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Houtman, Gustaaf. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa Monograph Series No. 33. Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, 400 pp. ISBN 4-87297-748-3

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Chapter 12
Aung San and
the ‘religion' question’

So far, I have argued that the practices that make up mental culture are the key concepts that underlie Burmese political culture. In the analogy between body, prison and state as all subject to samsara, the solution to realistic work with these entities is to purify the politician's mind so that he or she may see truth in the world and take the right action. Neither government, nor revolution, can be based on anything other in popular perception. However, these would be nothing but concepts were it not for the personalities and their ideas that brought them to life in this century of struggle for freedom and national independence. I have shown that preoccupation with mental culture on the part of the political leadership in Burma is the rule, not the exception. To understand both the army and the NLD, we cannot avoid coming to terms with Aung San, the spiritual father of both. At first sight, taking into account Aung San's treatment by some Western analysts, the NLD is entirely out of kilter with Aung San on the question of religion. However, as I will show, a closer analysis of the Burmese version of his speeches tells us a very different story about Aung San that seems to have eluded those who relied on the English versions.

We already know something about the way he framed his politics in terms of Buddhism for, as already noted, Aung San followed the nationalist monk U Wisara in expressing national independence in terms of loki nibbana. He also followed Thahkin Kodawhmaing's emphasis on byama-so tayà. Aung San's unification is conceived of as having been accomplished through his samadhi. The question arises, how did Aung San stand on the issue of religion. How did he distinguish between mental culture and culture, and to what extent did Buddhism play a role in his political philosophy? In what way did he meet his fate of having become a ‘martyr’ in the specifically Buddhist sense of azani?

‘Religion’ in Aung San's speeches

General Aung San was the leading young politician of Burma during the turbulent eight-year period 1939–47. He has so far been portrayed as making a firm division between ‘religion’ (including Buddhism) and ‘politics’. Silverstein, in his second and latest edition of The political legacy of Aung San, describes Aung San as having a belief in ‘the clear separation between politics and religion’, as ‘never having identified with the Buddhist political leaders’, and as not employing ‘religion in the service of politics’, so that ‘under his leadership, the movement was predominantly secular and impartial on the religious issue’.

Such views of Aung San's politics are commonly held among western scholars. For example, Cady argued that Aung San was a popular hero in his own right who did not need or want religious support.[1] Largely because U Nu, Aung San's successor, placed such great emphasis on Buddhism, its role in Aung San's politics has usually been dismissed out of hand. Brohm finds that Aung San ‘was never noted for any outstanding religiosity of his own’.[2] Even Mendelson finds that Aung San was ‘thoroughly unsympathetic to any political role whatsoever being played by members of the Order, and there are some indications that he wanted to limit recruitment to the Sangha and control it very severely’.[3]

Of course, Aung San, when compared to U Nu for example, was not given to grand public expressions of devotion to Buddhism, nor was he known for elaborating at great length on Buddhist ideas in his speeches, nor for ostentatiously practising personal Buddhist mental culture. He did not develop a complete Buddhist ideology of government the way U Nu did. Also, it is quite clear from his earliest speeches that he did indeed argue for some sort of a boundary between Buddhism and politics. Already in the early 1930s, during a student debate at Rangoon University, he argued for the motion proposed by his elder brother that monks should not participate in politics.[4] Also, as we will see, he argued during the Japanese occupation for a limit on recruitment to the Sangha. Finally, he is known to have regularly emphasized freedom of religion,[5] though in this respect he is not particularly different, as U Nu did so too.

Though both accepted the involvement of monks in pre-independence politics, some have argued that

(c) ILCAA 1999 - Gustaaf Houtman. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999, ISBN 4-87297-748-3, p243/392

the most important difference between U Nu and Aung San's attitude towards monk involvement in politics is that Aung San felt it would be ‘anti-modern’, whereas U Nu held that it would be detrimental to the purity of the Sangha.[6]

As part of the Dobama heritage of political leadership, Aung San was critical of the early YMBA forms of Buddhist leadership, as it seemed to lack an understanding of the role non-Buddhist political revolutionary philosophies played in uprisings and wars internationally, and the monks who headed these movements were too backward-looking. In particular, he was critical of the YMBA rally cries ‘our race, our religion, our language!’, which he said ‘have gone obsolete now’, as ‘race’ has no tests, and religion should be ‘a matter of individual conscience’.[7] He repeated this, asking whether politics is ‘slogan-shouting alone, “race, religion, language,” as we used to shout?’. And he answered

Religion is a matter of individual conscience, while politics is social science. We must see to it that the individual enjoys his rights, including the right to freedom of religious belief and worship. We must draw a clear line between politics and religion because the two are not one and the same thing. If we mix religion with politics, then we offend the spirit of religion itself. Politics is pure secular science.[8]

However, scepticism about the role of Buddhism in politics, and in particular monks in politics, was extremely prevalent among Burma's younger modernist generation of political leaders right up until July 1948 shortly after Aung San's assassination. U Nu is widely regarded as an advocate of Buddhism in politics, and there is no doubt that he was after World War II a more active Buddhist than Aung San was before he met his death. Nevertheless, we must remember that even U Nu was openly critical of monk behaviour in his early days, as was clear from his 1937 preface to the book Modern Monk (Tet Hpongyì).[9] By 1954 he had not only withdrawn his preface, but he had even banned the book. He did not advocate a direct role of Buddhism in government until after national independence was attained. Brohm points out that until 1948 there was no evidence whatsoever in U Nu's speeches or his appointments that he wanted to involve Buddhism in national politics. The decisive moment was the second split of the AFPFL in July 1948, which took place after Aung San's assassination. The increased emphasis on Buddhism in Burmese politics ensued from the weakening in party unity.

Had Aung San been alive at the time of the second AFPFL split, he too may have responded to the need to solidify his power base. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that Aung San was more given to employing Buddhist terminology after he himself expelled the communists from the AFPFL in the first AFPFL split in October 1946.

Silverstein argues that ‘Buddhism – an integral part of Burmese tradition – did not provide Aung San with a dominant theme in his political thought, as it did with several of his contemporaries, nor did it provide a basis for his speeches and actions’.[10] In the absence of a detailed analysis of his speeches delivered in Burmese, however, which is the language he used to address the Burmese people, it is difficult to say exactly what role Buddhism or religion in general played in his politics. There is a wide gap in the way material appearing in the two languages turns out to use a very different language and vocabulary. This is nowhere more apparent than in Maung Maung's biography of Ne Win which appeared in both languages at the same time in the year 1969. The English version is much shorter than the Burmese (323 pages as against 469 pages in Burmese) and is less clearly divided (10 as against 21 sections in Burmese), but it eliminates much of Maung Maung's attempt to justify Ne Win through internal cultural criteria. The result is that Ne Win comes across in the English version as a secular pragmatic person, but in the Burmese version he comes out as a man with Buddhist sentiments (such as his cetana with which the Burmese version begins and ends but the English never even mentions). To interpret Ne Win's legacy on the basis of the English rendering of his life is therefore to leave out the vernacular Burmese political values from analysis.

The lack of attention paid by western academics to Aung San's Burmese writings, and a lack of attention to shifts in opinions as these young nationalists matured is, in my view, the principal reason why his politics has been fundamentally misunderstood. In saying this I am not arguing that he was an extremely devout Buddhist; I am arguing that he could not but help bring Buddhist sentiment into his speeches, if only because he was addressing Burmese people, the majority of whom are Buddhist, and because his ultimate

goal was socialism after democracy, and socialism had been translated into Burmese by Buddhist concepts.

We know that as a youth he had Buddhist sentiments, was educated in a Buddhist monastery, and wanted to ordain a monk and learnt Pali.[11] Indeed, Aung San Suu Kyi points out that though popular opinion often casts Aung San ‘in the role of a completely political animal’, he in fact ‘had a deep and abiding interest in religion’.[12] At the beginning of his days at Rangoon University, he admired U Lawkanatha, an Italian Buddhist monk. And while himself a monk between 1932–33, he asked his mother whether he could follow Lawkanatha. Also,

Even after he [Aung San] had entered the world of student politics which was to absorb him so completely, he wrote to one of his closest friends of his ‘pilgrimage in quest of Truth and Perfection’ and of his conscious striving after ‘sincerity in thought, word and deed’. He also expressed his concern over the ‘spiritual vacuum … among our youth’ and the fear that ‘unless we brace ourselves to withstand the tide … we will soon be spiritual bankrupts par excellence’.[13]

One observer has argued that to the Burmese ‘Buddhism was in fact the very ethos of the traditional Burmese state and culture’.[14] This would mean that a modern Burmese politician would have to come to terms with this political Buddhist heritage in his speeches. Though much has been published on Aung San, so far no one has raised a distinction between the English and the Burmese versions of his speeches and writings. To suggest that Aung San merely confronted Buddhism is to oversimplify his position on this matter. As I will show below, he did indeed use many Buddhist terms and expressions in his Burmese speeches, but of these we find little or no trace in their English versions. So far, no analysis has been performed on the Burmese terminology in his speeches, and to understand his views more fully, we need to look more closely at the particular Burmese expressions he used. In particular I take issue on the following points.

(1) The diverse Burmese terminology for ‘Buddhism’ and ‘religion’ have been translated into singular concepts, and their nuances have been lost. The English versions cannot be relied upon for judgments about Aung San's stance on Buddhism and religion in general. In Aung San's view, some kinds of high Buddhist practice are outside the category ‘religion’.

(2) Silverstein has overlooked the fundamental importance of pagoda politics. Aung San's most important political speeches were given at the Shwedagon Pagoda. The backdrop of the pagoda lent the liberation struggle legitimacy. Pagoda building and uniting in joint acts of merit remain important concepts in the idea of national ‘unity’ as expressed by Aung San. Translations of the speech titles of the speeches into English have sometimes removed the Buddhist ambience. For example, the English title ‘Problems for Burma's Freedom’ is very different from the Burmese title ‘Speech on the Middle [Shwedagon] Platform’ [Aly\psßyM vIlaKM min\K.æn\:].

(3) Silverstein has argued that Aung San believed ‘monks should have no political role in Burma’.[15] Such is a rash judgment, and Aung San had a much more complex perspective on this issue.

(a) First, we cannot collapse Aung San's views on Buddhism into a singular judgment applicable to his whole life. He seems to have held different views of the role of Buddhism depending on the political conditions. The assertion that Aung San did not identify with the cause of Buddhist leaders is misinformed, as he did refer appreciatively to political monks leading the struggle against British colonialism, such as Ottama and U Wizara, as martyrs [Aazanv\pug©oiul\].

(b) Second, Aung San believed that certain monk activities constituted what he termed the ‘highest form of politics’. Aung San saw the period approaching national independence as inaugurating an era in which Buddhist monks should start to play a different role in politics. The ‘highest form of politics’ he envisaged monks engaging in was the improvement in the overall harmony and tolerance of difference amongst the general population by preaching the practice of the higher forms of mental culture, such as byama-so tayà and metta. These would foster national unity everyone craved for.

(7) The Burmese concept for ‘martyr’ [Aazanv\], which Aung San used for the heroes of the past

including ‘political monks’, and which was used for himself by his admirers, has important meanings in Buddhism in respect of mental training in the sense of the practice of mental culture. This has important hitherto unexplored Buddhist dimensions.

(8) Silverstein presents Aung San as having a ‘secular’ view of politics, much as political scientists might have today. However, for Aung San ‘secular’ means loki [elakI] and calls forth its opposite ‘transcendental’ lokuttara [elakut†ra], which is associated with the highest forms of mental culture in Buddhism. The former he regarded as a social goal involving social means, whereas the latter he regarded as an individual quest based on individual means. My view is that in his designation of politics as ‘secular’, Aung San was primarily concerned with distinguishing one kind of secularity from another – he argued against certain prevalent interpretations of politics which linked it to low forms of magic (loki pañña). He was against interference in politics by certain kinds of ‘contaminated’ Buddhism, as oppose to the higher forms of Buddhist practice with social implications, such as byama-so tayà mental culture, which he admired and observed as the most vital component in the politics of a socialist society, indeed, as representing socialism.

(9) Aung San often used small Pali phrases with Buddhist implications either in the main body of his speech or to conclude (e.g. tumhe ganhatha,[16] may you be free from danger [AewraehaN†o avera-hontu]).[17]

(10) Aung San, like all politicians, needed journalists to mediate and translate his ideas into popular concepts to broaden and deepen their appeal to the masses. It could be said that the public perception of Aung San as a nationalist politician was considerably influenced by the writings and speeches of Thahkin Kodawhmaing in particular, and by Ba Maw's support. They skilfully translated Aung San's politics into traditional symbolism.

Since politics is a ‘mundane’ affair that – unlike the issue of nibbana – does not excite the Burmese people, what we discover in Aung San's speeches is a struggle to find respectability for politics in the Burmese system of thought. He takes as his reference two indigenous models for political behaviour. The highest politics is historically lokuttara politics, which takes as a reference point the attainment of nibbana, conceived in terms of monastic support and pagoda building, but primarily as personal practice of mental culture. This is based on the view that if mental defilements are reduced throughout the country, then people will prosper and there will be no disasters. The second is the loki pañña path, based on low and ‘dirty’ opportunist practices of astrology, magic and wizardry, that leave the selfish mind intact with its defilements. Aung San, in his early schoolboy politics, attempted the second model. Towards the end of his university days and in his early Thahkin period, he abandoned the second path to find a synthesis between the first model and Marxism. By the end of his life, just prior to national independence, he synthesised a redefinition of Burmese ‘secularism’ while on the path to the first model, and incorporating democracy and socialism, as an extended path centering on the ideal of byama-so tayà as a ‘social’ meditation.

A note on the sources

There is a large amount of literature in Burmese on his speeches and his life.[18] However, there are to my knowledge only three main works in English and one in Japanese that deal with his life and works in any detail.[19] The conspiracy behind his assassination has also attracted much speculation in the works of others. The full extent and range of Burmese sources are generally not reflected in English, though Nemoto's work in Japanese does come to terms with many Burmese sources.[20]

It is interesting to note that Aung San usually composed his speeches in English, and then presented

them in Burmese.[21] This is reflected, for example, in the English title of his 1946 Burma's challenge, which is transcribed in Burmese as [Ba:ma:K¥µlc\:]. When he translated his speeches into Burmese, he used a very different vocabulary, evoking entirely different worlds. There are many significant differences between the Burmese and English versions, which offers a very different perspective on Aung San's views on religion.

Surprisingly, in his assessment of sources on Aung San, Silverstein expresses the view that ‘thus far, no official or authoritative biography of Aung San has been written’, and that ‘no systematic collection of his speeches, writings, and papers has been published’. He attributes this to the way the post-1962 regimes have kept the archives of the Burma Defence Services Historical Research Institute closed to researchers.[22] However, he jumps from Aung San's writings in 1946 directly to the English sources and mentions only one Burmese source, of which only the English versions are reproduced. This glosses over a great deal of work done in Burmese before 1962, when the archives were still open to researchers, and work done after the closure, by selected Burmese scholars. It also overlooks the entire dimension of Aung San as a Burmese politician addressing the Burmese in his native language.

It is not true that there is no authoritative biography of Aung San. If authorisation is taken to mean expressing approval of the work by writing a foreword or preface, then Bo Thein Hswei's The biography of Aung San was authorised not only by Aung San's political and spiritual mentor Thahkin Kodawhmaing, but also Aung San's close comrade Prime Minister U Nu and Aung San's wife Daw Khin Kyi. Furthermore, the revenue from the book sales are pledged to the Bogyok Aung San Library [biul\K¥op\saûkv\.piõkt\tiuk\], which was originally headed by Bo Thein Hswei, the author himself. Published in 1951, it contains two essays written by Aung San in Burmese: one essay on his birth and school days,[23] and another essay on his own possible origination from a famous rebel.[24] They bear little resemblance to the original English versions included in Silverstein's collection of speeches, and are of some interest as they reveal a very different side to Aung San's views of politics from what has been presented in the English language thus far – in particular on his interest in numerology and astrology, and in his maternal grandfather U Min Yaung. The editor, in co-operation with people close to Aung San, composed a biography on Aung San for the substantive period from his birth up until the foundation of the Burma National Independence Army.[25] The longest section is made up, however, of reminiscences by individual acquaintances in twenty sections.[26]

A second biography Aung Than on Aung San [eAac\qn\:feAac\Sn\:] was first published in 1964 by his brother Aung Than. Aung Than writes in his preface that the government was writing a biography of Aung San which had not yet materialised. He claimed that there were biographies on other leaders, but that as yet there was no biography on Aung San (he clearly does not acknowledge the Thein Hswei biography). Though he acknowledges other attempts at writing Aung San's biography, he feels that these do not highlight Aung San's political achievements. Aung Than was part of a biography committee set up by the AFPFL, but the committee never convened and so he decided finally to write a biography of his own.

It is also of interest that Bo Thein Hswei (1919–1976), the author and editor of the first ‘forgotten’ biography, was also Ne Win's bodyguard during the war, and had been in charge of the unit that liberated Rangoon. He became a monk in the Sunlun Sayadaw vipassana tradition. He is also the author (under his monastic name of Thathana Wíthokdí) of the first known Burmese national history of Buddhist practice (mental culture) entitled Myanma Naingngandaw yahànda aríya-myà i hteirokpattí padípattí thathanawinkyàn (The biographies of the enlightened and those on the path to enlightenment in Burma's tradition of practice) which covers the history of vipassana tradition in particular.[27] It is thus interesting to note that it should be a soldier involved in

the liberation of Burma who wrote the first national history of vipassana, the technique of ultimate liberation from samsara. This thus suggests more realistic overlap between the discourse of mental culture in the politics of the self, and the politics of the country.

As for why Silverstein did not report these two important Burmese biographies of Aung San in his latest edition, we can only surmise that it was, first of all, because he does not read Burmese. Second, it was because neither Maung Maung nor Aung San Suu Kyi mention these two volumes, and so he could find no reference to them. Possibly, Aung San Suu Kyi was not able to get hold of this source while writing in England what is largely a personal profile of her father. However, there is little excuse for Maung Maung not to have mentioned these sources – he collected the contributions for his volume in 1961, well after the first volume was published and after the first 1958 Ne Win Caretaker Government. Perhaps Maung Maung judged much of this material irrelevant to the English speaking public.

It would appear, however, that authors of Aung San biographies rival among oneanother to portray him in a particular way, and to prevent emergence of a more diverse and rounded view of Aung San as a human being with changing and sometimes conflicting ideas. Maung Maung had the motivation to interpret Aung San in a particular way. Since Maung Maung served later as Ne Win's biographer and was in charge of the legalities of developing the Burmese Way to Socialism, and eventually became the token civilian Prime Minister of Burma selected by Ne Win between 19 August and 18 September 1988. This would mean his political interests would have prevented him from dealing with Aung San disinterestedly. If Silverstein inherited his view of Aung San mostly from Maung Maung, then this may be a very selective portrayal of Aung San, perhaps more consonant with Ne Win's view of the political arena than with Aung San's.

Aung San's life may be divided into five main periods youth, university days, the early period in the Dobama party as a Thahkin, the period of his relationship with Japan and the post-war period. However, he may be seen throughout as essentially a unifier of the country, as he was personally involved in all, and took the initiative in most, major attempts at unifying diverse interest groups during the period 1939–47.[28] He received no better compliment than that of Churchill who identified him, from the British colonialist point of view, as the ‘traitor rebel leader’ of a ‘quisling army’.[29]

Education

Born in Natmauk in 1915, he began his education aged seven in 1922 under Sayadaw U Thawbita's monastery in Natmauk Myo. In 1928, he moved to the National College at Yeinangyaung. In 1932 he joined Rangoon University aged 18. As editor of the university journal, he was held responsible by the university authorities for not revealing the author of the article ‘Hell hounds at large’, in which senior university staff were criticised. His dismissal from the university provoked the 1936 student strike. He became President of the Rangoon University Student's Union between 1937–38, two years after U Nu's presidency.

While at the university, his first essay was ‘Burma and Buddhism’ in Gandha-loka Magazine, April 1935, in which he set out what he calls ‘the Buddhist Middle Way’. The Buddha invited everyone for themselves to ascertain truth for themselves, and he encouraged a spirit of criticism which is ‘the vital essence of Buddhism’, against excessive attachment to past cultural tradition. This vital essence is lacking in Burma and ‘the Burmese people should dive a little deeper than they seem to be doing at present and not be content with mere superficial observation’.

In the Ratana Sutta the hollowness of the forms and ceremonies is mentioned. Yet Buddhism as we find it in Burma, remains only in form and so too the civilization. The spirit requisite for the growth of our civilization has died down. It is therefore the bounden duty of every true Burman to revive the spirit of criticism, inherent in Buddhism, and apply it to every

problem affecting Burma. If Burma is to regain her freedom and prosperity, the feeling of uneasiness in eradicating the fetish of tradition must be overcome and the ancient civilization of bricks must be displaced by the civilization of hewn stones.

He took an interest in his maternal grandfather U Min Yaung, who had led an early rebellion against the British. Aung San himself wrote two articles on this. In ‘Mingyi U Min Yaung who was beheaded and was not crucified’ [ka:sc\Atc\mKMrxeKåc\:òPt\KMrtµ.x mc\:ýkI:¨I:mc\:erac\] (Thuriya, June 1935) he writes about his family relationship to a rebel leader. ‘Was U Min Yaung the rebel leader Bo La Yaung U Hkaung or not?’ [qUpun\biul\lerac\¨I:eKåc\:hut\mhut\mc\:ýkI:¨I:mc\:erac\] was also published in Thuriya in August 1935. This would have come to the attention of Thahkin Kodawhmaing, who used to be editor of this magazine, and would explain Kodawhmaing's early support for Aung San.[30]

Thahkin

In 1938, some time after his term as RUSU President was over, he joined Dobama Asiayone together with U Nu. Both began to use the title Master (‘Thahkin’).[31] The nationalist Dobama Asiayone had already taken in a first wave of memberships from students after the February 1936 student strikes.[32] Young students joining the party were a vital element in the split of the party itself, in which the Thein-Maung faction supported their active involvement at executive level. Both Aung San and U Nu were ‘unconstitutionally’ elevated by this faction to the Dobama Executive Committee as ‘organizers’ on 18 August 1938.[33]

In the course of this year, a split took place in the Dobama Asiayone in which U Nu joined, together with Aung San, the radical ‘internationalist’ Thahkin Kodawhmaing faction rather than the ‘nationalist’ Ba Sein faction. The latter faction included Shu Maung, later to become General Ne Win responsible for the 1962 coup against Nu: this faction tried hardest to keep out ‘new blood’ in the central committee of the Dobama.[34]

Though by no means radically committed to communism himself in terms of ideology in his later life, together with students, ex-students and some others, he founded the Communist Party on 15 August 1939, of which he became General Secretary.[35] An illegal organization at the time, this group mainly met for discussion, and for Aung San his dedication to ‘the Communist Party slowly faded away’ in favour of the Dobama Asiayone.[36]

From our point of view, it is most significant that in October 1939, as representative of the Dobama, he joined Ba Maw and others in the formation of the Freedom Bloc (htwet-yak-gaìng) of which he also became General Secretary. This brought together a broad range of Burmese factions engaged in the struggle for independence.

The relationship with Japan

The relationship with Japan began for Aung San when the Japanese intercepted him in China while looking for international help for Burma's struggle for national independence. He arrived in Japan in November 1940. The relationship was formally ended when the Japanese surrendered on 1 August 1945, though it became clear much earlier that there was no future in associating the Japanese with Burma.

As we have seen, Bo Bo Aung escaped from political authorities, and the Freedom Bloc was founded on this idea of unconstraint. While some leaders of this Freedom Sect, including U Nu, were arrested by the British, Aung San had escaped Burma on 8 August 1940 eventually ending up in Japan, where he organised the Burma Independence Army (of which he became Chief of Staff). Because of his role in founding the army, Aung San came to be regarded as the father of the Burmese army.

Aung San realised that the Japanese were not liberators but occupiers, who were not intent on giving Burma its independence. The Communists were aware that Japan was not aiming towards Burmese national

independence, and they went underground in spring 1942. In late 1942, after the Japanese set up a subordinate Burmese administration, the Thahkin inner circle began to take precautionary measures with the aim of safeguarding the Burma Defence Army. Discussions to organize resistance against the Japanese started in October 1943, soon after Aung San's return following the Japanese declaration on 1 August in Tokyo of Burma as an independent nation and coequal member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. A Karen unit of the Burma Defence Army contacted the British in October that year with a view to co-operating with the Allied Forces. However, concrete steps were not taken until the foundation in August 1944 of the nationalist coalition known as the Anti-Fascist Organisation.

Though Aung San was at times critical of the Japanese, for a time in his public speeches he played up Japan's positive contribution in helping the Burmese to oust the British and gain independence. This praise can be found in his speeches up to and including the occasion of the Japanese declaration of Burma's independence on 1 August 1943. It was his speech at the unveiling of the statue of U Wisara in early October 1943 that he first began to publicly question and express doubts about Burma's national independence under the Japanese, for he said ‘the independence we have achieved is not permanent. Only if we win this war will independence be permanent. As we have not yet won the war, we are unable to taste loki nibbana’.

Speeches during the Japanese occupation

During the early part of his relationship with Japan, Aung San delivered a number of speeches which indicated that Japanese ideas had a significant influence on him at the time. He gave few speeches in which Buddhism figures as a subject.

However, in one speech he indicated that he was unhappy with the quantity of monks and nuns in the country. In the speech ‘The art of warfare’ [eqngçss\b¥øha [KN2] ] given in early November 1942, he first worried about the size of the population of China and India in comparison to Burma, and then

Speaking frankly, we do not need more monks and nuns in Burma. In my view I do not want one monastery per village. I want them to live in only one monastery per five villages. However, the public is unlikely to like these words. But like it or not, if we are to look at it in terms of development of this country this is the truest thing to say. Japan also is a Buddhist country. But when it comes to warfare of the nation, monks cannot remain, they have to fight. If you want the nation to advance, the loki to advance you will have to set aside the otherworldly matters [elakut†raer:]. It is not possible to combine and develop the two at the same time. What is needed in this country today is to issue laws which people must obey and which people may not like.[37]

The change came about in Aung San's speeches after the Japanese declaration of Burma's independence in August 1943. Disappointed with the Japanese handling of Burmese independence, he airs his grievances quite openly in the speech ‘The ceremony opening the U Wisara Statue’ [¨I:wisarek¥ak\Rup\Pæc\. pæµAKm\:Ana:Ò] in early October 1943. This was a suitable occasion since U Wisara was at that time regarded as the greatest Burmese martyr, now only exceeded by Aung San himself. He recounts how U Wisara died on hunger strike in prison after 166 days of incarceration under the British. He honours all the martyrs who renounced their lives for the country. Now there is no need to think of sectarian issues during U Wisara's time. He pays respect to this martyr's ‘irrepressible spirit, patriotism, mind like an immortal jewel (Skt Amrita-dhani)[38]’ [ANiuc\mKMliusit\x m¥oi:K¥s\sit\x Añmetsit\]. He courageously faced his fate alone in prison without companions. At that time, Burma was not independent and was classed under ‘wrong-viewed’ [misÍalUm¥oi:] (which is the way U Wisara persistently characterised the British occupiers).

That is why it is important that we now also breed this martyr spirit [Aazanv\sit\Dåt\emæ:òmø]. He then says ‘As the national independence we have attained is not yet permanent, as we have not yet won this war we are unable as yet to enjoy the taste national independence, of loki nibbana’.[39] I want us to, even if we are the last ones remaining, from today to develop this martyr spirit [Aazanv\Aòmoetsit\Dat\kiu yen>ksf emæ:òmøûkesliueûkac\:].

Towards national independence

By October 1945, the British had returned to govern Burma. From that point until national independence in January 1948 there was a period of intense political manoeuvring on the part of the AFPFL Thahkins for recognition of the Burmese people. They wanted to be recognised by the British as the most

representative political entity in Burma. Furthermore, the ethnic and communist issues had to be resolved for the sake of unity if demands for national independence were to be successful. Just as during the Japanese occupation, Aung San was seen as the most outstanding Burmese politician and an extremely capable negotiator with all factions.

The Anti-Fascist Organisation was renamed the Anti-Fascist Peoples’ Freedom League (AFPFL) in August 1945. However, it had already issued its party manifesto on 25 May 1945 that advocated a democratic constitution for the government of independent Burma.[40] This party received broad support, including from the army, though the army eventually withdrew its support in 1958. Aung San headed the early AFPFL mission in negotiating the terms for national independence, but was assassinated prior to independence on 19 July 1947.

The loki pañña legacy

In Thahkin Tika (1938) Thahkin Kodawhmaing described Aung San as a most promising young national leader. Also Aung San worked closely with Ba Maw during and after the foundation of the Freedom Bloc 1939. The fact is that Thahkin Kodawhmaing and Ba Maw expressed Aung San's role in terms of the traditional currents and symbols of mundane knowledge [loki pañña] and of the samatha tradition. Indeed, their initial support seems to have coloured local perceptions of Aung San.

In one of his works, Thahkin Kodawhmaing describes Aung San as follows:

aMomf – atmifqef; atmifqef;ESifh?

awmifwref;wGifjzifh?

anmif&rf;twufrSm bm;rJhq&mwdkY xHk;vdky?

aemifweef;qufp&m oem;oeJY tm;rEGJYMueJY[JhvdkY

EGm;&Jhyrm&kef;cJhw,f?

bkef;&Jharwåm/[41]

O – Aung San Aung San,

[unclear reference]

so alike you are

to Bame Saya in aiding [magically] King Nyaung Yan's ascent to the palace

to continue the royal lineage in the palace, possessed of pity, don't be disheartened … …

work like a bull [reference to martyr]

with your meritorious glory and metta

Ba Maw's Mandalay speech pointed at Bo Bo Aung as the saviour of the Burmese, but he left ambiguous who was Bo Bo Aung's incarnation or Bo Bo Aung's favourite. There is some evidence to suggest that some identified Aung San as a manifestation of Bo Bo Aung, and if not a manifestation then at least protected by Bo Bo Aung, who in turn, ‘saved and protected’ Setkya Min.[42] Also, he is regarded as a universal king. Thahkin Kodawhmaing regarded Dr Ba Maw as the ‘ruler’ (adipati), but in Thahkin Tika he identified Aung San as the coming Universal Monarch and the Nagani (Red Dragon).[43] Yet others thought at the time that Aung San was ‘a forerunner of Setkya-Min’.[44] Indeed, by 1942 the identity of Setkya Min was supposedly attributed by some to Thahkin Aung San.[45]

There was a time in his youth that Aung San shared this view of Burma's liberation as possible through traditional skills, for he had thought of liberating Burma through loki pañña.

However, the desire to free his country from foreign rule seems to have lodged itself in Aung San's mind well before he arrived at Yenangyaung. He has written that as a small boy he often dreamt of various methods of rebelling against the British and driving them out, and sometimes indulged in fancies of disconcerting magical means to achieve the same purpose.[46]

Aung San realised this kind of discourse still surrounded him even though he had himself changed his views, and this is clear from his speeches. As I will show below, Aung San moved away from this kind of politics, and it is this in particular that earned him the label of being a ‘modern’ politician. The distinction he makes between various kinds of politics was evident quite early in his writing, namely in the article

‘Various kinds of politics’ [Niuc\cMer:Am¥oi:Am¥oi:], published in Dragon Magazine (February–March, 1940).

Aung San was, and still is, mostly regarded as a modernist of pragmatic disposition different from all the other politicians of his time. He is generally regarded as a man of action, a man of great selflessness who risked his own life, indeed, gave his own life, for the good of the whole country. Unlike Saya San, he did not expect to win by using magic. Unlike Thahkin Kodawhmaing, he did not like the use of alchemy and other forms of indigenous skills to bolster his credibility as a politician; this he condemned. Unlike Ba Maw, he did not like to use millenarian symbolism of weikzas, such as Bo Bo Aung, to strengthen his own role as political saviour of the country. And, unlike U Nu, he did not use the vipassana tradition or the monastic order to reinforce his political claims. Essentially, he was a very different kind of politician. Nevertheless, he could not prevent others from proclaiming his antecedents, and we can sense the tension between the loki and the lokuttara path in what Aung San writes.

Teiza

In preparation for his role in securing Burma's freedom from the British Aung San took on the name of the great power of alchemic transformation, namely Major-General Fire [Bo Teiza biul\etz].[47] His other comrades took equally victorious names.[48]

Aung San's nom de guerre is indirectly associated with a range of former kings, and also in opposition to illegitimate kings through Bo Bo Aung. Given the idea of reincarnation, there is often a very flexible attitude to the association between contemporary action and historical personalities of the past.

First, Teiza was originally linked by the rebel hermit Bandaka to King Kyanzitha, the first unifier of Burma. King Kyanzittha supposedly reincarnated as Maung Teiza. He built a pagoda that hid an arsenal with which he was alleged to have attempted to unsettle King Thibaw. Thibaw could not capture Teiza, as he escaped by arrangement of Bo Bo Aung. Second, in a later life Teiza became the hermit Bandaka himself and attempted to finalise the pagoda by putting an umbrella on it. He engaged in fighting the British.

Bandaka. himself a rebel who proclaimed to be an incarnation of Tei-za, proclaimed the end of British rule in the year 1929 on the strength of a prophesy by Patman U Aung [Bo Bo Aung]. He had a play performed in that year in which Maung Tei-za [Young Brother Fire] was supposed to be a reincarnation of King Kyanzittha. He built a pagoda during King Thibaw's reign, but it was reported to King Thibaw that this was really an arsenal. Thibaw ordered his execution, but Tei-za miraculously escaped with the help of Patman U Aung [Bo Bo Aung]. Hermit Bandaka played on the idea that he was the incarnation of Maung Tei-za and was about to finalise the pagoda by putting an umbrella on it.[49]

Teiza [etzxetzaxeteza\xetzt\] is a Pali loanword tejja meaning fire, ‘glory’ [Bun\:tn\Kiu:] and ‘power’ [Asæm\:]. It is closely associated with the element of fire in alchemy which is known as ‘the hermit's distraction’ and which has a long history of association in the attainment of supernatural power and wealth, and is characterised as a form of samatha.

Yet another association of Teiza is power which permits the conquest and liberation of a country through the flourishing of the sasana. Princess Hlaing Teik Hkaung [l§ic\Tip\eKåc\tc\], wife of Kanaung Min, mentioned in ‘Auspicious Attainment of Victory’ [eAac\mgçla pt\p¥oi:]:

Bun\:eta\ewx etzal¥Meòpac\x cå:eTac\ qaqnax Tæn\:ptv\rax kæ¥n\:òmdIpå x skïwåAluM: x Bk\mqatNun\: x Tk\òbhîa Bun\:qiu>tiuc\ x riiuk\K¥on\: pµ.tc\vM X

Radiating great glory, emitting fire (teiza), the 5000 year Buddhist teachings will flourish on the Southern Island, and throughout the universe, right up into the highest glorious Brahma heavens, the universe will vibrate

So it is hard to deny an underlying association between Aung San's nom de guerre and the role of Bo Bo Aung in overcoming of the unjust king and in anticipating renewed support for the sasana. Furthermore, it is more than likely – given his ambitions in youth and his familiarity with the rhetoric of his political colleagues steeped in loki pañña – that Aung San consciously chose this name as appropriate for victory over the British.

Weikza

Aung San evidently realised the popular perception that increasingly vested in him the role of the magician, wizard and mental cultivator-cum-ruler, when he said in his speech ‘People's struggle day’ [lUTutiuk\pæµen>min\>Kæn\:] on 1 September 1946

At this time I am a person who is very popular with the public. But I am neither a god [VgYad], wizard [kWuamBYa] or magician [Wo:mZlâuYa]. Only a man. Not a heavenly being [QMmZlW^gMm], I can only have the powers [`AtWmd] of a man [Zi].[50]

In ‘I want to implement land reform’ [eòmsMns\kiu ñpòpc\eòpac\:lµK¥c\ty\] given on 5 February 1947, he says ‘I cannot provide you instantaneously, like zawgyi-weikzas, with what you want’ [eza\g¥Iwizêaetæliu Kc\b¥a:tiu>liuK¥c\ta tmuhut\òKc\:lup\mep:Niuc\BU:X].[51]

Bo Bo Aung

Aung San also denigrated use of Bo Bo Aung in politics. In his speech ‘Please change your minds’ [sit\eòpac\:sm\:på] in April 1947, he said to the people of Nat Mauk, his birthplace, a town close to Salei [sel] where there is a pagoda dedicated to Bo Bo Aung, that he would help them as much as he could, but

Although I will help, I can only do my best in my capacity as a human being [lUpug©iol\]. We do not have a relationship with Bo Bo Aung [k¥op\tiu>haBiu:Biu:eAac\nµ.ASk\Aqæy\mRHiBU:].[52]

Having thereby denied a link with Bo Bo Aung, he goes on to gently point out that people should not follow Buddhism wrongly with such beliefs:

It was the Buddha who preached this. Although the Buddha preached with the aim of improvement of sentient beings, if you do not know how to do it, if you cannot follow it, than it is useless. Leave it alone. It will only be right if you want to do it, and you can do it.[53]

He then goes on to say what has been commonly repeated in Burma since 1962. ‘If you want to encourage attainment of nibbana then practise tayà [nibèan\erak\esK¥c\lH¥c\ nibèan\erak\eûkac\:tra:kiuk¥c\.x]. If you want independence, then practise the method by which independence may be attained [læt\lp\er: liuK¥c\lH¥c\ læt\lp\er:rrax reûkac\: k¥c\.Ta:ûkpåX].’[54]

Again, in the same speech under the heading ‘Burma will be free’ he says:

As for Burma, don't ask for astrology [ebdc\], don't ask for Bo Bo Aung, as we will absolutely and certainly attain independence. This is the era of bombs. If people do not keep up with the times, than government officers cannot keep up. If you see it from their point of view, such would be the fault of the people.[55]

In sum, the implication is that belief in Bo Bo Aung and reliance on Bo Bo Aung and astrology are not in accord with Buddhism, but are also not in accord with modern times in which modern weaponry is required. For politicians to make progress people need to change their views and catch up. Furthermore, though the path to nibbana is superior to mistaken belief in Bo Bo Aung, and runs in parallel with politics, the nibbana and the political paths run separately: the first is about the individual and the second about a collective quest.

This does not mean, however, that Buddhism has no role in politics. Later in the same speech, he argues for the inclusion of some of the higher Buddhist practices such as metta in the form of government he advocates. Indeed, he says:

I will govern with loving-kindness and truthfully. If it is for the right cause and for the truth, I dare to lay down my life. [k¥op\kemt†aNHc\. qsßakiueRH>Ta:ôpI:Aup\K¥uop\my\X tky\lui>ekac\:ty\mHn\ty\Tc\li.RHilH¥c\ Aqk\sæn\.rµty\X] [56]

Quoting U Hpo Hlaing ‘If people do not know, they will fear’, and ‘If you are courageous, you may not die – if you die, you need not go to hell’, he says that

If you act boldly with truth and one-pointed mind [samadhi qmaDi] you will succeed. If leaders work without cowering they will succeed. If our army is secure, others are unable to come and fight. [rµrµrc\.rc\. qsßaqmaDINHc\. lup\lH¥Hc\ eAac\mHaBµX kiuy.\tp\luMl¥Hc\ tòKa:k lamtiuk\Niuc\BU:X] [57]

This means that, though Aung San does not accept Bo Bo Aung, he does accept ‘one-pointed mind’ (samadhi) and ‘loving-kindness’ (metta) as part of the political quest. Both of these are part of the ‘samatha’ range which explicitly addresses the mundane sphere (loki), but are superior to magic (loki pañña). However, samatha is also an integral part of vipassana and therefore cannot be separated from the supramundane, for it is preparatory to it.

The practice of metta and attainment of samadhi are part of politics and this is confirmed in another speech, in which he refers to socialism as ‘underpinned by byama-so’ [òbhîsiur\tra:kiu AeòKñpueqa “SiurHy\ls\zc\:”].[58] This characterisation, which to my knowledge has only been made once in his speeches, has been used in the leaflet distributed on the occasion of 35 years commemoration of Martyrs' Day to

indicate that

General Aung San, in establishing Burma, is not a person possessed of self-view who put himself forward merely to gain independence for his country and nationality. He is a socialist who, having taken as his basis byama-so tayà practice, looked after the people. [biul\K¥op\eAac\Sn\:qv\ òmn\maNiuc\cMeta\kiu TUeTac\ratæc\ mimitiuc\:òpv\NHc\. lUm¥oi:læt\lp\er:Atæk\kiuqa eRH.tn\:tc\ôpI: eSac\ræk\Kµ.qv\.At†wådIqma:mhut\epX òbhîsiur\tra:kiu AeòKKMôpI: lUm¥oi:er:tra:kiupåR§òmc\quM:qp\qv\.SiurHy\ls\wådI t¨I:òPs\qv\X]

This publication goes on to characterise Aung San as both ‘following the way in conformity with the dhamma’ [tra:eqanv\:lm\:m¥a:òPc\.] and in ‘striving for independence’, entirely ‘without serving his own interests’ [kuiy\k¥oi:mPk\Bµ].

This suggests that socialism is conceived of less as an ideology than a long-established practice of mental culture rooted in Buddhism, to which the advocates of the Burmese Way of Socialism between 1971–88 in particular would appear to subscribe. Aung San's characterisation of socialism as byama-so tayà was to preface each BSPP document published after 1971.

Indeed, Aung San is on record for having criticised Didok U Ba Cho. About whom he says

Didok U Ba Cho knows how to embarrass people with some of his views (for example by following caballic squares based on letters and numbers, and mantras [¨pma Ac\: Aiuc\ mN†ra: liuk\sa:òKc\:]). Though we youngsters do not agree with him … Because he is a true wunthanu person … we wished him all the best in carrying out his responsibilities for national independence and for the good of the country.[59]

Aung San extended this criticism to include U Ba Cho's desire to constitutionalise Buddhism as the national religion, which Aung San saw as seriously impairing national unity.[60]

I have already mentioned how in 1940, signed as a Thahkin, he wrote an interesting two-part article called ‘Various kinds of politics’ [Niuc\cMer:Am¥oi:m¥oi:].[61] Below follows an abstract of this article.

He starts by reviewing various local ideas about politics, which includes ideas about ‘new fashioned gods, magicians, and wizards’ [Bura:lk\qs\etæx emHa\Sraetæx pTmMSraetæ]. He repeats U Ba Pe's view that ‘politics is such very dirty work’, and U Thein Maung's view that ‘as for politics, it is a gramme of merit, but a pound of hell’. As for U Saw, he merely encourages bad people. Dr Ba Maw supports Stalin and Hitler.

Reflecting on these views, he asserts ‘I believe that politics is science [elakDåt\]’. It is about ‘cause’ [Aeûkac\:] and ‘effect’ [Ak¥oi:], and this is also ‘the basis of the Buddha's teachings’ [Èka:Bura:tra:lv\:òPs\qv\], and is the natural order in everything. This is why the Buddha taught the inhabitants of the world. After analysing Greek etymology for the European-wide concept, he views politics as a social science, and therefore a science. If in the past it concerned government of countries, now politics is concerned with developments world-wide. Politics centers on human beings, who differ from animals in intelligence, and who are able to represent and manipulate letters and numbers.

He finds that the Burmese also trace the origins of political life back to the humans in the era of the padesa tree, when the thamada was elected. Government had to be invented because humans had deteriorated through their mental defilements. Government comes about because people are unable to observe the law [tra:mesac\.Niuc\]. If they could, then there would be no need for government. According to Burmese texts, a primary cause of the inability to observe law is greed [elaB ]. Greed resulted in accumulation of private property and the wrong-viewed [qkïaydi™i] concept of ‘mine’. Because of greed the fire of anger [edåqmI:] arose. Because of these two, ignorance [emah] arose. Then fighting arose. The result was a desire for government. This is different from ‘democracy’, in which, on the contrary, it is government that serves to follow the wishes of the people [òpv\qU>SNãAr]. Democracy may be the foundation, and is the ultimate truth [prmt\tra:] of politics.

So politics is seen to be of benefit, but is based on a serious study of complex causes in which there are many options. It is about coming face to face with a substantive reality [nPU:etæ>dU:etæ>ATv\òdt\NHc\.Nuic\cMer:òPs\qv\]. The politics found in magical verses and mutterings is only to come from books [gåTamN†ya:etæmn\:liu>rtµ.Niuc\cMer:keta.òPc.\saAup\Tµtæc\qaBt\rBU:fX].

He then returns to the earlier question of whether politics is dirty.

In truth, politics belongs to the realm of the mundane, and it is not the means to nibbana. Nevertheless, within the mundane the supramundane can have a presence. It can remain within loki. Only when the stomach is full, can morality be observed.[62]

Therefore, politics is a principal matter. That is why we must not let this issue slip from our grip. It is relevant to everything. Although it is mundane, it should never be characterised as dirty. Because it is said to be for the good of the collective, politics means to demonstrate a noble mind which aims for the people's progress. Among its special features is also the knowledge planning for the progress and well-being of all of us.

[AmHn\mHaNiuc\cMer:mHaelakIer:pc\òPs\fx Niuc\cMer:mHa nibèan\erak\eûkac\: tra:mhut\epx qiu>eqa\lv\: elakImHalv\: elakut\rHiNiuc\fx elakItv\Niuc\fx AUmetac\.mH qIlesac\.Niuc\fx Tiueûkac\.Niuc\cMer:kpc\mpc\mtv\:X].

Once that knowledge has become apparent, we can then seek out our spiritual well-being, can't we?

People want to have improvement, they want reform, they want progress. This much is clear. The main thing is wanting progress. In this, the final goal is loki nibbana.

Therefore, in what way could this be dirty?'[63]

The second part of the article seeks to find a synthesis between Marxism and Buddhism. The centrepoint of this essay is that he does not support capitalist [DånRHc\] politics, and ultimately links the quality of politics to the quality of mind. ‘That is why, please practise politics by disposing yourself to uproot your inferior mind,’ [Tiu>eûkac\.qc\fsit\wy\ kin\:eAac\:eneqalUvM.sit\kiu eP¥ak\òpI: Niuc\cMer:kiu liuk\sa:liuk\ sm\:på:X].

Some have a philosophy of poverty, holding the view that everyone should lead a life of poverty. My view is not this. Yet all politics needs an overall view [wåd]. ‘Too few people think carefully. There is no habit to think: ‘What is the greatest sore of the country? How is the road to loki nibbana, or national independence?’ [tiuc\:òpv\rµ.AnakBalµx tiuc\:òpv\rµ.læt\ralæt\eûkac\:òPs\tµ. elaknibèån\lm\:haBy\luiirHiqlµhu sit\kU:mHamkU:tt\X]

A reminder of the elections

On 13 March, Aung San reminded the people of the forthcoming 9 April elections in his ‘Reminder of the elections’ [eræ:ekak\pæµ qtiep:K¥k\].

Despite his reservations about involvement of astrology and corrupt forms of Buddhism in politics, the intrinsic involvement of these in everyday Burmese language means that Aung San cannot avoid using ‘astrology’ [ebdc\] as part of his ‘prediction’ of the election outcome. He says that ‘tonight I will predict (‘astrologise’) what will happen’ [ken>v k”un\eta\ebdc\ehaTa:NHc\.my\], and he says ‘I predict (‘astrologise’) that political opportunists will …’ [ebdc\ ehaTa:K¥c\ty\].[64]

Also, though he distinguishes politics from the path to nibbana, at the same time he warns that politics must be clean, suggesting that the techniques for attaining nibbana have a relevance for Burmese politics.

Politics is but politics. It is not working towards the attainment of nibbana. However, beginning with ourselves let us not play dirty. Let us not be bad. It is necessary to watch out … … [Niuc\cMer:ha Niuc\cMer:BµXnibèan\erak\eAac\lup\enûkta mhut\BU:X qiu>eqa\ cåtiu>k sôpI: mvs\pt\påNHc\.X mmiuk\ûkpåNHc\.X mm§elak\tµ. enramHalµ Aer:msiuk\NHc\. l¥s\l¥øRÚ§Ta:ûkPIu>liuqv\X][65]

Middle Way

The above sketches demonstrate that Aung San could not avoid coming into contact with perceptions other people had of him, in particular the peasants, as a supernatural sign or omen. The way Aung San attempted to get out of his predicament was to use Buddhist terminology.

In what is thought to be his earliest publication, entitled ‘Burma and Buddhism’ (in the magazine Gandhaloka gNÎelak), Aung San described the ‘Middle Path of Buddhism’ as providing the much needed liberal criticism that permits the middle path between the two extremes, on the one hand, of the total abandonment of past ways of life and, on the other hand, the total acceptance of past ways of life.

During the present period of transition through which Burmans are passing, the most remarkable has been the perceptible results of reformative influences. The Youth of the land are fully alive in the situation and have not been slow in contributing their quota to the reconstruction of a greater Burma. They have realised that things ancient though hallowed by time and sanctioned by usage do not necessarily fit in with modern conditions. Young Burma in approaching its problems with a spirit of criticism, and trying to see things as they are. They have taught themselves to view things from a detached standpoint and find many an old tradition or custom which ought to be abandoned, or which ought to be retained and improved upon, or which ought to remain intact. As in other times and in other climes, there are those who cling to the past and view with alarm at any change and look upon with scorn any alteration in the old order of things: and there are those who are incessantly clamouring for change-quick and sudden. Between these extremes Buddhism paves the middle path.[66]

This idea of the Middle Way has been used by politicians in other Buddhist societies also, such as Ceylon's Prime Minister Bandaranaika, who used it to explain his compromise on the language problem.[67] Smith identifies as ‘the spirit of compromise of opposing beliefs and interests’ which he view as ‘clearly

central to the functioning of democracy’.[68]

However, he used the Middle Way elsewhere in different contexts. In his speech ‘Who are the authorities in Burma [bmaòpv\Aa%arHc\By\qUlµ]’ published on 17 June 1946, Aung San explained the problem the left wing posed to the unity of the AFPFL party as ‘We are looking for the Middle Way’ [mzß¥imnv\:kiurHaenty\].[69]

When the Buddha expounded the Noble Eightfold Path in ‘The turning of the wheel of the doctrine’ (Dhammacakkapavattana), which represents the Buddha's very first teachings after his enlightenment, he concluded his sermon by referring to it as The Middle Way [Majjhima Patipada mzÛimp!ipdånv\:].

The two extremes, monks, are not to be followed. What are the two? To give yourself up to indulgence in sensual pleasure, which is base, common, vulgar, unholy and unprofitable. Avoiding both these extremes, the Tathagata has shown the Middle Path, which is to make for insight and knowledge, to lead to peace, discernment, enlightenment or Nibbana. What, monks, is that Middle Path? It is the very same Noble Eightfold Path.[70]

These two extremes are represented by the two kinds of life the Buddha rejected: on the one hand, his life as a prince in the world of indulgence, and on the other, his life immediately after renunciation from the palace, when he practised often painful ascetic exercises based on self-mortification. They lead into a broadly balanced Buddhist practice of mental culture, in which Right Concentration is supported by Right Effort, which prevents sinking into sensual pleasure, and Right Mindfulness safeguards against falling into extremes of asceticism. Right Concentration is furthermore supported by morality – Right Speech, Right View and Right Livelihood.

Of course, Aung San used this concept metaphorically. Nevertheless, this speech marked a turning point in Aung San's political path. It anticipated the eviction of the Communists from the AFPFL in October 1946, after which Aung San increasingly made use of Buddhist concepts and idioms to express political ideas. Furthermore, despite the Ne Win regime's avowed commitment not to place Buddhism centrally, this concept of The Middle Way became a central point in The Burmese Way to Socialism. In both respects, much as the Buddha rejected his two prior ways, the resultant politics is described as neither leftist nor rightist.

Problems for Burma's freedom

Of his published speeches, the one that most elaborated on religion is ‘Problems for Burma's Freedom’. Given at the inauguration of the AFPFL Convention on 20 January 1946, it is an important speech for Burma's main democratic political party. In this speech, the first the AFPFL gave to the public, Aung San set the parameters of secular politics in a predominantly Buddhist country. He admited the historical importance of Buddhism, but wished to see only certain kinds of Buddhism in politics, and sought to clean politics of certain old ideas. Maung Maung described the ambience of this speech as follows.

In January 1946, the AFPFL convened its first great assembly of peoples on the slopes of the Shwedagon Pagoda. People came from all over the country and from all walks of life. It was a great upsurge. The general mood was a peculiar and unique amalgam of war-weariness and the great relief that was felt at war's end, nationalism and the pride of having emerged from the war as an ‘independent’ nation which was much battered and bruised but still whole and functioning, and hero-worship for Aung San and the joy and relief felt in having found in him a man to whom the future could be entrusted. Aung San was the hero of the hour, the Bogyoke – the Supremo. People needed someone whom they could trust without reservation, and blindly follow, and Aung San was that someone. He had led the Burma Independence Army, he had led the resistance. He was without selfishness; he was as poor as the people themselves, having acquired nothing during the war – when people in his position were gathering fortunes – except a loving family, and a solid reputation with the people.

It was a situation of a kind that rises but rarely in a country's history, when a people who are looking for a hero and a man who is looking for his mission meet, and there is happy union and the two merge into one …[71]

The English title is very different from the original Burmese title ‘Speech on the Middle Shwedagon Platform’ [Aly\psßyM vIlaKM min\>K.æn\:]. Though this would make little sense to an international readership, to the Burmese it conveys a rich historical and nationalist emotion. The fact that the speech was given at the Shwedagon was extremely important to the ambience. This is so for several reasons.

First, it was becoming apparent towards the end of the Japanese occupation that the allied bombing of Rangoon could become serious if the Japanese dug themselves in and refused to retreat. For this reason, from October 1944 delegations mostly led by U Tun Aung and U Thein Maung regularly visited Japanese headquarters requesting them to spare Rangoon, but in particular the Shwedagon Pagoda. The Japanese

responded that nothing, not even the Shwedagon Pagoda, was ‘indispensable’ in the war effort. However, as the war progressed, Japan desperately needed positive statements from the front, and this presented adipati Ba Maw and U Tun Aung with the opportunity to go to Tokyo to make a case for saving Rangoon and the Shwedagon. This visit, together with subsequent visits to headquarters, finally elicited a response. The Japanese left Rangoon on 23 April 1945 and the Shwedagon was saved from war damage.[72]

Second, to Aung San's intention the Shwedagon was at that point in time related to the quest for freedom. This is evident in the first part of his speech, in which he points out the significance of the Shwedagon for the Burmese nation. He stated that to gather in a meeting is the appropriate way for citizens of the world, and remarked on the significance that such a meeting should take place at the Shwedagon. The Shwedagon ‘was built by us with the noblest of desires’. The spires of the Shwedagon ‘point at the highest of achievements, namely unconditioned nibbana’ [ATæõ\ATip\òPs\eqa nibèan\ AqKçtqiu>vWn\òpeta\mUraòPs\qv\>SI:mI:tn\eSac\ýkI:]. It was here that rebellions and revolutions [Aer:eta\puM] took place. And this pagoda, and its surrounding region, have entered the records of Burmese history. It is also where the ‘patriots’ [m¥oi:K¥s\pug©iol\] congregated who fostered ‘martyr mentality’ [Aazanv\sit\]. Here the history of Burma began. Sacred relics were interred no less than 2,500 years ago. National independence was imminent but not achieved as yet.

By changing the English title, this occasion has lost its Buddhist connotations ambience, so that the essential unity Aung San understood to exist in Burmese history between Buddhism and politics is not conveyed. Aung San refers back to the struggle of the 1920s, the need for freedom, the long-term nature of the struggle, the role of heroes in history, the danger of false gods and false prophets, and the importance of collective action, so that after national independence [læt\lp\m§]. He emphasises that freedom in a real and absolute sense [læt\lp\er:Ass\] may finally be attained (i.e. nibbana), but also says that it is important to move with the spirit of the times in a changing world (i.e. don't just aim for Buddhist freedom which should also be accompanied with pragmatic decisions).

Aung San then asks

Some of us have been [d]oing still, consciously or unconsciously, the same old way of ‘dirty’ politics. But is politics really ‘dirty’? Certainly not. It is not politics which is dirty but, rather, the persons who choose to dirty it are dirty. And what is politics? Is it something too high above us to which we can just look up in respectful awe and from which we refrain, because we are just mortal clay in His hands and cannot do it? [k”Nup\\tiu>qv\ qamn\puTuz¨\m¥a:òPs\eqaeûkac\. Niuc\cMer:kiumlup\qc\.x Niuc\cMer:qv\ Alæn\òmc\.òmt\qv\. Atæk\k”Nu\p\tiu>NHc\. mtn\mrax el:òmt\sæa em¥Ha\ R§rn\qalH¥c\RHiqv\hUj Siurmv\elaX] Is it something charlatans used in preying upon the credulous imagination of some of our people, the kind of thing capable of being set aright only by fanciful tales and legends? Is it a dangerous ground which we must be wary to tread and might as well avoid, if we possibly could? Is it a case of ‘race, religion and language’ [Am¥oi:-Baqa-qaqnaer:] forever, as we were once wont to say? What is it, then, really?

With this question Aung San is preparing to locate politics in an ethical system which depends on personal comportment and spiritual attributes. It resembles the Dalai Lama's view of politics, who said:

Sometimes we look down on politics, criticizing it as dirty. However, if you look at it properly, politics in itself is not wrong. It is an instrument to serve human society. With good motivation – sincerity and honesty – politics becomes an instrument in the service of society. But when motivated by selfishness, with hatred, anger, or jealousy, it becomes dirty.[73]

The translation ‘mortal clay in His hands’ in this passage implies the concept of an absent creator. Furthermore, the reference ‘something too high above us’ is really a much too liberal translation of the concept of puTuzên\, puthujjano, which he here uses for ‘us’, and which means ‘an ordinary person who is not a noble one (ariya), i.e. a person unaccomplished in mental culture’. In other words, in this passage Aung San does not ask whether politics is too high for us, but rather repeats his earlier assertion that ‘the persons who choose to dirty it [politics] are dirty’, and that our own spiritual attainments in mental culture are lacking which causes otherwise noble political causes to be corrupted.

He then proceeds to point out that politics is neither low nor high, but concerns itself with the ‘mundane world (loki) of human beings’ [lUelak] (as opposed to the supramundane realm of elakut†ra). For politics to be noble, however, this mundane world must exclude the lower forms of selfish mundane skills such as magic, alchemy and astrology.

What is it, then, really? The fact is that politics is neither high nor low [òmc\.òmt\læn\:qv\lv\:mhut\x nim\.k¥læn\:qv\lv\:mhut\], neither magic nor astrology [m¥k\lHv\.ebdc\lv\:mhut\] nor alchemy [Ag©irp\lv\:mhut\]. Nor is it simply a dangerous ground to tread upon. It is not a question of bigoted or parochial nationalism either. It must always approximate the truth of marching events. In short, after all is said and done, politics means your everyday life [k”N\up\tiu>en>s¨\NHc\.AmYlU>elaktæc\

etæ>þkMenûkreqakisßpc\òPs\epqv\X]. It is You, in fact [Niuc\cMer:Siuqv\mHalU>kisßpc\òPs\epqv\]; for you are a political animal as Aristotle long ago declared. It is how you eat, sleep, work and live, with which politics is concerned. You may not think about politics. But politics thinks about you. You may shun politics, but politics clings to you always in your home, in your office, in your factories. There, everyday you are doing politics, grappling with it, struggling with it … You have to live and get certain things that are yours for your living, and this is your politics. This is your everyday life; and as your everyday life changes, so changes your politics.

Silverstein dismissed Aung San's views of politics as ‘your everyday life’ as ‘neither systematic nor original’.[74] However, in his reading he misses the Burmese value system implied in the Burmese version of this passage, and with it, its inspiration to contemporary opposition politicians today. The translation of the speech changes certain things. In particular it adds ‘you are a political animal as Aristotle long ago declared’, which is not to be found in the Burmese.

More important from our point of view, however, is that it glosses over the fundamental distinction in Burmese thought between the plane of human existence and the other planes of existence, and on the other hand, between the entire mundane world, including all planes of existence and the transcendental world beyond the mundane. In translating both ‘human world’ [lU>elak] and ‘human affairs’ [lUkisß] as ‘your [everyday life]’ it collapses such important distinctions clearly implied in the Burmese original. And yet, not to understand these distinctions makes it almost impossible to comprehend Aung San's other views about politics, such as the elements he dismisses from politics like alchemy, astrology and religion, as well as the elements he admires in politics such as samadhi, metta, and byama-so tayà. All of these ideas refer to and are dependent on these underlying ideas of politics as pertaining to the human plane of existence, and to the realm of the mundane world. His definition of politics as samsara must also be understood in relation to this.

Perhaps the most important point is that vipassana, the practice that gives the contemporary politicians the courage to face imprisonment, addresses the very realms which Aung San defines as ‘politics’. Not only does its practice lead to a change in the habits of everyday life, but it also emancipates from the human plane and the mundane world of existence. This explains how even from Aung San's point of view, who was not prone to religious theorizing, the practice of vipassana contemplation can be construed, if not as a political act in itself, then at least as having extremely important political consequences.

He then says that politics is about improving life and about freedom [læt\lp\er:], and that it is not beyond understanding. This is followed by an important paragraph in which he proceeds to consider the view some have that ‘politics is religion [Baqatra:]’.

It is not above understanding. Alas! this is not to be, for some wiseacres have ordained. They say politics is dirty. They say politics is religion [Baqatra:]. They say these all in contradiction with each other in one and the same breath.

Politics is religion [Baqatra:]! Is it? Of course not. But this is the trump card of dirty politicians. In this way, they hope to confuse and befog the public mind, and they hope to slur over and cloud real issues. Theirs is the way of opportunism, not politics. Religion is a matter of individual conscience [kiu:kæy\qv\.Baqaer:mHa lUAqI:qI:tiu>f qk\wc\ yuMûkv\m§òPs\f] while politics is a social science [lUAqI:qI:tiu>f epåc\:qc\:Sk\SMm§qipéMAtt\]. Of course, as a social science, politics must see that the individual also has his rights, including the right to freedom of religious worship [Baqakui:kæy\Niuc\m§]. Here we must draw the line definitely between politics and religion, because the two are not one and the same thing. If we mix religion with politics, this is against the spirit of religion itself, for religion takes care of our hereafter and usually has not to do with mundane affairs which are the sphere of politics [Baqaer:NHc\. Niuc\cMer:kiuerasp\påmU Baqaer:f qeBatra:kiu Sn\>k¥c\raerak\epfX Aeûkac\:mUka:x Baqaer:qv\ enac\tmlæn\Bwm¥a:kiu (wå) elakut†rakiu eRH>RHUqv\òPs\eqaeûkac\. elakAer:NHc\. m¥a:sæamqk\Siuc\eK¥X Niuc\cMer:mHamUka: elakIer:qa òPs\epfX]. Politics is frankly a secular science, that is it [Niuc\cMer:mHamUka: elakIer:raqa òPs\qepfX].

In the Burmese original there is no reference to ‘individual conscience’, but the ‘faiths of various people’. This is important, for the concept of collective faith is an important element in the term chosen for religion (batha yeì) here. Nevertheless, politics here is equated with the mundane world (loki), whereas religion ‘usually’ deals with that which transcends the world (lokuttara). This is where the two part company.

Then Aung San says that many progressive religious values, including ‘love (metta), truth and righteous living’ are social values beneficial to society and politics. But many backward religious values also hinder progress and interfere with political development. He refers in particular to the great progress that Burma made when Anawratha performed ‘historical surgery’ by eliminating the Ari. The Ari are concerned with priestcraft that corrupts religion, as opposed to the Sangha who are responsible for learning and educating.

Aung San's reference to religion as dealing with the ‘hereafter’ is incomplete, of course, if it is to include mental culture. For example, vipassana is very much about awareness of the present moment and a change in the here and now for the individual. More indirectly, it is conceived as having great implications for the

collective. Either Aung San was carried away here in his attempt to distinguish religion as supramundane from secular politics, or he excluded this particular quest from his comparison.

It is my belief that to understand Aung San's politics we must appreciate that he actually handled two concepts of Buddhism, one which lay within the realm of ‘religion’, and the other, the highest form, which was ‘beyond religion’.This, I will now attempt to demonstrate.

Throughout the speech, he uses two different Burmese concepts for the English concept ‘religion’. He mostly uses batha-yeì [Baqaer:], the generic concept for all religions irrespective of any judgment as to their truth or values. More rarely he uses thathana-yeì [qaqnaer:], the concept for the Buddha's teachings, and its correct continuation (through ordination procedures), correct dissemination and its correct practice. Though these evoke fundamentally different meanings and are used in fundamentally different contexts, these have both been misleadingly translated into English as ‘religion’.

As I have pointed out elsewhere,[75] for Buddhism these two concepts have substantially different meanings. The first is related to cultural points of view and, when used to characterise Buddhism, corresponds roughly to what has been labeled ‘Buddhendom’ [budÎBaqa] that broad culturally shared system of beliefs which is often in conflict with the original pure form of Buddhism and which is comparable in truth value to other religions. The second is ‘Buddhism’ [budÎqaqna], the Buddha's teachings as correctly implemented practically in one's own personal life.

So Aung San does not, as Silverstein and other observers seem to think, ban all forms of religion from politics. Though he clearly argued against the involvement of Buddhendom in politics, this does not apply to the initial purificationary stages in Buddhism which, on the contrary, he refers to as ‘the highest politics’.

Indeed, Aung San proceeds to say that Buddhism should be cleansed of its more defiling Buddhendom elements, and only its higher values are valuable to politics.

Speaking of Buddhism [Buddhendom] [budÎBaqa] particularly, which is the religion professed by the greatest bulk of our people, I can say without prejudice to other religions [AòKa:Baqatra:] that it is more than a religion itself and has several indications of its becoming possibly the greatest philosophy [light of Buddhendom-Buddhism] [budÎBaqa qaqnaerac\] in the world, if we can help to remove the trash and travesties which antiquity must have doubtless imposed on this great religion.

I wish therefore to address a special appeal to the Buddhist priesthood and say to them: Reverend Sanghas! You are the inheritors of a great religion [holy Buddhism budÎqaqnaeta\] in the world. Purify it and broadcast it [holy Buddhism qaqnaeta\] to all the world so that all mankind might be able to listen to its timeless message of Love and Brotherhood [qmsit† NHc\.vIrc\:As\kiu- emac\rc\:NHs\mk.µqiu>enNiuc\ûkpålim.\mv\] till eternity. Reverend Sanghas! We will worship you forever as Promoters of Love and Brotherhood. We are prepared to listen to your exhortation for Love and Brotherhood [emt†atra:qmsit†qeBaTa:eqa] not only amongst our own people, but also amongst the peoples of this wide world. And we will support you in this respect as best we could, for this is what the world and our country need very badly at this moment. Reverend Sanghas! You have a tremendous role to play in world history, and if you succeed, you will be revered by the entire mankind for ages to come. This is one of your high functions ordained by your religion; and this is the highest politics which you can do for your country and people [tpv\.eta\tiu> Niuc\cMNHc\.lUm¥io:Atæk\ Aòmc\.òmt\SuM:eqa Niuc\cMer:kiu eSac\ ræk\ralv\:erak\påqv\]. Go amongst our people, preach the doctrine of unity [vIvæt\er:tra:] and love [emt†atra:]; carry the message of higher freedom [òmc\.òmt\eqalæt\lp\er: tra:] to every nook and corner of the country, freedom to religious worship [Baqatra:kiu:kæy\Niuc\m§], freedom to preach and spread the Dharma anywhere and anytime, freedom from fear [eûkak\Ræ>Msiu:rim\pUpn\òKc\:mHkc\:læt\m§], ignorance, superstition, etc., teach our people to rely upon themselves and re-construct themselves materially spiritually and otherwise. You have these and many more noble tasks before you [ArHc\qUòmt\tiu>qv\qMu:lU>Tæõ\Ta: òmt\sæaBura:x ûqwåd ep:eta\mUKµ.qv\.Atiuc\: Apémaednx qméaedT mem.mel¥a.Bµ As¨\Tawr Aa:Tut\ ûkBiu>tpv.\eta\tiu> bmalUm¥oi:luM:kiu SiuSuM:meta\mUûkpåBura:X Èqiu>eqa mimikuiy\kiu mimiqalH¥c\ Aa:kiu:m§òPc\. tpv\.eta\tiu>f lUm¥io:qv\ elakut\ elakI NHs\lIeqa Ak¥oi:TU:m¥a:kiu KMsa:Niuc\eAac\eSac\ræk\Niuc\ûkeplim\.mv\X]. Will you or will you not rise equal to your tasks? The answer lies doubtless with you.[76]

Unless we discriminate between ‘Buddhism’ and ‘Buddhendom’ this passage would not be comprehensible. He speaks of Buddhism by monks as ‘the highest politics’, whereas earlier he had said that ‘if we mix religion with politics, this is against the spirit of religion itself, for religion takes care of our hereafter and usually has not to do with mundane affairs which are the sphere of politics’. We can only understand Aung San if we comprehend that he has moved between two very different senses of religion, namely from Buddhist ‘religion’ (Buddhendom budÎBaqa) in the mundane world, a cultural kind of Buddhism full of accretions, such as professed by the Ari but thankfully purged by Anawratha, to the more pristine Buddhism (Buddhism budÎqaqna) that Anawratha ended up with which focuses on practice and learning according to teachings of the Buddha.

In the English version of Aung San's speech, furthermore, of which the paragraph above is part, is translated as ‘spiritual or otherwise’, but omits the important Burmese reference to the monks working for the good of the mundane (loki) and supra-mundane (lokuttara) benefit of the Burmese people.

Having said that Buddhism (as opposed to Buddhendom) plays a role in encouraging the highest political values, he nevertheless proceeds to equate politics, in its repetition and mundane endlessness, with samsara. ‘As a matter of fact, politics knows no end. It is Samsara in operation before our eyes, the Samsara of cause and effect, of past and present, of present and future which goes round and round and never ends … [k”N\up\tiu>qMqraÒlv\enrepj põisßqmupéåd\tra:eta\òmt\Atiuc\: Aeûkac\:NHc\. Ak¥oi:x Atit\NHc\. psßopén\x psßopén\NHc\. Anagt\Sk\sp\j]’.

The translation ‘the laws of cause and effect’ misses the reference to the original Burmese as paticcasamuppada, which is the Buddha's realisation at enlightenment of the laws of all conditional relations responsible for continuity in the cycle of rebirths, or samsara. This would indicate that the Buddha through his teachings and practice, had encompassed politics within his teachings, for he expounded the laws whereby it operates. These are still available in the practices the Buddha transmitted, and through mental culture in correct ‘Buddhism’ [qaqnaer:] (as opposed to that accretion of cultural activities in the ‘religion’ called ‘Buddhendom’ [budÎBaqa]).

This concept of politics as samsara builds on the view expressed in the history of Burma, namely that writing a history is a form of meditation because of the destruction of generations of kings. Politics, as an activity grappling with loki, is subject to the laws of impermanence. If Aung San makes his point about samsara to contemplate the impermanence of the British, Ne Win, seeking to follow in Aung San's footsteps, makes a similar point to contemplate the impermanence of the U Nu regime.[77] Furthermore, it is during the highs that samsara is used to explain impending victory, though magic (yadaya) is used to instrumentally avert the laws of samsara.

He then draws attention to fascism as ‘the worst product of capitalism the world has ever seen’, which he blames on its avarice [wiqmelaB visamalobha], its unrighteousness [ADmî adhamma], and its lack of support for beings ready to receive the Buddha's teachings (or beings eligible for nibbana) [eweny¥ veneyya], after which he characterises capitalism as follows:

Capitalism, being based on anarchic production for profit and resultant inequalities in distribution of wealth, is no longer able to solve the problems that it itself sets. Instead [ÈADmîwådeûkac\.] it has called forth irreconcilable antagonism between man and man, race and race, nation and nation, which is greatly intensified and extended in depth and range, by the very culture that it breeds (the culture of profit motive, greed and hate) [emt†aDat\mkU:Niuc\Bµ elaBx edåqx emahtra:tiu>kiuqa pæa:m¥a:j laKµ.ûkelqv\] …

Capitalism here is quite clearly indicated as adhamma vada, which means against the dhamma, i.e. against the Buddha's