and the Dó-ba-ma into concentration
sects (htwet-yak gaìng). Nu also attributes reference to the
concentration sects to Dr Ba Maw.
Thahkin Kodawhmaing, who already characterised himself as a yogi, seemed quite
prepared to interpret this characterisation seriously in terms of the authority
concentration meditation conveys over space, much as a yogi is no longer
confined to place or constrained in movement.
The
Japanese occupation of Burma began in December 1941, and was fully completed by
the end of May 1942. On 1 August that year, Ba Maw was appointed head of the
executive government (Ana shin). His cabinet replaced the earlier
unsuccessful Baho government, constituted mainly by members of the Burma
Independence Army. Ba Maw adopted royal airs, also employed by U Chit Hlaing,
elected president of the GCBA,
Saya San, U Saw and his ‘Patriot’ (Myòchit) Party. This indicates
how closely tied are attributes of kingship and leadership to mastery of yantara,
sek and loka.
By December 1942, Ba Maw was somewhat jealous at the
success of the independent East Asia Youth League which had been set up by
Judson College graduates on 28 June 1942. This was the biggest youth
organization in the country and concerned itself entirely with non-political
measures such as safety shelters, sanitation measures and library and education
activities, which had received the support of the Japanese. He sought to bring
this youth league under his own official National Service Association (Myanma
Wunthanú Ahpwé), also known as the Circle Army (Wa Tat), launched
in December 1942. As Cady put it,
-
Dr Ba Maw's ‘Circle Army’ or Wa Tat was based on a
Burmese legend according to which a magician astrologer demonstrated his
superiority over the king by drawing a circle which multiplied itself in spite
of royal efforts to erase it. The circles of service units should likewise
magically multiply. The idea was cleverly conceived, but the needed spirit was
lacking.
It is evident from his book that he was unsuccessful this
time in adapting the concentration symbolism to his political ambitions, unlike
1939. He declines to mention this episode in his book.
However, Ba Maw had a more comprehensive vision of what samatha
is about. When he developed the New Order Plan he said that ‘we must
substantiate our independence’, declaring:
-
This [substantiation of independence] can be done only by
action; and we who have got the power must act. Even action is not enough, for
there must be quick results as well. In these breakneck days when, speaking
quite plainly, a world revolution is taking place and everything is in the
melting pot, only action and its results matter, revolutionary action to suit
revolutionary times … And behind the revolutionary action there must always be
the revolutionary will as the driving force. Our old world has gone to pieces
and no political magic root or spell exists which can put it together again or
get us safely out of it. Only action will do it, our action. A revolutionary
period, as someone has said, has no use for witch doctors …
-
We have therefore accepted today a revolutionary task rather
than an office. That is the right way of looking at ourselves in the service of
a state which has not only won its independence out of a war but is also
fighting a war to save that independence from the fires of a world conflagration
…
If ‘witchdoctors’ were no longer of any use in actually
completing the revolutionary task, nevertheless, the need to plan involved much
the same skill as Saya San had demonstrated in his rebellion – the skill of
concentration (samatha, samadhi) but placed beyond the reach of loki
pañña. He proceeded to declare:
-
All planning is concentration: of power and control, of action,
of means and ends. Looking at it as a structure, a plan just follows this theory
logically to the end, and by doing so generates its own power. The ground
elements in planning are really concentration in one form or another, mass
organisations, national unity, mobilisation of wealth and labour, collective
action, leadership and so on …
Ba Maw found planning to be an activity of
‘concentration’. The association between concentration, nationalism and the
circle (or yantara, cakka, or Bo Bo's wa) is complete when we
consider how the chapters of Ba Maw's last book are punctuated by the circle
with the peacock at the centre. After declaring that the world and truth are
‘round’, where the West sees reality ‘as a being, changeless and
individual’, the East sees it ‘as a transcendental ever-changing flow and
becoming’ through the cycle of rebirth; in his conclusion he
(c)
ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series
33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa,
1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p240/392
ends on the
following reflexive note about this roundness of truth.
-
My last words at this moment are that we should not go awhoring
again after those false gods who have clearly messed up the world and our lives
too, but to search the atlas diligently and reverently and learn the truth from
its maps and facts, especially from the greatest fact of all, that the earth and
its truths are round, that nothing is true by itself but only as part of a
whole, and that whole is made up of opposites that balance and complete each
other.
These last words were issued from Sugamo prison in Japan,
where Ba Maw was incarcerated by the British between December 1945 and July 1946
after the allied invasion of Japan. This is reminiscent of Manu's attempt to
find the truth about the universe in concentration meditation while focusing on
the earth kasina. Manu, with whom he shared the legal profession, had
also been disappointed with his wrongful judgements which prompted him to renew
his familiarity with the world, the cosmos. Ba Maw was further imprisoned during
the U Nu regime, between August 1947 and July 1948, and imprisoned again by the
Ne Win regime in May 1966 until 1968. He died in 1977.
The
Martyr (Azani)
So far I have demonstrated that machinery of government is
not conceived of as addressing primarily a secular world. It addresses the world
of samsara and of the three loka. Since mental culture brings
superior vision of the cosmological laws, mental culture is the ultimate
qualification for leadership. The core values of revolution are thus mental
culture mixed in with magic for added control over loka.
Azani [Aazanv\],
the Burmese concept of martyr, is commonly invoked in political songs and
documents that celebrate and seek to encourage the right state of mind for the
fight for national independence and freedom. However, it is as well to point out
some significant differences in the Burmese Buddhist concept from its Christian
counterpart.
The Christian concept of the saint is that of a martyr, a
term which also came to have important political connotations. In Christianity
this has two meanings. On the one hand, the early meaning was ‘witness’.
Later, the concept came to signify ‘suffering’, the ability to withstand
great hardship and death in order to witness the truth according to one's
convictions. As Tambiah points out, this change in meaning is to some extent
bound up with the changes in the religion itself. In the early phase of
Christianity, establishing the truth of religion was the most important, while
in later times it was the ability to identify with a model Christian life placed
under duress.
Today, azani is commonly glossed as a ‘person with
discrimination and courage of his convictions’ or ‘hero who is prepared to
sacrifice his life for a good cause’. However, this is an inaccurate and
incomplete meaning that surrenders too early to the Christian connotations of
martyr. This glosses over its particular Burmese Buddhist meanings. The Buddhist
concept of saint is not primarily that of witness or sufferer, but that of a
renouncer engaged in mental culture. The relics are not of those who suffered a
violent death in witness to conviction, but the relics of ascetics practising
mental culture and compassion. The political overtones of this concept are also
different.
Azani is being used, of course, to refer to those
who die as the result of the political struggle. Ba Yin describes U Sein Hla
Aung, the nationalist monk U Ottama's defence lawyer, as azani after he
died of dysentery. There are various current classifications of the azani.
The Nine Azani refers to Aung San and his eight cabinet colleagues who
were assassinated, and whose remains were placed in the Rangoon Martyrs'
Mausoleum (Azani Beikman). The Seventeen Azani arose from the 1920
demonstrations in Mandalay. Ne Win gave this concept an entirely different slant
when he attempted to coin a new socialist vocabulary by referring to the
‘worker azani’ [Alup\qma:Aazanv\].
However, it is more difficult to explain why monks who do
not die for a political cause, but merely successfully pass a difficult
examination should be designated an azani. Furthermore, why would (1) the
lion (2) the elephant (3) the horse
(4) the cow (5) the human and (6) the yahanda be grouped together as the
Six Azani? To understand this we must reveal further layers of meaning.
The Six Azani are also known as ‘the six creatures
able to tell the truth about cause and effect without fear’ [meûkak\mRæM>
mtæn\.mSut\Bµ eûkac\:k¥oi:hut\mHn\kiuewPn\tt\eqa pug©iol\qt†wå 6-m¥oi:].
The sixth has a special status as the only one who was fearless as a result of
being free from mental defilements. The other five, however, lose their fear for
the wrong reasons, namely as the result of having a strong ‘self view’ [At†di™i]
(c)
ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series
33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa,
1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p241/392
and ‘false view of individuality’ [qkïydi™i].
In all cases, however, they imply that mental and physical training is involved
across lives, which ultimately produces a gifted person whose physique and mind
work perfectly in tandem.
This idea of azani implies a degree of control over
cosmology. For example, the monk-author Shin Maharatathara wrote ‘as for human
azani, men are not tied to the six spirit heavens’ [lUAazanv\x
eyak¥\a:qv\lH¥c\xeòKak\òpv\nt\rp\x mkpelpåX],
indicating that human azani could attain to the Brahma heavens that lie
above the human realm and the six deva realms. Thahkin Kodawhmaing, furthermore,
subscribes to the view that the practices suited to azani themselves
propel them to the higher heavens, He wrote that ‘azani are of course
the byama-so sects’ [Aazanv\ –
òbhîsiur\ giu%\:etæepå.X], underlining the importance of the byama-so
‘social’ meditations to the nation and to national unity.
A more accurate rendering, and more in-keeping with its
original meaning as ‘training’, is the definition of azani as ‘one
who is capable of bold action because of the ability to instantaneously
discriminate the proper from the improper’ [qc\.mqc\.kiuK%K¥c\:qij
rµrc\.sæaESac\Ræk\Niuc\qU]. It means ‘one who knows
instantaneously’ as derived from ‘swiftly’ [læn\sæax
l¥c\òmn\sæa, Pali a Aa]
and ‘one who knows’ [qitt\qU, Pali janiya
zanIy].
Derived from Pali a-ja-niya [Aazaeny¥] the concept is related to Sanskrit ajati ‘good
birth’ or ‘thoroughbred’ (a plus jan), but Buddhaghosa
associated its Buddhist meaning with ‘to learn’, ‘to be trained’ (a plus
jña-). The contracted form ajañña was almost exclusively used
for thoroughbred horses, also applied metaphorically to a man of noble race,
namely ‘a steed of man’ (purisajañña).
In Part II Concentration (samadhi) Visudhimagga
there is Chapter III entitled ‘Exposition of the acceptance of the subjects of
meditation.’ In Section IX on ‘the book’, the penultimate impediment of
the Ten Impediments is the development of concentration (the tenth is psychic
powers). The Elder Abhaya (The Fearless), a specialist in meditation, wished to
expound the Tipitaka without learning the commentaries. His recitations were
rejected by the monks as he had evidently not learnt them from teachers. He was
advised to learn the commentaries from the Elder Mahadhammarakkhita who knew the
whole scriptures, where he went with five hundred monks. Abhaya recited by day
and Mahadhammarakkhita explained by night. At the end, Mahadhammarakkhita is
persuaded that mental culture is the ultimate route to knowledge and he becomes
an azani.
-
And sitting down on a mat in the presence of the Elder Abhaya,
he said, ‘Friend, teach me a subject of meditation.’ ‘Sir, what do you
say? Is it not to you that I have been listener? What shall I teach that is not
known to you?’ The Elder said to him, ‘Friend, different is the path if thou
hast been along it before.’ It is said that the Elder Abhaya then became a
streamwinner. And he gave him a subject of meditation, and after his return
heard that the Elder had passed utterly away while reciting the Law at
Lohapasada. Having heard it he called for his robe, attired himself and said,
‘Friends, befitting is the path of Saintship [Azani Martyrdom] to our
teacher [cå.rHc\tiu>cåtiu>fSraqv\eòPac\.(lv\:)eòPac\.mt\fx
Aazanv\meTr\(lv\:)òPs\epfX]. Our teacher, friend, was upright, noble. In
the presence of his own pupil in the Law he sat on a mat and said, ‘Teach me a
subject of meditation.’ Friends, befitting is the path of Saintship [Arahat]
for the Elder [Arht†mg\qv\el¥ak\pt\lHpåqv\].’
To such as these study is no impediment.
Azani in this context, therefore,
refers to the correct perception of the importance of meditation training, and
actual success in its practice (as opposed to scriptural learning) prior to
death. The meaning was evidently not lost on the Ne Win regime, since Maung
Maung couched Ne Win's message from the very beginning as the ‘working azani’,
who, though aiming for nibbana, must work to fill their stomachs first.
The journey through samsara by the individual, the community and the
nation is here subordinated to their basic needs of food and shelter that
underpin spiritual quest in mental culture. This divides the spiritual quest
into two phases, but unlike the U Nu government, who thought of it all as one
path on the way to a final goal, the spiritual phase lies outside government's
immediate brief. Nevertheless it needs to be addressed in advance as an ultimate
goal of the purpose of human life and human politics – such is the machinery
of government that must address the machinery of samsara. This can never
be a secular politics as we know it. To pretend it is, as Taylor did, is to
fundamentally misinterpret the broader Burmese concept of State.
(c)
ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics.
ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series
33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa,
1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p242//392
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